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I link agency theory and an institutional theory perspective to predict the strategic 
choices firms make and the performance consequences of these choices during a 
period of institutional transition.  The two strategic choices I investigate are the 
choice to collaborate with foreign firms and the choice to exit the market.   
I examine the strategic choices and the performance consequences of strategic 
choices in two essays.  In the first essay, I argue that the ownership concentration of 
domestic private, domestic institutional, foreign private and foreign institutional 
owners, institutional transition, and business group affiliation, each affects a firm’s 
choice to collaborate with foreign firms or to exit the market.  In the second essay, I 
argue that strategic choices such as collaboration with foreign firms or exiting the 
market, in the case of business group affiliated firms, have a positive impact on a 
firm’s performance.  However, the relationship between these two strategic choices 
and a firm’s performance is contingent on the governance structure of the firm. 
I test the theoretical arguments presented in this dissertation on a longitudinal 
sample of 9,926 Indian firms over a 17 year period from 1989 to 2005.  The time 
period from 1991 onwards is a period during which there have been gradual and 
significant developments in various institutional dimensions related to product 
markets, labor markets and capital markets in India.  This makes India an ideal 
setting for studying the process of strategic adaptation during institutional transition. 
The empirical analyses largely support my arguments.  With respect to the 
effect of ownership structure on a firm’s strategic choices, I found that different types 
of owners influenced a firm’s choice to collaborate with foreign firms or to exit the 
market, differentially.  Institutional transition had a non-linear impact on the choice 
to collaborate and the choice to exit.  During the initial years of institutional 
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transition, there was a high incidence of exit as well as collaborative activities; 
however, as the institutional transition progressed, the exit and collaboration choices 
were implemented less frequently.  Finally, I found group affiliated firms to be more 
likely to choose the “exit” and the “collaborate” options, as compared to unaffiliated 
firms.   
Regarding the performance consequences of strategic choices, I found that a 
firm’s choice to collaborate and to exit had a positive impact on a firm’s performance.  
The positive relationship between foreign collaborations and a firm’s performance 
was, however, contingent on a firm’s ownership structure and its business group 
affiliation.  Likewise, the positive relationship between the number of exits in a 
business group and a firm’s performance was contingent on the ownership structure of 
the non-exiting firms of the business group.  
The theoretical arguments and the findings I present in this dissertation 
provide new avenues of research on strategic adaptation and change, especially in the 
dynamic and evolving institutional environments we have been witnessing in many 
emerging economies in the early 2000s. 
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Strategy makers today face a world with diverse and changing institutions of 
governance. This situation raises fundamental questions for our field, for it is these 
institutions that determine who sets the goals for the company, who exercises control 
over strategic decisions, and who bears the consequences. 
- SMS 2006 Conference Invitation 
 
An important question for strategy research is, “How do firms respond to fundamental 
changes in their institutional environments and what are the performance 
consequences of a firm’s strategic responses?”   
Even though strategic management scholars recognize that organizations and 
their environments change over time (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Peng, 
2003), much of the extant literature fails to incorporate the dynamic aspects of 
changes in strategy and environment in theoretical and empirical modeling 
(Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997; Zajac et al., 2000).  The studies that do look at the 
issue of strategic adaptation focus on industry specific changes in certain aspects of 
the environment, such as regulatory changes (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Smith & 
Grimm, 1987; Zajac & Shortell, 1989) but the overall institutional environment in 
such studies remains quite stable (Peng, 2003).   
Industry specific changes studied in a cross-section of time might be 
subordinate to the multi-faceted and broad changes that can occur in national 
institutional environments.  This issue is particularly important in the case of 
emerging economies.  In the early 2000s, many economies in the world went 
through fundamental changes in their institutions (Newman, 2000).  This transition 
related to changes in such institutions as capital markets, product markets, labor 
markets, the trade regime, and soft infrastructure such as monitoring mechanisms, 
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legal systems, property rights, education systems and various forms of market 
intermediaries (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Peng, 2003).  The changes have been so 
pervasive that scholars identify these economies as transition economies (Hoskisson 
et al., 2000; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).   
Within a transition or emerging economy, an investigation focusing on a 
single aspect of environmental change may not be able to capture the full extent of the 
dynamics affecting the strategic adaptation of a firm.  For example, it is difficult to 
gauge the effect of financial market liberalization, unless one takes into account the 
changes in collateral and contract laws, and the monitoring mechanisms used to help 
enforce these laws.  Likewise, the effect of changes in the property rights cannot be 
gauged, unless one takes into account the changes in the legal system and the law 
enforcement mechanism.  To understand the strategic reaction of firms to broad 
environmental change, we need to structure the investigation so that it takes into 
account the overall changes in the institutional environment and the firm level 
attributes that are affected by such changes. 
This dissertation addresses these issues of strategic adaptation to transitions in 
institutional environments by using an integration of agency theory and an 
institutional perspective.  I use agency theory because the dominant shareholders in a 
firm affect the strategic choices made by firms (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991). The 
importance of owners in affecting strategic choices is particularly notable in the case 
of emerging economies, as institutional changes affect firm performance by shaping 
the incentives of different stakeholders and influencing agency costs (Park, Li, & Tse, 
2006).  Scholars have emphasized the importance of internal governance structure in 
affecting firms’ strategic choices and performance in emerging economies 
(Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Ramamurti, 2000) 
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I augment agency theory with an institutional perspective based on the 
consideration that the internal governance structure of a firm is often determined by 
the quality of the external governance structure and the prevailing institutions 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  In the absence of efficient external governance structures, 
firms often arrange themselves as business groups through pyramidal ownership 
structures (Almedia & Wolfenzon, 2004; Khanna, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). An institutional perspective helps to examine the influence 
of the external governance structure, which manifests itself in the form of business 
group affiliation in weak institutional environments, and affects the incentives and 
motivations of different actors (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; Ramamurti, 2000).  Thus, 
I contend that integrating agency theory with an institutional perspective provides us 
with a framework that is effective in analyzing the influence of a firm’s internal 
governance structure as well as its external governance structure on its strategic 
choices. 
The strategic choices I investigate are (1) the choice to exit a market, and (2) 
the choice to collaborate with foreign firms.  The first part of the dissertation 
examines how domestic and foreign ownership stakes, business group affiliation and 
the process of institutional transition affect the likelihood of a firm to either exit a 
market or to collaborate with foreign firms.  The second part of my dissertation 
builds on the first part to investigate the performance implications of these two 
strategic choices that a firm can make.  In addition to assessing the direct effect of 
these two strategic choices on firm performance, I propose contingency factors based 
on ownership concentration and group affiliation, which enhance or diminish the 
influence of these two strategic choices on a firm’s performance.  
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OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation aims to build theory and provide evidence about the impact of the 
internal and external governance structures of a firm on its strategy and performance 
during a period of institutional transition.  Empirically, the dissertation examines 
how ownership structure and ownership identity, institutional transition and business 
group affiliation affect a firm’s choice to collaborate with foreign firms or to exit a 
market, and what are the performance consequences of these strategic choices.  This 
thesis is situated in the Indian context during the period from 1991-2005, which is a 
time of significant institutional transition.  Figure 1.1 presents the overall framework 
of this dissertation.  Below, I delineate the research questions I investigate in this 
dissertation. 



























o Collaborate with MNCs 
 5
Essay 1: Strategic Adaptation during Institutional Transition 
How firms adapt their strategies to a changing external environment is a question of 
fundamental interest amongst strategic management scholars.  During a period of 
institutional transition, firms are exposed to multiple opportunities and threats (Peng, 
2003).  Some firms perceive tremendous opportunities and take strategic actions to 
make use of the new opportunities by, for example, collaborating with other firms 
(Lavie & Fiegenbaum, 2000) or increasing their levels of diversification (Guthrie, 
1997) and investment (Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992).  At the same time, other firms 
may find the emerging environment as threatening, and view it as difficult to survive 
in the competitive environment (Dawar & Frost, 1999; Kosova, 2004), and prefer to 
exit the market.    
An interesting feature of institutional transition, in terms of its relationship to 
the strategic change literature comes from the opportunity to view strategic change 
over an extended period of time.  The extant literature on strategic adaptation looks 
at adaptation as a discrete event (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997), in which an 
organization changes from one state to another (Van de Van & Poole, 1995), without 
giving adequate attention to the strategic choices that result in the adaptation over 
time.  Strategic adaptation is a continuous process (Zajac et al., 2000) making it 
problematic to theoretically conceptualize adaptation as a discrete static event.  
Notably, the strategic choices I investigate in this thesis, such as forming 
collaborations or exiting the market (in case of business groups) are dynamic in nature 
as organizations can make these choices repeatedly as a strategic response to the 
changes in the external environment.  A focus on strategic choices can enhance our 
understanding of how organizations develop congruence between the external 
environment and their internal structures, in a dynamic manner. 
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I investigate two strategic choices – the choice to collaborate and the choice to 
exit.  The choice to collaborate with foreign firms or to exit the market are important 
strategic decisions for emerging economy firms which have been founded in a 
protected and weak institutional environment (Peng, 2003).  As these choices are 
made by the dominant actors in organizations, I investigate the impact of ownership 
structure and identity and business group affiliation in influencing the two strategic 
choices over time.  I use agency theory and institutional theory perspectives to set 
the theoretical framework for examining the strategic choices that firms make during 
a time of institutional transition in an emerging economy. 
Essay 2: Strategic Adaptation and Firm Performance  
Firms that develop congruence with the external environment are expected to 
experience superior performance (Andrews, 1971; Duncan, 1972).  As with Essay 1, 
the extant literature analyzing the impact of strategic adaptation on firm performance 
generally conceptualizes adaptation as a static event.  Moreover, these studies 
conceptualize the performance consequences of strategic adaptation in an 
environment which is largely static (Peng, 2003), but for a few industry specific 
changes in certain regulative aspects.  When change is the only constant aspect in an 
environment, any congruence developed with the environment becomes obsolete as 
soon as a firm takes a static view on adaptation (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Peng, 
2003; Zajac et al., 2000).  This necessitates that we shift the focus from a static 
conceptualization of strategic adaptation to the strategic choices firms make in a 
dynamic manner, in a study of the performance consequences of strategic adaptation.   
In the case of emerging economies undergoing institutional transition, a 
domestic firm’s choice to collaborate with foreign firms, or their choice to exit a 
business, can have profound performance consequences.  Foreign firms can help 
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domestic firms by providing superior technological or managerial resources along 
with the expertise to more effectively tackle the competitive challenge of local 
competitors.  Such collaborations would also mean that the domestic firms do not 
have to compete against the technologically advanced foreign firms in the domestic 
markets.  Likewise, the decision to exit the market is an adaptation process (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1989).  By selectively exiting a business, an organization releases scarce 
resources for more productive utilization in other parts of the organization.   
The benefits of collaborations and exit would however, not accrue in similar 
ways to all firms.  The benefits a firm can derive from foreign collaborations depend 
on the motivation and ability of different owners to gain from a foreign collaboration 
(Buckley, Clegg, & Wang, 2002; Yin & Zajac, 2004).  Likewise, all firms affiliated 
to a business group may not be able to derive similar benefits from the selective 
elimination of other firms in the group.  The ownership structure of a firm can play 
an important role in shaping the outcomes of the exit decisions (Bergh, 1995; 
Donaldson, 1990; Hoskission, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White, 2005).  Accordingly, in 
this essay I propose a contingency perspective, utilizing an agency theory and an 
institutional perspective, to identify the role played by ownership structure and 
business group affiliation in influencing the relationship between the strategic choices 
– collaborate or exit – and firm performance.   
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
I test the theoretical framework developed in my essays on domestic firms 
situated in India.  There are several reasons why I have selected an Indian context for 
the empirical validation of my arguments.  First, the focus on institutional transition 
in this dissertation necessitates that the investigation be made in a country 
environment that has undergone substantial institutional transition in recent years.  
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Scott (1995: 148) argued that to understand how organizations behave during a period 
of fundamental institutional transition, scholars should be “examining and 
comprehending organizations operating in other places”.  Emerging economies 
present a natural laboratory for studying strategic adaptation during institutional 
transition.  As Peng (2003: 277) points out, “the scale and scope of these 
(institutional) transitions (in emerging economies) are unprecedented in recent 
history”.  India is a country that has undergone fundamental institutional transitions 
in recent years and where organizations are trying to cope-up with the changing 
institutional environment (Kripalani, 2004). 
Second, I want to focus on a single country in my analyses, as the nature of 
institutions and the process of institutional transition are likely to vary considerably 
from country to country.  For example, a notable feature of the business environment 
in China is the active presence and direct participation of the central, provincial or 
local governments (Park et al., 2006; Qian, 2000a).  On the other hand, in the case of 
India, the direct participation of the national government in running private businesses 
has become substantially reduced in the post 1991 period.  By focusing on a single 
country, I can control for these country specific variations, which would, otherwise, 
not be possible to control. 
Third, the regional variation in the soft institutional infrastructure is minimal 
in the case of India.  India is a loose republic and states do not have much autonomy 
in implementing their own rules and regulations because of the complex multiparty 
political system (Khilnani, 1997).  Uniformity in the institutional infrastructure 
across the nation alleviates the concerns arising due to the regional variations 
observed in some other economies such as China. 
Fourth, the economic importance of India has greatly increased in recent years, 
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partially as a result of the institutional transitions that have taken place in India.  A 
focus on strategic adaptation of Indian firms is likely to be interesting for the 
academicians and practioners with a focus on India, and the scholars interested in 
understanding the process and impact of such strategic adaptation in other contexts.  
Fifth, the data requirements for testing the arguments in this thesis require that 
the data be available for the entire period of institutional transition.  Institutional 
transition in India started in 1991, whereas in other emerging economies, it started 
much earlier.  For example, in China, institutional transition started in 1978 (Qian, 
2000b), while in Chile it started in 1973 (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b).  It is often 
difficult to obtain reliable firm-level information for emerging economy firms for the 
pre-1990 period.  In the case of India, I have been able to obtain information on the 
key variables for the entire population of organizations from 1991 to 2005, making 
India a suitable empirical setting. 
Last, in recent years, firms from advanced economies have shown a great deal 
of interest in the Indian market and Indian firms.  Indian firms have also become 
quite active in the global market place as is evident by the 12 billion USD acquisition 
of European steel maker Corus by the Tata group of India in 2007 (Tata Group, 2007).  
It is not only interesting, but also important for scholars and practioners with interest 
in advanced economy firms to understand how the firms from emerging economies 
such as India are becoming increasingly competitive in global markets. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Theoretical Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the conceptual literature in several ways.  For the 
strategic adaptation and change literature, this dissertation contributes by looking at 
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the underlying dimensions of strategic adaptation.  The strategic choices I investigate 
result in a change in the overall strategic stance of a firm over time.  A focus on 
strategic choices helps me take a continuous view on strategic adaptation (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997), rather than looking at strategic adaptation as a static event.  A 
shift from a static perspective following the punctuated equilibrium model, to a 
dynamic perspective on strategic adaptation is particularly important in understanding 
strategic adaptation and change in environments that are continuously evolving (Peng, 
2003; Scott, 1995).   
In addition, I incorporate the role of organizational actors (owners) in a study 
of strategic choices, which helps integrate the rational, learning and cognitive 
perspectives on strategic adaptation (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997).  The 
integrative approach I adopt helps in examining the alignment of a firm’s strategy 
with the internal structures of a firm as well as with the external environment.  This 
is a significant advancement over the existing studies, many of which either study the 
alignment between a firm’s strategy and its internal structures (e.g., Yin & Zajac, 
2004), or between a firm’s strategy and its external environment (e.g., Goodstein, 
Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). 
This dissertation also contributes to recent developments in agency theory and 
institutional perspectives.  Recently scholars have argued that in addition to a 
principal-agent problem, many emerging economy firms experience a unique 
principal-principal problem (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Dharwadkar et al., 
2000; Lemmon & Lins, 2003).  I advance this literature by elaborating on how 
different types of agency problems affect the strategic adaptation of emerging 
economy firms.  With respect to the institutional perspective, the dynamic 
perspective on strategic adaptation I adopt in this dissertation, advances our 
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understanding of the incentives the external environment offers to, and the constraints 
it imposes on, firms which are attempting to adapt to a changing external environment 
during different phases of institutional transition and development   
Finally, for the business group literature, this dissertation helps to disentangle 
the implications of group affiliation for firms’ strategic choices and performance 
during different phases of institutional development.  The strategic choices to 
collaborate and exit the market are widely recommended by consultants such as 
McKinsey and Company, and applied by firms and business groups in emerging 
economies (Jaipuria, 2002).  A systematic investigation about the suitability and 
performance consequences of these strategies is likely to enhance the utility of these 
strategies for emerging economy firms.   
Empirical Contributions 
The empirical setting of this dissertation is India, which has undergone a rapid 
institutional transition, that began in 1991, when the Government of India adopted its 
policy of economic liberalization.  India’s recent rise in global markets has attracted 
the attention of practioners and scholars alike.  India’s growth has largely been 
driven by indigenous entrepreneurship unlike growth in other emerging economies, 
which have expanded on the strength of inward foreign direct investment and directed 
investment by state bodies.  An investigation into the strategies and performance of 
Indian firms will be of interest not just to academics, but also to practioners involved 
with, or interested in, India and Indian firms.  
The database used in this dissertation has been developed using several 
previously unexplored sources.  The issues of strategic choices and the implications 
of these choices are, to the best of my knowledge, being investigated for the first time 
in the context of an emerging economy.  The base sample comprises the experiences 
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of 9,926 firms during the 1989 to 2005 period.  The firms include all the 
publicly-listed firms in India during this period, as well as many major non-listed 
firms.  The firms in my sample account for 75% of all corporate taxes and more than 
95% of the excise duty collected by the federal government (www.cmie.com).  The 
data on the foreign collaborations covers all the foreign collaborations between any 
Indian and foreign firm, as formed during the 1991-2001 time period.  Likewise, the 
data on firm exits covers all the exits (whether by closure, or merger and sale) made 
during the 1991-2005 period.  The longitudinal coverage of data over a 17 year 
period provides substantial temporal variance in the dependent and independent 
variables, as needed to examine firm strategy and performance over time, particularly 
during a period of institutional transition.  
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is organized as follows. In the Chapter Two, I define and elaborate 
the key constructs used in this dissertation.  I discuss the Indian context and the 
process of institutional transition in India to justify the choice of the context as well as 
develop the key variables used in the dissertation.  I also present data to show that 
substantial institutional transition has taken place over the time period of this study in 
India.  Finally, I present an example of strategic adaptation by taking the case of the 
Tata group.  Chapters Three and Four present the two essays of this dissertation.  
The first essay (Chapter Three) examines the factors affecting firms’ strategic choices 
during a period of institutional transition. The second essay (Chapter Four) builds on 
the previous essay to identify the performance implications of different strategic 
choices.  Chapter Five integrates the findings of the two essays and links these 
findings with the extant literature.  I also discuss the limitations and conclusions of 
this dissertation in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
KEY CONSTRUCTS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
In this chapter I define the key constructs used in this dissertation.  As discussed in 
Chapter 1, this dissertation investigates how firms in emerging economies adapt 
during institutional transition and what are the performance consequences of the same.  
I argue that firms adapt by making certain strategic choices.  These choices are 
dependent on the ownership structure of the firms, business group affiliation and the 
level of institutional development in the external environment.  I elaborate on each 
of these constructs below. 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
There is a large body of work that has investigated the relationship between 
ownership structure and different firm level outcomes such as product diversification 
(Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990, Montgomery, 1994; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989; 
Ramaswami, Li, & Veliyath, 2002), geographic diversification (Carpenter, Sanders, & 
Gregersen, 2001; Morck & Yeung, 1991) innovation strategies (Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Johnson, & Grossman, 2002), corporate social performance (Johnson & Greening, 
1999), and financial performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen, 
2000).   
In studies looking at the impact of ownership structure on firm performance, 
scholars have paid considerable attention to diversification strategy as an intermediary 
strategy variable (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Lane, 
Cannella & Lubatkin, 1998; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).  The dominant theoretical 
framework in these studies has been the agency theory framework (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   
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These studies have found general support for the predictions based on agency 
theory in that the separation of ownership and control between the owners and the 
managers provides managers with the incentives to indulge in self serving activities 
(e.g. diversification) that are not necessarily in the best interests of the firm and other 
shareholders.  The shareholders, however, can monitor and control the managers 
from indulging in such value reduction activities.  An important assumption in this 
line of inquiry has been that different types of owners have the same motivation and 
incentives to maximize the shareholders’ value.  In other words, agency theory based 
studies typically consider different types of owners as homogeneous and only focus 
on the effect of ownership concentration on firm strategies and performance.   
Recently, scholars have begun to question this assumption (Douma, Geroge, & 
Kabir, 2006; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Ramaswami et al., 
2002; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003).  Douma et al. (2006) examined 
the differential impact of domestic and foreign owners on the financial performance 
of Indian firms, and found that identity of owners had an impact on the ownership 
concentration – firm performance relationship.  Hoskisson et al. (2002) examined 
owners’ preference for corporate innovation strategies, and found that different 
institutional investors had different preferences for doing innovation internally or 
acquiring it externally.  Johnson & Greening (2002) looked at the relationship 
between equity ownership and corporate social performance, and found that corporate 
social performance had a positive relationship with pension fund equity but no 
relationship with mutual funds and investment bank funds.  Ramaswami et al. (2002) 
investigated the linkage between ownership of different types of owners such as the 
government, institutional owners and foreign owners and diversification in Indian 
firms.  They found that different owners had different preferences for related and 
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unrelated diversification, as well as the level of diversification.  These findings raise 
questions about the validity of the assumption that different owners are homogeneous 
in their preferences.  
There are at least three dimensions on which owners differ.  First, different 
owners have different expectations, risk profiles, and motivations for investments 
(Monks & Minnow, 1995; O’Barr & Conley, 1992).  For example, the objective of a 
foreign firm to invest in a domestic firm may be to take over the management of the 
firm.  The foreign owner may have deeper pockets and a higher capability to take a 
riskier and longer term position than a domestic owner.  Second, not all owners have 
the same motivation and interest to monitor managers’ actions (Brickley, Lease, & 
Smith, 1988).  For example, scholars have shown that institutional investors 
generally follow managers or sell their stocks in case of policy disagreements, rather 
than confronting the managers of a firm (Heard & Sherman, 1987).  Many 
institutional investors are in business relationships with the organizations in which 
they invest, and a confrontation with the management of the organization may have a 
detrimental effect on their interests.  Finally, not all owners have the same capability 
to perform active monitoring (Khanna & Palepu, 1999a).  Studies based on emerging 
economies have shown that domestic institutional investors are less effective than 
their developed economy counterparts, in monitoring the management, as they are 
less experienced (Frydman, Phelps, Rapaczynski, & Shleifer, 1993) and lack the skills 
needed for effective monitoring (Khanna & Palepu, 1999a; Rapaczynski, 1996). 
The above discussion also highlights that different owners may affect a firm’s 
strategy and performance even if they do not belong to the largest owner category.  
Some owners may be able to and willing to exercise their influence only when they 
hold a sizable stock of ownership, while many others may get actively involved at 
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relatively low levels of ownership (David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998).  For example, 
institutional investors, even with their relatively small share of ownership, would be 
very active in ensuring that the decisions made by the firm in which they invest, do 
not harm the interests of the shareholders (Monks, & Minnow, 1995).  The identity 
of owners along with the level of ownership they hold is therefore crucial for the 
strategic choices firms make and the performance consequences of these decisions. 
Brickley et al. (1988) classify different owners based on their relationship with 
the organizations in which they invest.  Some of the owners could be highly 
sensitive to the pressures from the managers to follow the managers at all times, while 
others may be pressure resistant and may not get influenced by the managers at all.  
Brickley et al. (1988) call these two extreme cases as pressure sensitive and pressure 
resistant groups.  Owners could be pressure sensitive for many reasons.  Some 
owners may have close interactions and business relationships with the organization 
in which they invest.  Confronting the managers on crucial issues may hurt their 
business interests in the organization.  In addition, active monitoring involves much 
effort on part of the owners to gather important information on crucial matters.  Not 
all owners may have the motivation and ability to gather all the relevant information 
to take a stand of their own.  Finally, even with all the relevant information available, 
not all owners may have the capability to analyze it.  Some owners may find it more 
prudent to rely on the judgments of the managers rather than rely on their own 
judgments. 
Pressure resistant owners, on the other hand, invest with clear profit and goal 
objectives and have the ability to perform the monitoring role.  In between the 
pressure sensitive and pressure resistant categories, there could be pressure 
indeterminate investors who may decide their course of action on a case to case basis.  
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For example, a group of owners may not have all the relevant information about a 
firm to take their own stand, but when it comes to crucial decisions that have grave 
consequences for their own interests, these owners may put in the extra effort to 
collect all the information and take a stand of their own. 
The literature review I presented above suggests that the agency theory 
assumption that all owners are alike may be untenable as owners differ with each 
other on multiple dimensions.  Owners differ in terms of their relative power, 
incentives, motivation and ability to monitor the managers, and these differences need 
to be explicitly recognized in studies examining the effect of ownership structure on 
firm strategy and performance.  Following these arguments, in this dissertation, I 
look at the effect of four categories of owners – domestic private, foreign private, 
domestic institutional and foreign institutional – on firms’ strategic choices and the 
performance implications of these strategic choices.  I identify these owners based 
on two important dimensions – whether the owners are domestic or foreign and 
whether they belong to private or institutional investor categories.  These four 
groups of owners are important as they significantly differ with each other on the 
level of influence they can have on the firm management.  A few other studies, done 
in the Indian context, have investigated the influence of these ownership categories on 
different dimensions of firm strategy and performance (Douma et al., 2006; 
Ramaswami et al., 2002).  I elaborate on the importance of these four ownership 









Figure 2.1 shows how domestic/foreign and private/institutional owners are 
situated on the dimension of pressure sensitivity/resistance to the organization in 
which they invest.  The domestic private ownership category relates to the 
ownership by the management of the firm or other sister organizations under the 
control of the same management (in the case of business groups).  These owners are 
likely to be the most pressure sensitive due to their close relationships with the 
organizations in which they invest.  In many cases, domestic private owners control 
and manage the firms themselves.  In such cases, there are no principal agent 
problems as the principals are also the agents (Venkiteswaran, 2005).  However, this 
poses a different kind of principal-principal agency problem, in which one set of 
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(Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  The principal-principal agency problem necessitates that 
other owners keep a close watch on the actions of the domestic private owners and 
managers to protect their own interests. 
Unlike domestic private owners, foreign private owners are not sensitive to 
management pressures.  Foreign private owners often hold non-controlling stakes in 
domestic firms, and it becomes important for them to protect their interests if the 
domestic owners or the firm management indulge in value destroying activities 
(Ramaswami et al., 2002).  Foreign private owners also have strong financial and 
other resources and there can be advantages for the domestic firm to have the foreign 
owners on board (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  The reliance of domestic firms on 
foreign owners makes foreign owners less susceptible to the pressures created by a 
firm’s management.  In addition, foreign owners often invest in more than one 
domestic firm, and in more than one country.  As a result, they are not too reliant on 
any single domestic firm, and can confront the management of the firm on important 
and controversial decisions. 
Institutional investors often hold small equity positions, which may limit the 
institutional investors’ ability to influence the management of a firm.  However, 
scholars have found that, as a group, different institutional investors have similar 
behavioral dispositions, which makes the group act in a coherent and coordinated 
manner (Useem, 1996; Wahal, 1996).  Through coordinated actions, institutional 
investors gain power to influence a firm’s management, even with their rather small 
ownership stakes (David et al., 1998).  Thus we can consider the composite 
ownership across different institutional owners as a measure of their influence on firm 
management.  Within the institutional investor category, domestic and foreign 
institutional investors differ because of differences in their levels of experience 
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(Frydman et al., 1993) and skills (Khanna & Palepu, 1999a; Rapaczynski, 1996), and 
their relationships with other organizations. 
Domestic institutional owners, such as banks, often derive substantial benefits 
from their relationships with the firms in which they invest, and may not be willing to 
take a stand against the management of the firm, unless manager’s actions are quite 
detrimental to their interests (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1983; Khanna & Palepu, 1999a).  
This situation is exacerbated in the context of an emerging economy for two reasons.  
First, many of the institutional investors in emerging economies were government 
controlled in the past.  Under the influence of the government, these investors made 
many investments that were not necessarily driven by pure profit motive (Douma et 
al., 2006).  As an institutional environment improves; however, domestic 
institutional investors face increasing competition from other investors.  But, 
domestic institutional owners are also constrained by the vestiges of past relationships, 
which often restrict them from taking a stand against a firm’s management.  Second, 
domestic institutional owners in emerging economies do not have the necessary 
experience and skills to perform effective monitoring (Khanna & Palepu, 1999a).   
While state ownership and lack of experience make domestic institutional 
owners sensitive to the pressures of the managers, the competitive pressures as a 
result of institutional transitions force them to become more active in monitoring a 
firm’s management.  The net effect of the lack of experience and competitive 
pressures put the domestic institutional investors in the pressure indeterminate 
category.  Foreign institutional investors, on the other hand invest with pure profit 
motives, and will switch from one firm to another if they are in disagreement with the 
firm management.  The superior monitoring ability and experience also helps a 
foreign institutional investor to easily assess the value of different strategies adopted 
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by a firm (Frydman et al., 1993; Khanna & Palepu, 1999a; Rapaczynski, 1996).  As 
foreign institutional investors do not hold any allegiance with the firm in which they 
invest, they are likely to actively monitor and counsel the firm management on crucial 
issues (Ramaswami et al., 2002).  
BUSINESS GROUPS 
Business groups are an important feature of industrial organization in many countries.  
Much research has documented the prevalence of business groups in both developed 
and developing economies (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998, Morck & Steier, 2004).  
Business groups are generally highly diversified entities, operating in many unrelated 
business areas.   
Scholars have proposed several definitions of business groups.  Leff (1978) 
defines a business group as a set of firms doing business in different markets, but 
under common administrative and financial control.  Granovetter (1994) reviews the 
literature on business groups and identifies a business group as a collection of firms 
bound together in formal or informal ways.  In a similar vein, Khanna and Rivkin 
(2001) define a business group as a collection of legally independent firms, which 
share many formal and informal ties and take coordinated actions.  Analyzing firms 
from a single country (India), Encarnation (1989) discusses various types of 
relationships shared by the member firms of a business group.  These include social 
ties in the form of family, caste, religion, language, ethnicity and region, which 
reinforce financial and organizational linkages between the member firms. 
Because of heterogeneous nature of business groups around the world, most of 
the definitions are general in nature.  Yet, even with differences in the organizational 
form of business groups across countries, there are at least five common features 
characterizing business groups.   
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First, group affiliated firms are legally separate entities (Chang & Hong, 2002; 
Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  Thus, while the member firms are legal entities, the group 
itself is not.   
Second, business groups are diversified (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998).  A 
business group comprises several firms, each of which may operate in more than one 
industry.  Even when each of the affiliates operates in a single industry, the group in 
itself becomes highly diversified as each affiliate is still positioned in different 
industries. 
Third, group affiliated firms are often related to one another through some 
kind of shared ownership (Khanna & Rivkin, 2000).  Even though this may not be a 
defining characteristic of a business group, scholars have found common ownership 
among affiliated firms in many countries (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999).   
Fourth, group affiliated firms are linked through common financial ties 
(Keister, 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2005; Shin & Park, 1999).  In some countries, such 
as Japan, many groups (horizontal keiretsu) have their own banks. While affiliation to 
a bank may be prohibited by law in some countries such as India, intra-group loans 
and/or mutual guarantees may still be prevalent.   
Fifth, group affiliated firms share many informal linkages arising out of the 
socio-cultural structure of the society (Guillén, 2000).  The informal linkages may be 
due to religious, ethnic, regional or family backgrounds.  As Encarnation (1989) 
pointed out, such informal linkages reinforce the financial and organizational linkages 
between affiliated firms by creating an atmosphere of interpersonal trust (Granovetter, 
1994; Leff, 1978). 
Building on these features of business groups, I define a business group as a 
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set of legally independent entities, with formal (financial, common ownership, 
interlocking directorates) and informal (social) linkages, and operations in multiple 
product markets.  An explicit acknowledgement of the fact that business groups 
operate in multiple product markets, augments the definition proposed by Khanna and 
Rivkin (2000), and helps us identify the impact of changing institutional environment, 
which may not support a high level of product diversification (Lee et al., 2004). 
Theories of Business Groups 
Much of the extant literature analyzes business groups either from an 
economic or a sociological perspective.  Scholars arguing from an economics 
perspective rely on transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1975), as the 
basis for explaining the existence and potential efficiencies of a business group.  
Scholars have viewed business groups as a response to imperfect or missing markets 
(Caves, 1989; Leff, 1976, 1978).  More recently these views have been reinforced by 
arguments from institutional economics (North, 1990), based on which scholars 
contend that the efficiency of markets is determined by the quality of prevailing 
formal and informal institutions in a country.  An absence of quality institutions 
creates what has been termed as ‘institutional voids’.  Business groups exist as 
efficient organizational arrangement to fill these voids (Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna 
& Palepu, 1997, 2000a, b; Leff, 1978). 
 The sociological perspective on business groups, on the other hand, is built from 
the perspective that a firm, like any other organization, attempts to become 
isomorphic with the social structure surrounding it to gain legitimacy in its 
environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Thus depending on the extent and type of 
relationships in a society (vertical, horizontal or reciprocal), firms evolve into 
particular forms.  In a collectivist society, it may be a norm to do business with 
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friends and family, resulting in a high incidence of business groups.   
This approach does not necessarily stand in contrast to the economic approach.  
In line with the rationale of economic theory, a firm tries to reduce transaction costs 
by doing business with friends and relatives, as opportunistic behavior in the 
community of known parties may have a severe sanctioning (Dore, 1983).  
Related to the above, scholars have put forth two other explanations for the 
prevalence of business groups: business groups as a response to policy distortions, 
and a resource based view of business groups.  Business groups have come into 
prominence in many countries as a result of overt or covert support from the 
government (Evans, 1979), or as a means to avoid unfavorable government policies 
(Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998).  These arguments are similar to the economic 
argument, in that, policy distortions, favorable or unfavorable, create poor quality 
institutions resulting in inefficient market transactions, which thereby create an 
efficiency-based rationale for the emergence of business groups. The resource based 
view of business groups (Guillén, 2000) suggests that business groups emerge when 
firms develop capabilities for repeated industry entry.  Such a capability, however, 
remains a unique resource only under certain institutional conditions (Guillén, 2000).     
 Two important points emerge from the above discussion.  First, business groups 
emerge given a specific set of institutional characteristics in a country.  Second, 
affiliation to a business group affects firm’s strategic choices as such firms enjoy 
certain advantages as well as disadvantages as a result of group affiliation.  I 
elaborate on the implication of these aspects of group affiliation for firms’ strategic 
choices and performance consequences in the next two chapters. 
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INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION 
Organizational research has been concerned with the theme of institutions and 
institutional transition since the onset of the 2000s.  My late 2006 search of the word 
“institutions”, in the abstracts of peer reviewed articles in Business Source Premier, 
generated 6,830 hits for the five year period from 2001 to 2005, as against 6,388 hits 
for the 1991 to 2000 period and 2,645 hits for the 1981 to 1990 period.  I found a 
similar trend, when the search was restricted to three journals – Academy of 
Management Review, Academy of Management Journal and Strategic Management 
Journal.  The number of hits during 2001-2005 was 45 versus 71 and 39 during 
1991-2000 and 1981-1990, respectively.  These figures point clearly to the 
increasing attention institutions are receiving in management research. 
Institutional transition is a broad term and there is considerable ambiguity 
about what different scholars mean by this term.  Table 2.1 presents a summary of 
selected studies that have explored the issue of institutional transition in emerging 
economies.   
As detailed in Table 2.1, a common theme of institutional transition across 
different countries has been a shift in government policies towards creating a more 
market driven economy.  For example, in the case of China, the objective of 
institutional transition has been to reform the government and develop a rule based 
market system (Qian, 2000a, b; Park et al., 2006).  The steps involved regional 
decentralization, market liberalization, and restructuring of financial systems (Park et 
al., 2006).  In the case of India, institutional transition has resulted in the 
establishment of a more market friendly environment, with less governmental 
interference and a more liberalized economy (Forbes, 2001). 
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TABLE 2.1: 
Institutional Transition in Emerging Economies 
 







Stage 1 (1973-1981): 
• Starting from Pinochet’s takeover from Allende’s 
socialist regime  
• Privatization of SOEs 
• Removal of entry barriers for domestic and foreign 
firms 
• Severe restriction on labor unions 
  Stage 2 (1981-1983): 
• Triggered by the financial crisis in 1981 
• Period of rationalization 
• Take over by state of some firms 
• Reversal of some deregulation 
  Stage 3 (1985-1990): 
• Re-privatization of recently taken over firms 
• Privatization of core sector SOEs including social 
services 
• Strengthening of capital markets 
• Export promotion and easier access to foreign 
technology and capital 
  Stage 4 (1990 onwards): 
• Triggered by the introduction of democracy 
• Restoration of labor unions 
• Financial market liberalization 
 
China Qian (2000a, 
2000b);  
Park, Li, & Tse 
(2006) 
Stage 1 (1978-1993): Objective was to reform the 
government  
• Regional decentralization 
• Entry and expansion of local government (non-state) 
enterprises 
• Efforts at financial stability 
• Market liberalization through dual track approach 
  Stage 2 (1994 onwards): Objective was to build a rule 
based system 
• Unification of exchange rates and convertibility on 
current account 
• Restructuring of tax and fiscal system 
• Reorganization of the central bank 
• Downsizing of government bureaucracy 
• Privatization and restructuring of SOEs 
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TABLE 2.1 (Continued) 
 
Nation Key Studies Different Stages 
South 
Korea 
Lee, Lee, & Lee 
(2002); Lee, 
Peng, & Lee 
(2004) 
During 1980s and 1990s 
• Triggered by government’s desire to counter-balance the 
chaebols’ power and join OECD 
• Removal of import restrictions, increased competition in 
the domestic market 
• Rise in wages 
• Liberalization and strengthening of capital markets 
 
Taiwan Chu (1994, 




• Massive economic liberalization and political 
democratization driven by external forces such as 
pressure from the US government and internal factors 
such as political and social movements 
• Institutional transition comprised removal of restrictive
policies and establishment of market infrastructure 
• Privatization of SOEs 
• Deregulation of debt markets and the financial sector 
• Liberalization of the foreign exchange regime 
• Reduction in import controls and tariffs 




Although the specific steps involved in the process of institutional transition 
vary from country to country, there are some common characteristics of the process.  
These can be analyzed with respect to the changes affecting the capital markets, 
product markets and labor markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1999b, 2000a).  An 
identification of these processes can help us define and measure institutional 
transition.  
The changes in the capital markets involved a reorganization of banking 
system, a strengthening of the stock markets, a liberalization of financial markets by 
allowing domestic firms to borrow globally and foreign firms to operate in domestic 
markets, and currency reforms.  The changes in product markets involved a 
liberalization of the local markets by freeing up the restrictions about entry and exit in 
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different industries, an integration with the global economy by allowing foreign firms 
to operate in the local markets and the encouragement of domestic firms to expand 
abroad, export and import liberalization, an easier access to foreign technology, and 
the privatization of state owned enterprises.  The changes in the labor market 
involved restrictions on labor union activities, an upgrading of the skills of the 
available labor pool by better education and training, an establishment of more centers 
of higher learning, and the establishment of laws that ease labor mobility domestically 
as well as internationally. 
The above discussion highlights the fact that the process of institutional 
transition is important as it not only affects the level and type of competition in an 
economy, but also the availability of different types of resources for existing and new 
firms.  Given the importance of institutional transition, it is surprising that not many 
studies have attempted to investigate the impact of institutional transition on firm 
strategies and performance empirically.   
There are several factors that make an investigation into institutional transition 
quite difficult.  First, the process of institutional transition is complex involving 
multiple dimensions.  The changes are often incremental in nature (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000a; Qian, 2000a, b), making it difficult to assess the precise degree of 
institutional transition on a year on year basis.  Second, due to the incremental nature 
of institutional transition, it is often difficult to define a fixed time period in 
longitudinal studies.  Third, institutional transition in many economies has been 
continuing for many years.  For example, in the case of China, scholars believe the 
institutional transition started in 1978 (Park et al., 2006; Qian, 2000a).  In the case of 
South Korea, the institutional transition has been happening from the 1980s to at least 
the mid-2000s (Chang, 2003).  Given the long periods of incremental institutional 
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development, it is often difficult to obtain firm level data spanning across the periods 
before and after institutional transition occurred. 
Despite these difficulties, a few scholars have attempted to study institutional 
transition and its consequences.  Table 2.2 presents a summary of such studies.  
Scholars have adopted two ways to measure the impact of institutional transition on 
firm strategies.  First, some scholars have conceptualized institutional transition as a 
discrete event occurring in a particular year.  These studies then looked at firm 
strategies and performance prior to and after the particular year to envisage the impact 
of institutional transition.  For example, Luo and Chung (2005) used 1987 as a break 
year in the process of institutional transition in Taiwan and studied the role of 
particularistic relationships in business group performance during institutional 
transition.  There are two problems with this approach.  First, it assumes 
institutional transition to be a discrete event, and discards the incremental changes in 
the process of institutional transition.  This is contrary to the experience of 
institutional transition in many countries.  For example, in the case of China, even 
though 1978 was a crucial year in the institutional transition process, significant 
changes were not visible until one to two decades had passed since the transition was 
initiated.  Likewise, in the case of India, the institutional transition started in 1991, 
but the actual changes started taking effect only after a few years, as I elaborate in the 
next section.  Second, in many emerging economies, it is often difficult to find 
quality firm level data for earlier time periods so as to study the pre-post effect of the 




Conceptualization and Operationalization of Institutional Transition 
 
Nation Study Time Period Operationalization of Institutional Transition 
Chile Khanna & 
Palepu 
(2000b) 
1988-1996 • Time trend as a general proxy for changes in the 
institutional context 
• Use 13 variables related to capital markets, labor 
markets and other changes to show that a time trend 
is significantly related to the institutional changes. 
• The variables for capital markets include number of 
ADRs, number of companies covered by analysts, 
market capitalization to GDP ratio, capitalization 
ratio, value of share volume traded to GDP ratio. 
• The variables for labor markets include education 
enrollment ratio, tertiary level education enrollment 
ratio 
• Other variables included number of privatizations, 
value of pension funds, country risk, 18 month 
forecast of regime stability and number of terrorist 
incidents 
China Park, Li, 
& Tse 
(2006) 
1992-1996 Different firm level and environmental level 
consequences of institutional transition used as the 
indicators of the transition. These included: 
• Ties with different tiers of the government 
• Regional variation 
• Ownership structure 






1984-1996 • Time as a general proxy for incremental institutional 
transition 
• The 13 year period divided into four sub-samples 
• Five other variables used to capture institutional 
transition – Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, 
corporate bond value to GDP ratio, private sector 
credit to GDP ratio, percentage of import categories 
not subjected to import restrictions, percentage of 
students among primary school graduates that enter 
secondary school. 
Taiwan Luo & 
Chung 
(2005) 
1973-1996 • Comparison between pre- and post-reform period 
using 1987 as a break year 
• Indicators for comparison between pre- and post- 
periods include number of industries deregulated, 
number of public enterprises privatized, bank loans to 
private enterprises, exchange rate with US $, average 
tariff burden, foreign direct investment, economic 
freedom index, number of labor protests, number of 




The other approach to measuring institutional transition considers institutional 
transition as a continuous process (Peng, 2003), comprising a set of incremental 
changes in different institutional dimensions.  Studies in this tradition use different 
indicators, often related to changes in the capital market, product market and labor 
market, to measure the gradually changing aspects of institutions.  Khanna and 
Palepu (2000b: 272) in their longitudinal study of performance implication of group 
affiliation in Chilean context, used a time trend as a general proxy for institutional 
transition.  They also ran separate regressions between different institutional change 
indicators such as the number of American depository receipts issued, market 
capitalization to GDP ratio and education level to assess the suitability of time as an 
indicator of institutional changes.  The coefficient on time trend was significant in 10 
of the 13 variables, used in the study.  Khanna and Palepu’s (2000b) study utilized 
the nine year time period from 1988 to 1996, even though the process of institutional 
transition in Chile started in 1973 (Bosworth, Dornbusch, & Laban, 1994).  
Following Khanna and Palepu (2000b), Lee et al. (2004) also used time as an 
indicator of incremental institutional transition in their study on Korean business 
groups.  Their study utilized the 13 year time period from 1984-1996. 
I adopt the approach used by Khanna and Palepu (2000b) and Lee et al. (2004) 
to investigate the impact of institutional transition on Indian firms.  In the next 
section, I elaborate on the process of institutional transition and show the gradual 
nature of institutional transition in India.   
Institutional Transition in India  
Table 2.3 presents a chronological description of institutional transition in India.  
India faced a severe balance of payments crisis in 1991, to the extent that the foreign 
reserves of India were sufficient to cover only two weeks of imports.  Faced with the 
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fear of losing economic sovereignty, Indian leaders approached external agencies 
(IMF and the World Bank) for help.  These agencies obliged, but with their own 
conditions for assistance.  As a result of external pressures, as well as a realization 
on the part of Indian leaders of the benefits of a free economy, the Indian government 
initiated a series of measures for structural changes in the economy.   
TABLE 2.3: 
Institutional Transition in India (1991-2003) 
Year Steps 
1991 • Fiscal crisis – Foreign exchange sufficient to support just two weeks of 
imports 
• Pressure from IMF to start liberalization as a pre-condition to loans 
• Realization on part of policy makers of the importance of liberalization 
• Government initiated a limited liberalization initiative 
• Reserve Bank of India (RBI) devalued the Indian rupee by 20% 
• IMF sanctioned a loan of US $ 1.8 billion 
• Delicensing 
• Number of industries reserved for public sector reduced from 17 to 8 
• Licensing system abolished except in 15 critical industries 
• Eliminated the requirement of government’s approval for expansion of 
large firms  
• Foreign firms allowed to hold majority ownership in JVs 
• Automatic approval for foreign investment up to 51% in 35 industries 
• 100% ownership shares and full repatriation of profits in many 
industries for investments by NRIs 
1992 • Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) act passed by the parliament
• SEBI instituted as an independent regulator 
• Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) given permission to invest in all 
securities traded on the primary and secondary markets 
• FIIs must have at least 50 investors 
• One FII could own up to 5% in a firm 
• All FIIs combined can own up to 24% 
• Restrictions on the use of foreign loans abolished 
• Foreign portfolio investors allowed to invest in listed companies 
• Dual rate system created 
1994 • Indian rupee made fully convertible on current account 
• Government efforts to reform Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), the major 
stock exchange in India met with stiff resistance.  Government instituted a 
new stock exchange, National Stock Exchange (NSE), as a competitor to 
BSE, establishing better practices and more standard corporate governance 
(BSE was an association of Brokers).  Over time, this resulted in reforms in 
the BSE as well. 
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TABLE 2.3 (Continued) 
 
Year Steps 
1996 100% debt FIIs permitted, FIIs could buy corporate bonds, but not government
bonds 
1997 The maximum ownership limit of 24% for all FIIs in a firm raised to 30%,
subject to shareholders approval. 
1998 Further reforms in investment policies 
• Upper limit of ownership by one FII in one firm raised form 5% to 10% 
• FIIs allowed to operate in forward markets on a limited basis 
• FIIs allowed to trade equity derivatives 
1999 Requirement of having at least 50 investors for FIIs eased to 20 investors. 
2000 • Investment regime liberalized for foreign firms and individuals  
• Foreign firms and individuals allowed to open sub accounts with FIIs to 
invest in India 
• Local funds managers also allowed to do fund management for foreign 
firms and individuals 
• The 5% limit for a single investor in an FII eased to 10% 
• The maximum ownership limit of 30% for all FIIs in a firm raised to 40%, 
subject to shareholders’ approval. 
2001 • The maximum ownership limit of 40% for all FIIs in a firm raised to 49%,
subject to shareholders’ approval. 
• The maximum ownership limit of 49% for all FIIs in a firm raised to the
sectoral cap in the industry, subject to shareholders’ approval. 
2003 • Limitation on FIIs to operate in forward currency markets removed 
• FIIs allowed a single window entry through approval by SEBI, earlier they
had to seek approval from RBI also 
• India became a net debtor from a net creditor in its relations with the IMF 
Source: Media reports, government notifications. 
  The twin objectives of the structural change program were to attract foreign 
institutional investors and to unleash the potential of Indian entrepreneurs.  Specific 
measures included the abolition of licensing for setting-up new firms and increasing 
capacity, the gradual abolition of restricted industries for private sector participation, 
a reduction in excise and import duties and corporate tax rates, a liberalization of 
credit policies, a creation of statutory bodies for monitoring sector specific market 
activities, and a gradual withdrawal of the government from the business of 
micro-level management of the economy.  These measures, along with several others, 
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were expected to provide the necessary institutional support for the growth of private 
sector activities in a free and fair manner.   
It is difficult to directly assess the level of institutional change; however, one 
can look at various indicators related to capital markets, labor markets and product 
markets to gauge the level of institutional changes.  Figure 2.2 shows the average 
annual deposit and lending rates for the period from 1992 to 2004.  As can be seen in 
Figure 2.2, bank deposit rates fell from a high of 13% in 1991 to 5.25% in 2004, 
while the lending rates fell from a high of 19% in 1991 to 10.25% in 2004.  Figure 
2.3 shows the rise in the foreign investment inflows during the 1992-2004 period.  
Foreign investment inflows, a measure of trade liberalization, included direct 
investments as well as portfolio investments. Even though the foreign investment 
values may be much less as compared to other countries such as China, the absolute 
increase in foreign direct investment inflows from the small base of US $133 million 
in 1991-92 to US $16,050 million in 2003-04 suggests that substantial changes took 
place with regard to easing the inflow of FDI.  Figure 2.4 shows the increase in the 
stock market index during the 1991-2006 period.  The BSE index increased by 689% 
during this period, from 1049.53 in 1991 to 8278.55 in 2006.  In fact, in April 2007, 
the BSE index crossed the 14,000 mark, showing the increased confidence of 
investors in the Indian business environment.   
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Table 2.4 provides a measure of the reduction of transaction costs for 
transactions in national stock exchanges during the period from 1994 to 1999.  The 
transaction costs have been reduced from more than 4.75% of the total transaction 
amount in 1994, to 0.60% in 1999, which is close to the global best of 0.45%.  These 
statistics suggest that there have been significant institutional transitions in financial 
markets in India in the 1990-2005 period, which has resulted in a greater availability 
of capital at more competitive prices. 
Next, I focus on changes in the labor market in India.  Table 2.5 lists the 
number of institutions of higher education operating in India during the period from 
1991 till 2003.  The number of academic institutions for higher learning has more 
than doubled from 6,761 in 1991 to 14,143 in 2003.  This has resulted in a much 
larger stock of qualified highly-skilled personnel in India.  The number of scientific 
and technical personnel has increased by 60% from 4.486 million at the end of 1991 
to 7.710 million at the end of 2000.  This growth is much faster than the population 
growth which was 21.34% for the 1991-2001 period.  The total number of doctoral 
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degrees awarded in science and engineering disciplines increased by 81% from 5,049 
in 1996 to 9,131 in 2000 (www.indiastat.com).  In 2000, there were about 850 
business schools in India (www.indiaeducation.info), enrolling more than 300,000 
students each year (www.indiastat.com).  These statistics point to the significant 
progress made on the education front, which has resulted in a large pool of qualified 
workers.   
TABLE 2.4:  
Changes in Transaction Costs in Stock Exchanges in India 
 
Transaction Cost 1994 1999 Global Best 
Trading (%)    
Fees 2.5 0.25 0.25 
Impact Cost 0.75 0.25 0.2 
Clearing    
Counter Party Risk Present Nil Nil 
Settlement (%)    
Paper work 0.75 0.1 0 
Bad Delivery 0.5 0 0 
Stamp Duty 0.25 0 0 
Total (%) >4.75 0.6 0.45 
Note: Values in second, third and fourth columns represent the 
percentage cost of a trade, as accounted for by the various 




TABLE 2.5:  
Number of Institutions for Higher Education in India 
 













1990-91 184 49 4862 282 130 474 780  6761 
1996-97 228 65 6759 418 655 697 1411 10233 
1997-98 229 65 7199 458 769 848 1404 10972 
1998-99 237 71 7494 540 755 818 1790 11705 
1999-00 244 71 7782 635 685 804 1959 12180 
2000-01 254 77 7926 680 709 834 2657 13137 
2001-02 272 79 8737 838 725 846 2004 13501 





There have been significant improvements in other institutional domains as 
well.  The general awareness level of people has increased tremendously resulting in 
a heightened public scrutiny of the actions of businesses and government.  At the 
end of 2004, there were about 5,600 daily news papers with a combined circulation of 
60 million, about 15,000 weeklies, and 20,000 periodicals in 21 languages 
(www.indiaeducation.info).  A free and highly active media has played the role of 
public watchdog and helped to effectively monitor and enforce the rule of law.   
Following Khanna & Palepu (2000), I tested the relationship between each of 
these variables and the time trend between the years for which I had the data.  Table 
2.6 presents values at the beginning and end of the observation period, along with the 
coefficient (and p-value) on time trend.  Barring the number of medical colleges and 
teacher training institutions, all other labor market and capital market variables had a 
statistically significant relationship with the time trend.  Furthermore, these variables 
are highly correlated amongst themselves, suggesting that the time trend is a reliable 
indicator for institutional transition in India. 
 
TABLE 2.6:  
Time Trend and Institutional Transition in India 
Score Institutional Transition Indicator 1991 2003 
Coefficient on 
Time Trend p 
Capital Market & Trade Liberalization     
Deposit rate (%) 13 5.5 -0.49 0.00 
Minimum Lending rate (%) 19 10.25 -0.64 0.00 
BSE Index 1879.51 4492.19 123.14 0.02 
Foreign Investment Inflows (USD M) 133.00 16050.00 772.35 0.00 
Labor Market     
Universities 184 304 11.82 0.00 
Research Institutions 49 81 2.93 0.00 
Arts, Science & Commerce Colleges 4862 9166 383.18 0.00 
Eng., Tech., & Architecture Colleges 282 978 92.14 0.00 
Medical Colleges 130 759 6.36 0.48 
Teacher Training Colleges 474 873 19.28 0.06 
Total Higher Learning Institutions 6761 14143 650.71 0.00 
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STRATEGIC ADAPTATION 
Firms make strategic choices to adapt to the external environment (Ansoff, 1965; 
Mintzberg, 1990).  Scholars have defined strategic adaptation and change as a 
“difference in form, quality or state over time in an organization’s alignment with its 
external environment” (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997: 49).  The objective of the 
adaptation process is to create a better fit between the firm and its environment, which 
should consequently result in improved firm performance (Zajac & Kraatz, 1993) and 
firm survival (Haveman, 1992).   
The extant literature has multiple conceptualizations of strategic adaptation 
and change, depending on whether scholars view adaptation as a static event, or a 
continuous process (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). The conceptualization also varied by 
the theoretical lenses used (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997).  Table 2.7 provides a 
summary of the strategic adaptation and change literature, depicting different 
conceptualizations, and theoretical arguments.  I have identified the studies included 
in Table 2.7 by reviewing four major academic journals – Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal and 
Journal of Internal Business Studies – for studies on strategic adaptation and change.  
Table 2.7 is not an exhaustive list of all the studies, but includes all the major ones on 
strategic adaptation and change. 
 
 TABLE 2.7:  
Sample of Research on Strategic Adaptation and Change 
 
Author(s) Setting Definition of Strategic Adaptation/Change Key Arguments/Findings 
Singh, House, & 
Tucker (1986) 
389 Voluntary Social Service 
Organization in Toronto 
(1970-1982) 
Six measures – CEO change, change in service 
areas, change in goals, change in sponsorship, 
change in location, and structural change 
(through interviews) 
Effect of organizational changes depends on 
the location of change in the organization. 
Smith & Grimm 
(1987) 
27 railroads, prior to and after 
deregulation Subjective assessments by experts. 
Most firms changed their strategies in 
response to environmental variation, and 
those that changed performed better than 
those that did not 
Zajac & Shortell 
(1989) 
570 hospitals belonging to 8 
hospital chain, survey and 
secondary data  
Survey data to assess if the organizations 
changed their generic strategies. 
Organizations changed their strategies in 




Non-profit HMOs that existed 
in the US in both June 1983 
and June 1987 
Conversion from non-profit status to for-profit 
status. 
Organizational adaptation in response to 
changes in federal policies towards (health 
medical organizations) HMOs. 
Goodstein & Boeker 
(1991) 
Survey of 327 hospitals in 
California during 1980-86  
Strategic change measured as number of 
service additions and divestitures a hospital 
initiates. 
Organization’s management, ownership and 
board of directors affect strategic change. 
Kelly & Amburgey 
(1991) 136 air carriers (1962-1985) 
Assessed based on changes in the product mix 
– specialist to generalist and generalist to 
specialist. 
Organizations did not change in response to 
environmental changes (deregulation), and 
change was unrelated to survival. 
Haveman (1992) California Savings and Loan Industry (1977-1987) Diversification as a measure of change. 
Organizational change benefits if made in 
response to environmental restructuring. 
Wiersema & Bantel 
(1993) 
100 of the Fortune 500 firms in 
1980 
Strategic change measured as change in firm’s 
level of diversification. TMT turnover used as a 
measure of strategic adaptation. 
Environment, firm performance and 
strategic change affect TMT turnover, which 
is an adaptation mechanism. 
Zajac & Kraatz 
(1993) 
631 higher education colleges 
from 1971-1986 
Colleges restructured if they 1) added any 
business program, 2) added any graduate 
program, 3) changed from single sex to 
coeducational institution.  




TABLE 2.7 (Continued) 
 
Author(s) Setting Definition of Strategic Adaptation/Change Key Arguments/Findings 
Goodstein, Gautam, 
& Boeker (1994) 
Survey of 334 hospitals in 
California during 1980-86  
Change comprised of service additions, service 
divestitures, and service reorganization (change 
in the governance of a service delivery). 
Board diversity is a significant constraint on 
strategic change during periods of 
environmental turbulence (regulatory 
changes and heightened competition). 
Brown & Eisenhardt 
(1997) 
Multiple product innovations in 
six firms in computer industry 
(1993-1995) 
 Change is a continuous incremental process. 
Organizations with flexible, semi-structures, 
and the ability to link the future with the 
present successfully changed. 
Kraatz (1998) 230 American liberal arts colleges (1971-1986) 
Strategic adaptation measures as a professional 
program adoption (change in curricula) by a 
college.  
Strong ties to other organizations help in 
strategic adaptation by colleges. 
Zajac, Kraatz, & 
Bresser  (2000) 
4000 US saving and loan 
institutions (1980-1988) Change in residential mortgage lending. 
Environmental forces and organizational 
resources predict the strategic change. 
Organizations that changed more or less 
than predicted by the model performed 
worse. 
Gordon, Stewart, Jr., 
Sweo, & Luker 
(2000) 
120 firms in furniture and 
software industries (1987-1993)
Change in strategy along with changes in 
organizational structure, power distribution and 
control systems as identified from 10-K reports.
Industry turbulence and CEO turnover are 
precursors to strategic adaptation. 
Westphal & 
Fredrickson (2001) 
406 US industrial and service 
firms listed in the 1983 Forbes 
and Fortune 500 indexes 
(1984-1996) 
Strategic change measured as product market 
diversification and geographic diversification. 
Strategy experience of the board members 
affects strategic change. 
Yin & Zajac (2004) 6000 stores of a restaurant chain (1991-1997) 
Whether a store operated using a mixed 
strategy (dine in and delivery) or a pure 
strategy (dine-in or delivery only). 
Governance structure affects the choice of 
strategy; stores that match their strategies 
with the governance structure, perform 
better. 
Zhou, Tse, & Li 
(2006) A survey of 180 firms in China 
Senior managers’ perception of technical and 
administrative changes as compared to previous 
year. 
Firm ownership, past performance and the 
location of the firm affects strategic 
changes; both technical and administrative 
changes positively affect firm performance. 
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As detailed in Table 2.7, early work examining strategic adaptation placed a 
focus on the punctuated equilibrium model of organizational change (Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).  The punctuated equilibrium model 
suggests that organizations adapt by changing in a discontinuous, episodic and 
intermittent manner.  Utilizing the punctuated equilibrium model, many scholars 
operationalized organizational change as a static event such as conversion from 
non-profit status to for-profit status (Ginsberg & Buchholtz, 1990), restructuring in 
college curricula (Kraatz, 1998; Zajac & Kraatz, 1993), or a shift in the level of 
diversification and product mix (Haveman, 1992; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1993).   
Other conceptualizations of strategic adaptation have been based on subjective 
assessments through interviews (Singh et al., 1986), expert opinions (Smith & Grimm, 
1987) and surveys (Zajac & Shortell, 1989; Zhou, Tse, & Li, 2006 ).  Recently, 
scholars have begun to question the punctuated equilibrium model and the static 
conceptualization of strategic adaptation, especially in rapidly changing and turbulent 
environments (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Feldman, 2004; Weick & Quinn, 1999; 
Zhou et al., 2004).  Brown and Eisenhardt (1997: 1) argue that in a changing and 
turbulent environment, organizational “change is not the rare, episodic phenomenon 
described by the punctuated equilibrium model but, rather, it is endemic to the way 
these organizations compete.”  Given the continuously evolving institutions in 
emerging economies, a static conceptualization of strategic adaptation is inadequate to 
understand the causes and consequences of strategic adaptation process. 
Scholars have approached the issue of strategic adaptation from three main 
theoretical perspectives – the rational, learning and cognitive lenses (Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1997).  Scholars utilizing a rational perspective (Gibbs, 1993; Ginsberg & 
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Buchholtz, 1990) rely on large samples to study the antecedents and consequences of 
strategic change.  These studies however ignore the role played by the organizational 
actors in bringing about the strategic change.  In addition, these studies 
conceptualize strategic change as a static concept rather than paying adequate 
attention to the underlying dimensions which bring about the changes in the strategy 
content as well as in the organizations that are trying to change and adapt.  On the 
other hand, scholars utilizing the learning and cognitive lenses (Webb & Dawson, 
1991) rely on in-depth case studies, and focus on the role of managers in strategic 
adaptation and change.  These studies take into account the role played by managers 
in bringing about the strategic change, which itself is viewed as an evolutionary and 
iterative process. 
Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997) propose an integration of the three 
perspectives by incorporating the role of organizational actors in large sample studies 
of strategic adaptation and change.  A few other scholars have also given a call to 
incorporate the role of different decision agents in affecting strategic adaptation in 
multiple contexts (Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 2001).  This dissertation 
makes an attempt in this direction by investigating the role of owners/managers, along 
with the external environment, and other organizational characteristics, such as 
business group affiliation, in the strategic adaptation process.  In addition, rather 
than looking at strategic adaptation as a unitary process, I investigate the underlying 
strategic choices that firms and organizational actors make in an attempt to adapt to 
the external environment.  A focus on organizational actors (owners) and strategic 
choices helps in taking a continuous perspective on organizational change (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997; Weick & Quinn, 1999) in large sample studies, and thereby 
integrate the rational, cognitive and learning lens perspectives.  
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What are the strategic choices that firms make?  Few scholars have looked at 
incumbent firms’ reactions to changes in the competitive environment.  These 
studies have found that in the face of increased competition, often due to the entry of 
other firms, incumbent firms react by undertaking more aggressive marketing 
(Gersoki, 1995; Thomas, 1999), forming collaborations with other firms (Lavie & 
Fiegenbaum, 2000), restructuring by increasing or reducing their level of 
diversification (Bowen & Wiersema, 2005; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992), or simply 
abandoning the market (Gersoki, 1995).  In a study of American firms’ reactions to 
increased competition due to the entry of Japanese firms, Hopkins (2003) identified 
several strategic choices utilized by American firms.  These include geographic 
expansion, organizational restructuring, joint venturing, redesigning manufacturing 
operations, outsourcing, and changing marketing and distribution strategies (Hopkins, 
2003).  These choices can be classified into three categories – choice to compete, 
choice to collaborate or choice to exit.  
Faced with increased competition or changes in the prevailing institutional 
environment, some firms may decide to compete.  Firms may compete by several 
ways such as developing the resources and capabilities needed for competition, and 
diversifying into different product and geographic markets.  Some firms may find it 
difficult to compete, and may decide to collaborate to partially ward off the 
competition while acquiring crucial resources from the partners to strengthen their 
competitive position.  At the same time, other firms may find it difficult as well as 
less lucrative to sustain their operations in a particular business, and may decide to 
exit the business.  Competition, collaboration, and exit are thus the main strategic 
choices that firms choose when trying to adapt to the external environment. 
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Of the three strategic choices of competition, collaboration, and exit, the first 
one has received maximum attention in the extant literature.  Scholars have 
operationalized the choice to compete by looking at the level of product-market and 
geographic diversification (Haveman, 1992; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), new product offerings for new market segments 
(Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Goodstein et al., 1994; Zajac & Kraatz, 1993), or change 
in generic strategies and market focus (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Zajac & Shortell, 
1989; Zajac et al., 2000).  There is a rich literature on the antecedents and 
consequences of strategic choices such as product-market diversification (Delios & 
Beamish, 1999; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000) and geographic 
diversification (Lu & Beamish, 2004) in different contexts.  However, scholars have 
not paid adequate attention to the choices to collaborate and exit the market.  
For emerging economy firms that have operated in a protected environment 
for many years, collaboration may be a very important strategic decision to adapt to 
the changing external environment.  Likewise, for large multi-unit organizations 
such as business groups in emerging economies, exit by some firms of the group may 
be an important adaptation mechanism for the group as a whole.  In this dissertation, 
I focus on a firm’s choice to collaborate with foreign players and choice to exit the 
market as a means of strategic adaptation to the external environment.  In terms of 
the choice to collaborate, the focus on collaborations with foreign firms is justified as 
much of the competition for incumbent firms in emerging economies comes from the 
entry of foreign firms (Peng, 2003).  While the incumbent firms may collaborate 
with each other to face competition from foreign firms, the relatively poor resource 
base of emerging economy firms (Matthews, 2006) reduces the gain in advantages 
that comes from collaboration with one another.  On the other hand, foreign firms 
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bring with them useful technology as well as other resources (Khanna & Palepu, 
1999b), which help domestic firms in emerging economies to better prepare for future 
competition from other foreign firms as well as potential domestic competitors. I 
illustrate some of these points, using the detailed example of the process of strategic 
adaptation of the Tata Group. 
Strategic Adaptation: An Example (The Tata Group) 
The Tata Group is one of India’s largest and oldest business groups.  The group was 
founded in the mid 19th century by a trader-entrepreneur – Jamsetji Tata.  As of 
2005-06, the group had a total revenue of US$21.9 billion, equivalent to about 2.8% 
of India’s GDP, and a market capitalization of US$ 52.3 billion (www.tata.com). 
Together, Tata Group companies employ about 2,46,000 people, operate in 54 
countries and export products and services to 120 countries. 
The Tata Group is a typical example of business groups in India.  A look at 
the historical growth of the group suggests that the company’s strategy has been 
characterized by a process of continuous adaptation and responsiveness to the external 
environment.   
Table 2.8 presents the entry and exit pattern of the Tata Group since its 
inception.  Starting with textile industry in 1874, the group entered different 
industries at regular intervals.  Until 1947, such entries were driven by the 
opportunities provided by the colonial rulers to operate in certain industries.  Post 
1947, when India became an independent country, the Tata Group entered new 
businesses when ever they got an opportunity (Kedia, Mukherjee, & Lahiri, 2007).  
After independence, the Indian government put severe restrictions on the industries in 
which a firm could enter as well as the production capacity of existing ventures.  In 
such an environment, one of the ways to grow was to diversify into new industries.  
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From its inception till 1991, the Tata Group exited only two industries – aviation and 
locomotives.  Both of these exits were forced exits as the government nationalized 
these industries, forbidding private sector participation. 
The group held control over its firms through the common Tata name, 
interlocking directorates and cross shareholdings (Jaipuria, 2002).  The Tata family 
has controlling stakes in core affiliates – Tata Sons and Tata Industries, which are not 
publicly traded.  These two companies are primarily responsible for driving the 
growth of the group as a whole.  The reliance on cross shareholding, however, was 
very small prior to 1991, due to the virtual absence of the market for corporate control 
in the pre liberalized India (Jaipuria, 2002). 
Post 1991, once the Indian economy opened up to more local and foreign 
competition, competition accordingly became more intense.  Even though 
liberalization provided the existing players with more opportunities to pursue their 
entrepreneurial ambitions, it also meant that they had to operate in an unprotected 
environment.  Faced with increasing competition, the Tata Group decided to change 
its strategies about growth and management of group firms.  The more informal 
controls were replaced by formal ownership based control over the group affiliated 
firms.  The group raised its controlling stake to at least 26% in most major 
companies to avoid the threat of hostile takeovers.  At the same time, the group 
decided to focus on a few core areas and divest their stakes or sell of the firms 
operating in unrelated and less lucrative sectors.   
Prior to 1991, the Tata Group comprised 85 core companies (300, if we 
include the associates and subsidiaries) operating in about 45 industries.  The group 
decided to focus on seven core areas and reduce the number of core companies to 
about 40.  As shown in Table 2.8, the group exited many industries in the post 1991 
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years and sold off many businesses.  Some of the prominent businesses that the Tata 
Group exited include the toiletries and cosmetics business (sold to Hindustan Lever), 
pharmaceuticals business (sold to Wockhardt), and white good business (sold to 
Electrolux). 
TABLE 2.8: 
Entry, Exit Pattern of Tata Group 
 
Year Industry Entered Industry Exited 
1874 Textiles  
1902 Hospitality  
1907 Steel  
1910 Power  
1912 Cement  
1917 Soaps and Toiletries  
1931 Printing and Publishing  
1932 Aviation  
1939 Chemicals  
1940 Consumer Electronics  
1945 Locomotives & Commercial Vehicles  
1952 Cosmetics  
1953  Aviation 
1954 Air-conditioning  
1958 Pharmaceuticals  
1962 Tea and Coffee  
1968 Information Technology  
1970  Locomotives 
1984 Watches  
 Financial Services  
1994 Auto Components Soaps and Toiletries 
1994 Telecom Services  
1998 Passenger cars Cosmetics and Pharmaceuticals 
1999 Retail Bearings 
2000  Cement 
2001 Insurance Oil Drilling 
  Textiles 
2002  Paints 
2003  Printing and Publishing 
2006 Biotech, Super Computer  (Under consideration)  
2007 Airport Management  




This chapter reviews the literature on the four main constructs – ownership 
structure, business group affiliation, institutional transition, and strategic adaptation – 
used in this dissertation.  For each of these four constructs, I identify the relevant 
literature and define and discuss the key concepts. 
With respect to ownership structure, I argue that different owners have 
different level of motivation, ability and incentive to influence and monitor the firms, 
which necessitates that we incorporate the role of owners’ identities along with their 
concentration.  This issue is particularly important in emerging economies as the 
institutional environment shapes the motivations and incentives of different owners.  
Aside from the important role played by different ownership groups in a firm’s 
strategic decisions, a firm’s affiliation to a business group also affects the strategic 
choices firms can make in emerging economies.  Firms often arrange themselves in 
the form of business groups, in emerging economies characterized with weak 
institutional environments, to bypass the less efficient external markets for capital, 
products and labor.  Affiliation to a business group, while conferring many 
advantages to the affiliated firms, also creates many problems, including potential for 
misappropriation of firm value by the dominant owners at the expense of minority 
owners.  The strategic choices firms make and the consequences of these strategic 
choices depend on the net effect of the advantages and disadvantages of group 
affiliation. 
Next, I discuss the process of institutional transition in emerging economies in 
general, and in the empirical context of this dissertation in particular.  I elaborate 
why institutional transition could be an important determinant of a firm’s strategic 
choices, making institutional transition the underlying theme in this dissertation.  I 
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review the studies that have examined the impact of institutional transition on firm 
strategy and performance in different contexts to develop a measure of institutional 
transition.  Acknowledging the continuous nature of changes in the institutions, I 
measure institutional transition using a linear time trend.  I elaborate on the process 
of institutional transition in the Indian context to show the gradual development in 
various indicators related to the product markets, labor markets and the capital 
markets.   
Finally, I review the literature on strategic adaptation and change to suggest 
that much of the extant literature, with its focus on static strategic changes, has failed 
to acknowledge the dynamic aspect of strategic adaptation in large sample studies.  I 
suggest that scholars can enhance the understanding of strategic adaptation by looking 
at the underlying strategic choices that result in adaptation and changes over time.  I 
support my arguments about the importance of ownership structure, business group 
affiliation and institutional transition, in affecting a firm’s strategic choices, by 





STRATEGIC ADAPTATION DURING INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION 
 
With widespread changes in many economies in the world, there is an increasing 
attention being given to understanding how organizations change and adapt when 
faced with the fundamental changes in the prevailing institutional environment.  This 
literature is being developed from the starting point of strategic adaptation that has 
taken place in response to industry-level changes in certain specific aspects of the 
environment.  This literature has not given attention to the changes in the broader 
institutional environment (Peng, 2003).   
This lack of attention is surprising as fundamental changes in the prevailing 
institutional environment might be more important in influencing firm strategy than 
industry-specific changes.  To understand the strategic reaction of firms to broad 
environmental changes, we need to structure an investigation that takes into account 
the overall changes in the institutional environment and the firm-level attributes that 
are affected by such environmental changes. 
Institutional transition affects firms in several ways.  During a period of 
institutional transition, firms are exposed to multiple opportunities and threats 
(Kosova, 2004; Peng & Heath, 1996; Peng, 2003).  The development of new 
institutions changes the rules of the game and opens up many opportunities for firms, 
while restricting them from pursuing some of the strategies that led to their success in 
the past (Oliver, 1997).  How firms make strategic adaptations in environments 
undergoing rapid institutional transition is an issue that is open for systematic 
investigation by organizational scholars. This essay contributes to the strategic 
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adaptation literature by examining the strategic choices firms make when adapting to 
changes in the institutional environment. 
An investigation into strategic choices as motivated by shifts in the external 
environment helps us to better understand the process of strategic change.  The 
extant literature has examined strategic change as a discrete unitary event 
(Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997), and examines the effect of organizational 
demographics and environmental characteristics on the likelihood of the change.     
Scholars have conceptualized adaptation based on a shift in the level of diversification 
and product mix (Haveman, 1992; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Wiersema & Bantel, 
1993), a change in strategies specific to an industry situation (Ginsberg & Buchholtz, 
1990; Zajac et al., 2000), or based on subjective assessments through interviews 
(Singh et al., 1986), expert opinions (Smith & Grimm, 1987) and surveys (Zajac & 
Shortell, 1989).  These conceptualizations are often done at a given point in time and 
do not acknowledge the dynamic aspect of a firm’s adaptation process. 
In order to better conceptualize and understand the phenomenon of strategic 
change, research needs to move from measuring strategic change as a static event, to 
identifying the underlying strategic choices firms make, which lead to an overall 
change in a firm’s strategic stance over time (Hirsch, Friedman, & Koza, 1990).  
This essay contributes by examining the process of strategic change as comprising a 
set of strategic choices firms make in response to movements in the institutional 
conditions of the environments in which they operate.  
Firms may respond to institutional transition in several ways such as product 
and geographic diversification, collaborations or restructuring to reduce the scope of 
the firm.  In this essay, I focus on two important, but less explored strategic choices:  
the choice to exit and the choice to collaborate with foreign firms.  The decisions to 
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exit a market, or collaborate with foreign firms, are important strategic decisions for 
firms that have been founded in a protected and weak institutional environment and 
for actors who have largely relied on network based strategies to sustain the 
competitiveness of their firms in the past (Peng, 2003). 
I examine these two strategic choices using an integration of agency theory 
and institutional perspective.  I use agency theory because the dominant shareholders 
affect the strategic choices made by firms (Child, 1997; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991).  
At the same time, the internal governance structure of the firm is determined by the 
quality of the external governance structure and the prevailing institutions 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  In the absence of efficient external governance structures, 
firms often arrange themselves as business groups through pyramidal ownership 
structures (Almedia & Wolfenzon, 2004; Khanna, 2000; La Porta et al., 1999).   
An institutional perspective helps in examining the influence of the external 
governance structure, which manifests itself in the form of business group affiliation 
in weak institutional environments.  Thus integrating agency theory with an 
institutional perspective provides us with a framework to understand the incentives 
and motivations of different organizational actors (Eisenhardt, 1989; Oliver, 1997), 
and the effect of internal and external governance structure on firms’ strategic 
choices. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Agency theory is a dominant paradigm to analyze the influence of internal 
governance mechanisms and ownership structure on various firm level outcomes 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  According to agency theory, owners (principals) have 
different objectives than managers (agents).  Although owners have a preference for 
maximizing their profits, managers can have different preferences such as empire 
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building, high compensation, and job security (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 
1986). The conflict in objectives between owners and managers is called the 
principal-agent problem. 
In addition to principal-agent problems, firms in less developed institutional 
environments also face principal-principal agency problems, due to the conflicts in the 
interests of different shareholders.  The principal-principal goal incongruence results 
from weak external governance structures in which the large owners can deprive the 
minority owners from appropriating returns on their investments (Cho, 1999; 
Dharwadkar et al., 2000).   
The principal-principal goal incongruence makes it important to acknowledge 
the influence of ownership identity along with ownership concentration, when 
examining the influence of the ownership structure of a firm on its strategy and 
performance.  The issue of the identity of owners in affecting firms’ strategic 
decisions has recently gained importance in the literature (Douma et al., 2006; 
Johnson & Greening, 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).  The strategic decisions 
that firms make to adapt to the external environment have important short term and 
long term implications for owners and agents in organizations (Floyd & Lane, 2000; 
Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Nooteboom, 1999).  As different shareholders have 
different goals and incentives, their strategic preferences are also likely to be different 
(Hansmann, 1996), making it important to incorporate owners’ identities in an 
investigation of firms’ strategic decisions. 
Along with the internal governance structure, firms’ strategic decisions are 
also influenced by the external governance mechanism, which is dependent on the 
prevailing institutional environment (Holl & Kyriazis, 1997; Kochhar, 1996).  An 
institutional perspective helps us understand how the institutional environment affects 
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external governance mechanism and thereby influences firms’ strategic decisions.  
Using an institutional perspective, scholars have characterized weak institutional 
environments as those that have a weak system of external firm governance (Khanna 
& Palepu, 1997; Peng & Heath, 1996).  In such environments, one can often find 
firms organized in the form of business groups (La Porta et al., 1999).  The weak 
external governance due to less developed institutions makes the principal-principal 
agency problem (Dharwadkar et al., 2000) more severe in the case of business groups.  
The pyramidal ownership structures that are found in many business groups allow 
group owners to indulge in value destroying activities, even with relatively low level 
of direct ownership (Jensen, 1994; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001).  
As a result, dominant owners may indulge in a misappropriation of firm value at the 
expense of the minority owners in the case of group affiliated firms (Bertrand, Mehta, 
& Mullainathan, 2002; Lemmons & Lins, 2003).  This has implications for the 
decisions made by any firm of the group as such decisions have consequences for 
minority owners as well as other member firms of the group.   
Figure 3.1 extends these core ideas as drawn from agency theory and an 
institutional perspective to develop the theoretical framework of this chapter.  I 
elaborate on each of the linkages displayed in this figure and develop the hypotheses 
related to the impact of ownership structure, institutional transition and business 
group affiliation on a firm’s choice to exit a market or collaborate with foreign firms.   
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FIGURE 3.1: 
Model for Firms’ Strategic Choices 
 
 
Hypotheses: H1a: Link 1 (-) 
    H1b: Link 2 (+) 
    H1c: Link 3 (-) & Link 4 (-) 
    H1d: Link 3 < Link 4  
 
    H2a: Link 5 (-) 
    H2b: Link 6 (+) 
    H2c: Link 7 (+) & Link 8 (+) 
    H2d: Link 7 < Link 8  
 
    H3a: Link 9 (∩ shaped) 
    H3b: Link 10 (∩ shaped) 
 
H4a: Link 11 (+) 
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Ownership Concentration and Identity 
According to agency theory, the ability of a shareholder to monitor and play an active 
role in firm governance is determined in part by the ownership stake of that 
shareholder (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986).  Along with ownership 
concentration, the issue of ownership identity is also important because all owners do 
not behave in the same way, even when faced with the same set of ownership level 
based incentives (Monks & Minnow, 1995).   
An owner does not always want to maximize the economic profits; rather the 
owner wants to maximize his/her utility functions, which may or may not include a 
profit maximization dimension (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).  The utility function of 
an owner depends on many factors such as the interests, motivations and the risk 
propensity of the owner, and the nature of the external institutional environment in 
which a firm operates (Brickley et al., 1988; Hansmann, 1996).  Different owners 
may have different utility functions.  As a consequence, different owners will have 
different preferences for the strategic choices a firm makes. 
Owners also differ in their ability to monitor the activity of the managers, 
depending on the nature of relationship between the managers and the owners and 
between different owners.  For example, some owners, such as banks and 
institutional investors may lack the motivation to obtain the information needed to act 
independently.  As a result, banks and institutional investors may follow the decision 
of other more informed owners or managers (Heard & Sherman, 1987; Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 2000).  This is especially true in emerging economies, where the capital 
markets are not as developed as in most developed countries (Dharwadkar et al., 
2000).  While some of the owners may be driven purely by economic rationale and 
may not be influenced by the managers, others may be prone to managers’ influence 
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(Brickley, et al., 1988).  Brickley et al. (1988) categorize these two groups as 
pressure resistant and pressure sensitive owners.  In between these two polar cases, 
there are also pressure indeterminate owners, whose relationship with the managers is 
somewhere in the middle of this continuum: between being purely profit driven and 
actively monitoring the managers to being laissez-fair in their approach towards 
managers (Brickley et al., 1988; Ramaswami et al., 2002).  
This characterization of owners as based on their ability and desire to monitor 
managers and their pressure sensitivity to a firm’s managers helps me identify four 
important ownership groups for emerging economy firms, depending on whether the 
owners are domestic or foreign and private or institutional.  As I detail in the 
following sections, these four ownership groups – domestic private owners, foreign 
private owners, domestic institutional owners and foreign institutional owners – have 
a definite impact on a firm’s decision to exit and to collaborate with foreign firms.  
Exit Decision 
Domestic private owners belong to the pressure sensitive category.  They either 
control and manage the firm, or have close business relationships with the firm in 
which they invest (Venkiteswaram, 2005).  However, domestic owners are also 
concerned about the well being of the firm more than the managers.  When it comes 
to making crucial strategic choices, domestic private owners closely monitor the 
activities of the managers (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000).  Less concentrated ownership in 
the hands of domestic private investors means that the owners do not have sufficient 
power to influence the decision making.  In the case where domestic private 
investors do not have a high level of shareholding and the ownership is distributed 
amongst other groups such as institutional investors, managers are more likely to 
pursue strategies in their own self-interest without giving heed to the interests of any 
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particular set of owners (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Lane et al., 1998).   
As a result, a lower ownership position of domestic private owners increases 
the probability of conflict between the owners and the managers and among different 
owners.  Such conflict between the owners and the management and amongst 
different owners is likely to make the owners disinterested in the firm (Chhibber & 
Majumdar, 1998, 1999; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), and opt for an exit option, rather 
than getting into conflict and damaging their reputation (Dutta, 1997).  On the other 
hand, if the domestic private owners have high ownership stakes, they are more 
effective in monitoring the firm and are more motivated to actively participate in the 
management of the firm (Black, 1998).  Even if the firm may be making losses in the 
short run, owners with high ownership stakes will be less inclined to choose the exit 
option due to their long term horizon (Black, 1998; Blair, 1995), as exit would mean 
losing control over the residual value of the firm.   
Domestic institutional investors, on the other hand are more pressure resistant 
than domestic private owners (Ramaswami et al., 2002).  Domestic institutional 
investors have no business relationships with the firms in which they invest, even 
though they may have personal relationships with the managers due to informal 
business linkages prevalent in emerging economies (Peng, 2003).  However, 
domestic institutional investors in emerging economies are not very good at 
counseling and monitoring firms.  This is because they lack the experience (Frydman 
et al., 1993) as well as skills needed for effective monitoring and counseling (Khanna 
& Palepu, 1999; Rapaczynski, 1996).   
A higher ownership concentration in the hands of the domestic institutional 
investors is likely to increase the chances of a firm opting for an exit strategy in two 
ways.  First, domestic institutional investors, due to their lack of skills and 
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experience, are not likely to perform effective monitoring and provide prudent 
counseling to the firms.  As long as the firm is doing well, these investors are likely 
to rely on the judgments made by the managers and support them (Rapaczynski, 
1996).  However, managers in such firms may find it easy to indulge in opportunistic 
and wealth destroying behavior, making it more likely that the firm may fail and exit.  
Second, if the firm is not doing well, these investors would be the first ones to protect 
their own interests by withdrawing their support for the firm and in the process, 
increase the chances of exit for a firm. Accordingly I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): As the ownership stake of domestic private owners 
increases, the likelihood of a firm exit decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): As the ownership stake of domestic institutional 
owners increases, the likelihood of a firm exit increases.  
 
Foreign owners belong to pressure resistant category as they have a lesser fear 
of retribution by the firms’ managers in case of a conflict with the managers 
(Ramaswami et al., 2002).  Foreign owners are also generally more skilled and have 
more experience in monitoring a firm (Khanna & Palepu, 1999a), than domestic 
owners in an emerging economy.  As a result foreign owners can perform a more 
efficient monitoring function, particularly when they have a high ownership 
concentration.   
Many of the investments by foreign private owners come with technical and/or 
managerial expertise as often moved to a foreign country in the form of a joint 
venture or some other cooperative arrangement (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  Foreign 
ownership stakes are positively associated with the levels of resource commitment, 
technology transfer, and knowledge and skill transfer to the emerging economy firms 
(Chhibber & Majumdar, 1999; Djankov & Hoekman, 2000).  Accordingly, foreign 
private owners contribute to the performance of domestic firms by providing financial, 
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managerial and technical assistance, which is a valuable source of competitive 
advantage for the domestic firms (Djankov & Hoekman, 2000).   
Within the foreign owner category, institutional investors are more pressure 
resistant than private investors as they are primarily driven by profit and growth 
motives.  Foreign institutional investors often have good cross-country exposure by 
investing in multiple markets and multiple businesses.  The depth of the investment 
experience helps foreign institutional investors make more prudent investment 
decisions, often driven purely by a profit motive, as well as to effectively direct 
management in this direction (Kang & Stulz, 1997).  As a result, the presence of 
foreign institutional investors is likely to enhance the survival chances of a domestic 
firm. 
To summarize, I expect there will be a positive effect of ownership 
concentration of foreign owners on firm survival, which will be stronger if the owner 
is an institutional investor. 
Hypothesis 1c (H1c): As the ownership stake of the foreign private or 
foreign institutional owners increases, the likelihood of a firm exit 
decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 1d (H1d): The negative effect of foreign owners’ ownership 
concentration on a firm’s likelihood of exit will be stronger if the owners 
belong to the institutional investor category than if they belong to the 
private owner category.  
 
Collaboration Decision   
Ownership concentration and identity are also important when firms make the 
decision to collaborate with foreign firms.  Firms with concentrated domestic private 
ownership are less likely to collaborate with foreign firms due to the apprehension 
that foreign firms will gradually increase their influence posing a threat to the 
domestic private owners (Lane & Beamish, 1990; Luo, Shenkar, & Nyaw, 2001).  
The apprehension that foreign firms may increase their ownership stakes and acquire 
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the domestic firm is not unfounded.  Foreign firms are known to use local firms to 
penetrate the local market and gradually increase their ownership stakes to gain 
control over the firm or float a new entity to become a competitor with domestic firms 
(Luo, 2001, 2007).  In a study of cross border alliances, Bleeke and Ernst (1991) 
found that more than three-fourth of terminated alliances ended up with an acquisition 
by one of the partners.  A domestic private owner with a large ownership position 
will try to avoid such a scenario in which a foreign firm may take over the domestic 
firm, as it is detrimental to the domestic owner’s vested interests in the firm.   
Domestic institutional investors, as discussed earlier, are more pressure 
resistant than the domestic private owners (Ramaswami et al., 2002).  While they are 
likely to go along with the managers and domestic private investors in many 
situations, they are also concerned about their own interests.  As foreign 
collaborations are often viewed as a means to add value to the domestic firm by 
bringing better technology and other resources (Chhibber & Majumdar, 1998, 1999; 
Djankov & Hoekman, 2000; Luo, 2002), domestic institutional investors are likely to 
encourage foreign collaborations to enhance the market value of their own 
investments, even if the foreign collaborations are opposed by the domestic private 
investors.  As a net result, I expect domestic private investors to discourage foreign 
collaborations, while domestic institutional investors to encourage foreign 
collaborations.  
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): As the ownership concentration of domestic private 
owners increases, a firm’s likelihood to collaborate with foreign firms 
decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): As the ownership concentration of domestic 
institutional owners increases, a firm’s likelihood to collaborate with 




Similar to domestic institutional owners, foreign private and foreign 
institutional owners are also likely to increase the chances of foreign collaboration for 
several reasons.  First, foreign owners are not likely to view collaborations as a 
threat to their position in the firm.  Foreign owners have more experience and 
financial resources to thwart any effort to dilute their position in the venture by other 
foreign collaborators (Holst & Winzell, 2000).  In addition, the domestic firm in 
which the foreign owner has a stake is likely to be one of the many ventures of the 
foreign owner.  As a result the foreign owner may not be unduly worried about the 
chances of dilution of their ownership position due to other foreign collaborators.   
Second, the presence of foreign owners is likely to strengthen the competitive 
position of the domestic firms, making it a more lucrative target for other foreign 
firms to collaborate (Djankov & Hoekman, 2000).  Foreign owners also make the 
domestic firm more visible for other foreign firms due to the media attention on 
foreign firms’ activities in domestic markets.  Other foreign firms prefer to 
collaborate with domestic firms that are strong, well known and covered by the mass 
media (Kang & Stulz, 1997; Falkenstein, 1996).  Finally, presence of a foreign 
owner may result in further collaborations with the same foreign owner or with other 
foreign firms, which may have some relationship with the foreign owner.  For 
example, when Japanese firms invest in foreign countries, they tend to duplicate the 
relationships they have with other Japanese firms.  Such duplication results in a 
‘Kieretsu’ kind of relationship between the local firm and other Japanese firms in 
foreign countries (Keeley, 2001). 
Within the foreign owner category, institutional owners make investments 
with pure profit motives (Ramaswami et al., 2002), without any concern for their 
status or position in the domestic firms.  They will encourage any move, which is 
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likely to enhance the market value of the firm, to increase the value of their own 
investments.  As a result, a higher ownership by the foreign institutional owners may 
have a stronger impact than a higher ownership by the foreign private owners, on a 
firm’s likelihood of collaborating with foreign firms 
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): As the ownership concentration of foreign private or 
foreign institutional owners increases, a firm’s likelihood of collaboration 
with foreign firms increases. 
 
Hypothesis 2d (H2d): The positive effect of foreign owners’ ownership 
concentration on a firm’s likelihood of collaboration with foreign firms 
will be stronger if the owners belong to the institutional investor category 
than if they belong to the private owner category.  
 
Impact of Institutional Transition 
The process of institutional transition in emerging economies results in a gradual 
development of various institutions needed to support efficient market-based 
transactions (Li, Park, & Li, 2004; Peng, 2003).  During the process of transition, a 
government liberalizes and opens up the domestic market for local as well as foreign 
players (Ahluwalia, 1996).  As a result, more local players can enter the market, and 
the existing players can increase their capacity without any restrictions.  The overall 
effect is increased competition and a growing competitive threat to incumbents 
(Kosova, 2004).  An increased competitive intensity often leads to an erosion of 
profits (Gersoki, 1995), and is likely to threaten an incumbent’s position in the market 
as well as its access to resources.  This may in turn affect the survival of the 
incumbents (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Scherer, 1990).  
Institutional transition also results in an increase in competition from foreign 
firms as the restrictions on foreign entry are gradually removed.  Foreign firms 
create competitive pressures in the domestic markets due to their ownership specific 
advantages (Dunning, 1993).  The entry of foreign players alters the industrial and 
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competitive structure as the demand for scare resources is heightened (Kosova, 2004).  
Domestic firms often find it difficult to retain their talent, or retain their previously 
secured access to natural and other resources.  Institutional transition may thus result 
in domestic firms being driven out of certain industries by multinational firms (Caves, 
1996). 
In addition to creating a more competitive environment, institutional transition 
also creates opportunities for firms to enter new product market segments (Hopkins, 
2003; Khandwalla, 2002; Peng, 2003).  The new opportunities could come from the 
segments which were previously reserved for certain types of firms (such as small 
scale industries), or from new business segments (such as business process 
outsourcing or telecommunications) (Hopkins, 2003).  These additional 
opportunities mean that entrepreneurs and investors have many options, if the existing 
ventures no longer remain profitable.   
The increased competitive intensity results in many firms opting for an exit 
option (Kosova, 2004).  This effect is likely to be more pronounced in the initial 
years, when incumbents would have yet not accumulated enough experience to 
operate in a more competitive environment.  During the initial years of the transition 
process, the direction and pace of institutional change is not clear as government 
policies evolve and change during the process (Park et al., 2006).  There are 
conflicting demands from multiple influence groups, including external donor 
agencies, non-governmental organizations, trade unions, political parties and other 
domestic constituents, adding to the overall turbulence in the environment 
(McNamara & Vaaler, 2000).  At the same time, new business opportunities are 
likely to be more lucrative in the initial years due to less competition.  The 
cumulative effect of a high level of turbulence and availability of new business 
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opportunities would mean an increased incidence of exit by the incumbents 
(Goodstein & Boeker, 1991).   
However, the effect of both competition and new opportunities, is likely to 
become less pronounced over time.  Over time, the direction and pace of institutional 
transition becomes more predictable, making the environment relatively stable (Peng, 
2003).  Firms also learn to operate in the new environment.  At the same time, 
attractiveness of newly opened business segments becomes less as more and more 
firms enter these segments.  The cumulative effect is a reduced likelihood of exit in 
the later period of institutional transition.    
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): A domestic firm’s likelihood of exit is most 
pronounced in the early years of an institutional transition, but the effect 
becomes less pronounced in the later years of an institutional transition. 
 
Institutional transition creates a liberalized environment and opens up 
opportunities for foreign firms to enter local markets (Ramamurti, 2001).  However, 
foreign firms find it difficult to enter the local market on their own in the initial years 
for two reasons.  First, local governments are cautious in welcoming foreign firms in 
the initial years and keep changing their policies in the course of institutional 
transition (Kennedy, 1993).  These policies could relate to ownership restrictions, 
profit repatriation laws, import restrictions, export obligations and relationships 
between the foreign firm and local stakeholders, all of which have important 
implications for foreign firms to decide on their long term commitments for the local 
market (Ramamurti, 2001).   
Second, foreign firms lack the experience and skills to operate in the domestic 
markets on their own, at least during the initial few years of liberalization (Luo, 2001).  
As a result, foreign firms prefer to collaborate with local firms who can provide them 
with the legitimacy and knowledge to navigate the local environment.  Partnering 
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with foreign firms is beneficial for domestic firms also, as foreign firms provide 
financial, technical and managerial resources to the local firms (Chhibber & 
Majumdar, 1999, 2005).   
As the transition progresses and local government policies become more stable, 
a foreign firm becomes better able to cope with transition and is more accepted in the 
transitional economy.  Foreign firms also gain market knowledge and experience of 
operating in the local environment, and become more capable of making an 
independent entry (Luo, 2001).  At the same time, local firms develop their resources 
and capabilities on their own or in association with other foreign firms, reducing their 
need of further collaborations.  The net effect is a reduction in the extent of 
collaborative activities between domestic firms and foreign firms after the initial few 
years of institutional transition.  Accordingly, I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): A domestic firm’s likelihood of collaborating with 
foreign firms is most pronounced in the early years of an institutional 
transition, but the effect becomes less pronounced in the later years of an 
institutional transition. 
 
Business Group Affiliation 
The presence of business groups in many emerging economies can be attributed to the 
weak institutional environment in these economies (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  
Business groups in emerging economies often indulge in a high level of unrelated 
diversification.  The general consensus of diversification research done in the 
developed economy contexts is that unrelated diversification is associated with 
inferior firm performance (Mayer & Whittington, 2003).  However, unrelated 
diversification may be a profitable strategy in emerging economies due to weak 
institutional environments (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000a).  With the improvement 
in various dimensions of the institutional environment, unrelated diversification is 
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likely to become harmful for firms which pursued the unrelated diversification 
strategy successfully in a weaker environment (Gaur & Delios, 2006; Hoskisson et al., 
2005; Lee et al., 2004).  This has a consequence for those firms of a business group, 
which may be operating in non-core areas from the group’s point of view.  Such 
firms face a higher risk of exit, if the group decides to reorganize its activities and 
focus on a few core areas.  
Scholars have also found that business groups often indulge in tunneling 
resources from one firm to the other (Bertrand et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 1999).  
Tunneling can take many forms such as intrafirm transactions at non-market rates, 
leasing of assets, and providing loans at non-market rates.  In the extreme case, the 
group owner may decide to systematically transfer the assets of one of the firms, 
which may not fit into future scheme of things for the group, to other group affiliated 
firms, and declare the firm as bankrupt in due course, or sell it off to potential buyers.  
Even with a poorer resource base, group affiliated firms make a lucrative target for 
other firms to acquire due to the prospects of carrying forward the relationships the 
target firm may have with other firms of the group (Purbasari & Mobarak, 2006).   
On the other hand, it may be difficult for the owners of the unaffiliated firms 
to choose an exit option (Varma, 1997).  The owners of unaffiliated firms, unlike 
their counter parts of group affiliated firms, do not have the option to tunnel valuable 
resources of their firms before exiting the market.  The owners may not be entitled to 
any residual claim for their investments, if the unaffiliated firms decide to go bankrupt, 
as the debtors have a preference over shareholders (RBI, 2001).  Thus these owners 
have no incentive to choose the exit option and will opt for exit only when the firm is 
not able to sustain its operations.  For an equally weak resource base, the unaffiliated 
firms also make less lucrative acquisition targets than group affiliated firms, as the 
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acquisition of these firms does not bring any additional benefits to the acquirers.  As 
a result, I expect the group affiliated firms to be at a higher risk of exit than the 
unaffiliated ones. 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): Firms affiliated to business groups are more likely 
to exit than the unaffiliated firms. 
 
As discussed earlier, domestic firms derive several benefits by collaborating 
with foreign firms.  However, the benefits of foreign collaborations are likely to be 
stronger for group affiliated firms than unaffiliated firms as the benefits do not accrue 
only to the collaborating firm, but are shared amongst all the group members (Khanna 
& Palepu, 2000a).  The learning obtained by one firm from a foreign collaboration 
can be easily transferred to other group members through internal transfer and rotation 
of the employees (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  The positive reputational benefits 
associated with foreign collaborations are also shared by all the firms (Khanna & 
Yafeh, 2005).  
From the point of view of foreign firms also, group affiliated firms are more 
lucrative targets for collaboration in emerging economies (Lu & Ma, 2007; Purbasari 
& Mobarak, 2006; Wang, Wee, & Koh, 1999).  Foreign firms can tap into a group’s 
social capital and group wide resources, by partnering with any member firm of the 
group.  As a result, group affiliated firms are more likely to collaborate with foreign 
firms. 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): Firms affiliated to business groups are more likely 






To test the arguments presented in this chapter, we need a setting in which substantial 
changes have taken place on various externally evolving and formally enforced 
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institutions at a very broad level.  As elaborated in the previous chapter, India from 
1991 onwards provides such a research laboratory as a substantial level of 
institutional transitions has taken place in India in the past 15 years.   
Data Sources and Measures 
The base data for this essay comes from the Prowess database of the Center for 
Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).  The 2005 edition of Prowess has data on 
9,926 firms from 1989 till 2005.  The Prowess database includes all the companies 
traded on India's major stock exchanges and numerous non-listed including the central 
public sector enterprises and foreign enterprises.  These companies account for 75% 
of all corporate taxes and more than 95% of the excise duty collected by the federal 
government.  I restrict the sample to only publicly listed manufacturing firms as the 
details on ownership structure are not available for unlisted firms.  This restriction 
results in an unbalanced panel of sample size varying between 3,112 firms (year) to 
4,151 firms (year).  
Many scholars have utilized the Prowess database to study Indian firms (e.g., 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Bertrand et al., 2002, Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Ramaswami et 
al., 2002).  To confirm the reliability of the data obtained from the Prowess database, 
I obtained data on a random sample of 317 firms the for 1997-2001 period, from 
Capitaline.  The Capitaline database, maintained by Capital Market Publishers India 
Ltd., is an alternate source of firm level data on Indian firms.  It has a similar 
coverage of firms and variables as in the case of Prowess database.  My comparison 
between the Prowess and Capitaline data for the sub-sample of 317 firms reveals no 
difference in values of different variables. 
Dependent variables. There are two dependent variables in this study.  These 
include the choice to exit and the choice to collaborate.   
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Exit Decision. The information on firm exit comes from the annual filing of closure 
applications with a federal department under the Finance Ministry of the Government 
of India.  A total of 4,366 firms filed for closure during the 1991-2005 period.  A 
matching between the database on closures and the Prowess database reveals that 
1,008 firms in the base data filed for closure.  I also consider firms which merged or 
were acquired during the period of this study to have exited the market.  The 
information on this variable comes from the Prowess data base.  The Prowess data 
base identifies a total of 442 firms to have merged during the 17 year time period 
from 1990-2005.  Thus I obtain information on a total of 1,450 exits during the 
1990-2005 time period.  Figure 3.2 shows the annual distribution of different types 
of exits.  Of the total 1,450 exits, the sample of this study included 404 exits.  346 
of these exits were by closure, while 58 were by merger/acquisition.  The dependent 
variable takes a value of 1, when a firm exited the market by closure or 
merger/acquisition, and 0 otherwise.  I also test the likelihood of exit by closure and 
exit by merger/acquisition in two separate analyses.    
FIGURE 3.2:  





















Collaboration Decision. The information on foreign collaborations comes from the 
Annual List of Foreign Collaborations, published by the India Investment Center, a 
Government of India organization.  The Government of India approved a total of 
19,327 technical and financial collaborations between Indian firms and foreign firms 
during the 1991-2001 period.  A matching with the Prowess data reveals that 1,807 
firms formed 4,704 collaborations during this time period.  These collaborations 
comprised 2,892 technical collaborations and 1,762 financial collaborations.  Figure 
3.3 shows the annual distributions of different types of collaborations.  The sample 
of this study included 1084 collaborations.  These comprised 772 technical and 312 
financial collaborations.   
FIGURE 3.3:  
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I operationalized the collaboration decision as a choice variable as well as a 
count variable.  For the choice variable, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a 
firm entered into any foreign collaboration in a particular year, and 0 otherwise.  For 
the count variable, the dependent variable is the total number of foreign collaborations 
a firm had in a particular year.  In each of these cases, I conducted analyses 
considering the technical and financial collaborations separately.   
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Explanatory variables. The explanatory variables include the ownership variables, 
business group affiliation, and institutional transition.  For ownership, I use the 
percentage of ownership held by the four categories of owners – domestic private, 
domestic institutional, foreign private and foreign institutional.  The Prowess 
database provides information on the ownership holdings of different types of owners.  
Ramaswami et al. (2002) utilized the ownership information given in the Prowess 
database in their study of ownership-diversification relationship in the case of Indian 
firms.   
I operationalize the group affiliation variable as 1 if a firm belonged to a 
business group and 0 otherwise.  The Prowess database provides unambiguous 
information about the identity of an owner from which one can identify whether a 
firm is affiliated to a business group or if it is state-owned, foreign-owned or privately 
held.  As mentioned earlier, I did not include state owned and foreign owned firms in 
my sample.  Other scholars (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Chacar & Vissa, 2005) have 
also utilized the information given in the Prowess data base to identify whether a firm 
belonged to a business group or not. 
I operationalize institutional transition as a time trend variable, which varies 
from 1 to 15, between the years of 1991 and 2005.  An observation takes a value of 1, 
and then there is an increment of 1 for each year, with an observation in 2005 having 
a value of 15.  As I showed in Chapter 2, a time trend is significantly related with 
several indicators that suggest gradual development in the institutions related to 
product markets, capital markets and labor markets in India during the 1991-2005 
period.  Khanna and Palepu (2000b: 279) in the case of Chile, and Lee et al., (2004) 
in the case of South Korea use a similar approach to operationalize institutional 
transition. 
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Control variables. I control for firm level, and industry level effects previously 
controlled in literature.  Firm level variables include firm size, age, and 
technological and marketing capabilities, which I obtained from the Prowess database.  
I measure firm size as a natural logarithm of the total assets of a firm.  Firm age is 
the number of years elapsed since the founding of a firm till the year in the study.  I 
measure technology and marketing capabilities as the ratio of research and 
development expenditure over total sales and advertising and marketing expenditure 
over total sales, respectively.  I lag the technological and marketing capabilities, and 
ownership specific variables by one year.  I control for industry level variation by 
creating 23 industry indicator variables for the industry categories at the level 
equivalent to 2-digit SIC classification.  
Analytic Procedure 
I investigate the choices to exit and collaborate using an exponential event history 
estimation in which no age parametric dependence is specified in its functional form 
(Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1995).  This technique models the transition rate from an 
origin state (no exit/collaboration) to a destination state (an exit/collaboration) as a 
function of the prescribed covariates.  Its general form is: 
rjk = exp (αjk0 + Ajk1αjk1 + Ajk2αjk2…) 
where rjk is the transition rate from the origin state j to the destination state k (an 
exit/collaboration), with the observed covariate vector Ajk, parameters to be estimated 
αjk, and constant αjk0.  In the modeling, the covariate vector, Ajk1…N, comprises 
control variables, industry indicators and the variables related to ownership structure, 
institutional transition and business group affiliation.  The relationship between the 
covariates and the transition rate is specified as log-linear to ensure transition rate 
estimates are not negative, and estimation uses the maximum likelihood method.  
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The exponential event history model described above is more suitable than 
some other models such as a Cox semi-parametric model, and a discrete time hazard 
specification.  Exponential model estimates a baseline hazard rate, and allows the 
hazards rates to vary with time.  The Cox regression, on the other hand, makes no 
assumptions about the shape of the hazard over time and does not estimate the 
baseline effects, which results in a loss of efficiency in estimating the coefficients 
(Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez, 2004).  This makes exponential estimation superior to 
other semi parametric hazard models.   
To estimate the models, I developed a longitudinal sample of all the firms in 
the study to include all possible years t in which firm i could exit the market or form a 
collaboration with foreign firms.  I continued all observations until the end of 2005 
for the models testing the exit decision, and 2001 for the models testing the 
collaboration decision.  The models were right-censored at the end of the 
observation period.   
I also used Random effects Panel data Poisson estimation, when I 
operationalized the collaboration variable as an annual count of the foreign 
collaborations for a domestic firm.  I assessed the suitability of the Poisson 
estimation over negative binomial estimation using BIC values, which indicated no 
difference between the coefficients obtained from Poisson and negative Binomial 
estimation.  Further, I tested the appropriateness of random effects models by 
running fixed effects models and comparing the coefficient estimates using 
Hausman’s test.  The test revealed no significant difference between the random 
effect and fixed effect coefficients.  
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RESULTS 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations.  45% of the firms in the 
sample are affiliated to a business group.  Average ownership by domestic private, 
foreign private, domestic institutional and foreign institutional owners is 45.5%, 2.5%, 
5.1%, and 1.4% respectively.  None of the firms has a foreign ownership in excess of 
50%.  The maximum domestic institutional ownership is 65% while the maximum 
foreign institutional ownership is 39%.  The correlations are very modest, with the 
highest value being 0.46 between size of firm and group affiliation variable. 
Exit Decision 
Table 3.2 presents the results of exponential event history analysis on a firm’s choice 
to exit.  Model 1 has only control variables.  Model 2 has all the hypothesized 
effects other than the square term of the institutional transition variable, which I 
introduce in Model 3.  Models 5 and 6 present results of robustness tests.  In each 
model, I report the coefficient estimate along with the standard error.  A negative 
coefficient suggests that an increase in the independent variable reduces the chances 








TABLE 3.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations a  
 
Variables Mean S. D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Age  23.72 20.84 --            
2. Size (Log of total assets) 3.54 1.70 0.27 --           
3. Marketing intensity 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.17 --          
4. Technological intensity 0.001 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.00 --         
5. Group affiliation 0.45 0.50 0.21 0.46 0.09 0.00 --        
6. Time (Institutional transition) 8.53 3.98 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.13 --       
7. Domestic private owner b 45.50 20.96 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 --      
8. Foreign private owner b 2.50 9.22 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.10 -0.01 -0.26 --     
9. Domestic institutional owner b 5.11 8.16 0.18 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.25 -0.10 -0.17 -0.01 --    
10. Foreign institutional owner b 1.44 4.38 0.06 0.35 0.09 0.00 0.20 0.00 -0.07 0.02 0.19 --   
11. Exit (=1) 0.02 0.13 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 --  
12. Collaboration (=1) 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.13 -0.16 -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.14 -0.02 -- 
a Based on a sample of 23,834 firm year observations during 1991 – 2005 time period. 






TABLE 3.2: Exponential Event History Analysis (Event: Exit = 1) 
 
 
 Exit by closure or merge Exit by closure Exit by merger 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables           
Age -0.001 0.003 -0.006* 0.003 -0.005† 0.003 -0.005† 0.003 -0.001 0.006 
Size (Log assets) -0.122*** 0.031 -0.125*** 0.033 -0.126*** 0.033 -0.154*** 0.036 0.068*** 0.091 
Marketing intensity 1.729 1.555 1.447 1.538 1.586 1.593 1.566 1.766 1.403 3.668 
R & D intensity -26.828 21.832 -25.146 22.392 -28.076 23.314 -35.022 29.342 -10.429 31.903 
Hypothesized Effects           
Domestic private owner   -0.007*** 0.003 -0.006** 0.003 -0.007** 0.003 0.003 0.007 
Domestic institutional owner    0.027*** 0.005 0.026*** 0.005 0.031*** 0.005 -0.009 0.018 
Foreign private owner   -0.011† 0.007 -0.010 0.007 -0.005 0.007 -0.082† 0.050 
Foreign institutional owner   -0.145*** 0.034 -0.139*** 0.033 -0.155*** 0.041 -0.111* 0.056 
Institutional transition (Time)   0.148*** 0.014 0.988*** 0.114 0.915*** 0.117 2.636*** 0.642 
Institutional transition (Time) sq.     -0.044*** 0.006 -0.041*** 0.006 -0.110*** 0.028 
Group affiliation   0.452*** 0.114 0.506*** 0.115 0.254* 0.126 2.306*** 0.409 
Observations  23,834 23,834 23,834 23,834 23,834 
No. of Exits 406 406 406 348 58 
χ2 21.52*** 213.50*** 296.02*** 256.89*** 132.87 
Log Likelihood -2048.67 -1952.69 -1911.43 -1690.43 -340.63 
 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<.10 (all two-tailed tests) 
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H1a predicted that an increase in the ownership stake of the domestic private 
owners will reduce the likelihood of a firm exit.  The negatively signed coefficient 
(p<0.001) on the domestic private ownership variable supports H1a.  H1b predicted 
that an increase in the ownership stake of the domestic institutional owners will 
increase the likelihood of a firm exit.  The positively signed coefficient (p<0.001) on 
the domestic institutional ownership variable supports H1b.  I present these effects in 
Figure 3.4.  As shown in the figure, the probability of exit reduces with an increase 
in the ownership of domestic private owners (H1a), but increases with an increase in 
the domestic institutional owners (H1b). 
FIGURE 3.4:  
Effect of Domestic Ownership on Firm Exit  
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H1c predicted that an increase in the ownership stake of the foreign (private or 
institutional) owners will reduce the likelihood of a firm exit.  The coefficient on 
foreign private ownership variable is negative but significant only in some models.  
The coefficient on foreign institutional ownership variable is negative and significant 
(p<0.001) across all the models.  Thus, H1c is partially supported.  H1d predicted 
that the negative effect of foreign owners’ ownership concentration on a firm’s 
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likelihood of exit will be stronger if the owners belong to institutional investor 
category than if they belong to private owner category.  I compared the coefficients 
of foreign institutional ownership and foreign private ownership variables across the 
models using a Wald test for linear hypotheses.  I found that the coefficient for 
foreign institutional ownership variable was significantly more negative (p<0.001) 
than the coefficient of the foreign private ownership variable, in all the models.  
Thus H1d is supported.   
Figure 3.5 shows the effects hypothesized in H1c and H1d.  As shown in the 
figure, an increase in the ownership of foreign private owners as well as foreign 
institutional owners reduces the probability of exit (H1c).  Further, as predicted by 
H1d, there is a sharper reduction in the probability of exit with an increase in the 
ownership of foreign institutional owners than that of foreign private owners. 
FIGURE 3.5:  
Effect of Foreign Ownership on Firm Exit  
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Next I look at the impact of institutional transition and business group 
affiliation on the likelihood of a firm exit.  H3a predicted that a firm’s likelihood of 
exit increases during the early period of institutional transition, but starts decreasing 
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during the later period of institutional transition.  The coefficient on the linear term 
of institutional transition variable is positive and significant (p<0.001), while that on 
the square term is negative and significant (p<0.001), providing support to the 
inverted ‘U’ shaped relationship between institutional transition and the likelihood of 
a firm exit.  H4a predicted that the likelihood of exit will be more for group affiliated 
firms than the unaffiliated firms.  The coefficient for the group affiliation variable is 
positive and significant (p<0.001) in all the models, providing support to H4a. 
I present the effects of institutional transition and business group affiliation in 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7.  Figure 3.6 shows the inverted ‘U’ shaped relationship between 
institutional transition and the probability of exit (H3a), which remains higher for 
group affiliated firms at all time periods during institutional transition (H4a).  Figure 
3.7 further shows that that the group affiliated firms have a higher probability of exit 
than the unaffiliated firms (H4a). 
FIGURE 3.6:  

























FIGURE 3.7:  






















Table 3.3 presents the results of exponential event history analysis on a firm’s choice 
to collaborate with foreign firms.  Table 3.4 presents the results of the Random 
effects panel data Poisson estimation, when the dependent variable is a count variable.  
A positive coefficient suggests that an increase in the independent variable increases 
the chances that a firm will collaborate with a foreign firm. 
H2a predicted that an increase in the ownership stake of the domestic private 
owners will reduce the domestic firms’ likelihood of forming collaborations with 
foreign firms.  In Table 3.3, the coefficient of domestic private ownership is 
insignificant.  However, in Table 3.4, the coefficient of domestic private ownership 
is negative and significant (p<0.001) in all the models.  This suggests that domestic 
private ownership does not affect the likelihood of forming collaborations with 
foreign firms; but negatively affects the total number of foreign collaborations a 
domestic firm is likely to form in a year.   
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TABLE 3.3: Exponential Event History Analysis (Event: Collaborate = 1) 
 
 All Collaborations Technical Collaborations 
Financial 
Collaborations 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables           
Age 0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.009** 0.003 
Size (Log assets) 0.405*** 0.019 0.405*** 0.027 0.398*** 0.027 0.449*** 0.031 0.377*** 0.048 
Marketing intensity -0.862 1.084 0.661 1.029 1.359 1.120 1.500 1.278 3.039 1.908 
R & D intensity -0.186 1.720 0.432 0.813 0.481 1.045 0.668 0.872 0.272 3.097 
Hypothesized Effects           
Domestic private owner   -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.003 
Domestic institutional owner    0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.007 
Foreign private owner   0.010*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.003 0.009* 0.005 
Foreign institutional owner   0.024*** 0.005 0.027*** 0.005 0.023*** 0.006 0.037*** 0.008 
Institutional transition (Time)   -0.203*** 0.009 0.382*** 0.040 0.369*** 0.046 0.562*** 0.082 
Institutional transition (Time) sq.     -0.047*** 0.003 -0.048*** 0.004 -0.057*** 0.006 
Group affiliation   0.347*** 0.085 0.407*** 0.085 0.440*** 0.101 0.259*** 0.148 
Observations  23,834 23,834 23,834 23,834 23,834 
No. of Exits 1,084 1,084 1,023 772 312 
χ2 484.35*** 1282.80*** 1590.62*** 1374.55*** 450.11 
Log Likelihood -4001.61 -3602.39 -3448.48 -2732.60 -1439.73 
 
 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<.10 (all two-tailed tests) 
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TABLE 3.4: Panel Data Poisson Estimation (Random Effects) Results  
(Dependent Variable: Number of Collaborations) 
 
 All Collaborations Technical Collaborations 
Financial 
Collaborations 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Control variables           
Age 0.004*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.000 -0.008*** 0.001 
Size (Log assets) 0.578*** 0.005 0.441*** 0.006 0.441*** 0.006 0.495*** 0.007 0.304*** 0.012 
Marketing intensity 0.466* 0.242 -0.136 0.260 -0.136 0.260 -0.904** 0.316 2.211*** 0.450 
R & D intensity 0.720*** 0.061 0.714*** 0.062 0.714*** 0.062 0.738*** 0.076 0.683*** 0.109 
Hypothesized Effects           
Domestic private owner   -0.005*** 0.000 -0.005*** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.007*** 0.001 
Domestic institutional owner    0.002* 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006*** 0.002 
Foreign private owner   0.007*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.001 0.010*** 0.001 
Foreign institutional owner   0.028*** 0.001 0.028*** 0.001 0.024*** 0.001 0.037*** 0.002 
Institutional transition (Time)   0.102* 0.046 0.539*** 0.103 0.523*** 0.092 0.483*** 0.053 
Institutional transition (Time) sq.     -0.028*** 0.006 -0.027*** 0.006 -0.022*** 0.003 
Group affiliation   0.441*** 0.021 0.441*** 0.021 0.509*** 0.026 0.308*** 0.039 
Observations  23,834 23,834 23,834 23,834 23,834 
Wald χ2 18175*** 20836*** 20880*** 17935*** 3506*** 
Log Likelihood -28801 -28041 -28035 -22608 -11320 
 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<.10 (all two-tailed tests) 
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H2b predicted that an increase in the ownership stake of the domestic 
institutional owners will increase a domestic firm’s likelihood of forming 
collaborations with foreign firms. The domestic institutional ownership variable is 
insignificant in Table 3.3, but positive and significant in Table 3.4, suggesting that 
domestic institutional ownership is positively associated with the number of foreign 
collaboration of a domestic firm.  Thus H2a and H2b are only partially supported. 
H2c predicted that an increase in the ownership stake of the foreign (private 
and institutional) owners will increase a domestic firm’s likelihood of forming 
collaborations with foreign firms.  The coefficients of both foreign private and 
foreign institutional ownership variables are positive and significant (p<0.001) in all 
models in Table 3.3 as well as Table 3.4.  This provides strong support to H2c.   
H2d predicted that the positive effect of foreign owners’ ownership 
concentration on a firm’s likelihood of exit will be stronger if the owners belong to 
the institutional investor category than if they belong to the private owner category.  
I compared the coefficients of foreign institutional ownership and foreign private 
ownership variables across the models using Wald test for linear hypotheses.  I 
found that the coefficient for the foreign institutional ownership variable was 
significantly more positive (p<0.001) than the coefficient of the foreign private 
ownership variable, in all the models.  This provides support to H2d. 
Figure 3.8 shows the effects hypothesized in H2c and H2d.  As shown in the 
figure, probability of forming foreign collaborations increases with an increase in the 
foreign private and foreign institutional ownership (H2c).  The increase is however 
sharper in the case of foreign institutional owners than foreign private owners (H2d).  
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FIGURE 3.8:  
Effect of Foreign Ownership on Foreign Collaboration  
































Next I look at the impact of institutional transition and business group 
affiliation on a domestic firm’s likelihood of forming collaborations with the foreign 
firms.  H3b predicted that a domestic firm’s likelihood of forming collaborations 
with foreign firms will increase during the early period of institutional transition, but 
decrease during the later period of institutional transition.  The coefficients of the 
linear term of the institutional transition variable is positive and significant (p<0.001), 
while that of the square term is negative and significant (p<0.001) across the models 
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, providing support to the inverted ‘U’ shaped relationship 
between institutional transition and the likelihood of forming collaborations with 
foreign firms.  H4b predicted that the likelihood of collaboration will be more for 
group affiliated firms than the unaffiliated firms.  The coefficient for the group 
affiliation variable is positive and significant (p<0.001) in all the models in Tables 3.3 
and 3.4, providing support to H4b. 
I present the effects of institutional transition and business group affiliation in 
Figures 3.9 and 3.10.  Figure 3.9 shows the inverted ‘U’ shaped relationship between 
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institutional transition and the likelihood of forming foreign collaborations (H3b), 
which remains higher for group affiliated firms at all time periods during institutional 
transition (H4b).  Figure 3.10 reinforces the point that group affiliated firms have a 
higher probability of forming foreign collaborations than the unaffiliated firms (H4b). 
FIGURE 3.9:  





























FIGURE 3.10:  




























I tested the stability of the results by considering the dependent variables at a more 
disaggregated level.  I disaggregated the choice to exit into two ways through which 
firms exercise the exit option – by closing down the firm, or by merging with other 
firms.  Models 4 and 5 in Table 3.2 present the results of the analyses when the 
dependent variable is exit by closure and exit by merger, respectively.  The 
coefficients for the hypothesized effects are qualitatively similar in these models with 
the exception of domestic (private and institutional) ownership variables in the case of 
exit by merger.  The coefficients of domestic private and domestic institutional 
owners are not significant in Model 6, when the dependent variable is exit by merger, 
suggesting that domestic ownership has no effect on a firm’s likelihood of exit by 
merger.  
Likewise, I re-ran the analyses on collaboration variable by considering the 
two broad categories of collaborations between domestic and foreign firms – technical 
and financial collaborations.  I present these results in Models 4 and 5 in Tables 3.3 
and 3.4.  Here again the coefficients on the hypothesized effects remain qualitatively 
similar across the models in both the tables. 
To allay the concerns about the causality of the hypothesized relationships, I 
lagged all the dependent variables (including ownership variables) by one and two 
years.  The results were similar.  I also included past firm performance (return on 
assets, lagged by 2 and 3 years) in the models to control for the effect of past 
performance on a firm’s strategic choice.  The results were robust to inclusion of 
past performance as a control variable.  
Finally, I employed other hazard model specifications, such as a Cox 
semi-parametric model, a discrete time hazard specification, and negative binomial 
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estimation (for collaborations).  I found that the results were robust to these alternate 
specifications. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the strategic choices firms make during a period of 
institutional transition.  In this study, I develop an agency and institutional theory 
perspective on this phenomenon.  The two strategic choices I examine are the choice 
to exit a market, and the choice to collaborate with foreign firms.  I argue that the 
ownership concentration of different types of owners, along with their identity, has an 
influence on the strategic choices firms make.  Further, during different phases of 
institutional transition, firms experience different types of environmental influences, 
and accordingly make different strategic choices.  Finally, I argue that business 
group affiliation affects the strategic choices that firms make. 
The empirical analyses demonstrate that different types of owners have 
different preferences when firms make strategic choices.  An increase in the 
ownership of domestic private owners reduces the probability of exit; whereas an 
increase in the ownership of domestic institutional owners increases the probability of 
exit.  With respect to foreign owners, an increase in the ownership of foreign private 
or foreign institutional onwers, is associated with a decrease in the probability of exit.  
These findings support the view that concentrated ownership in the hands of private 
owners enhances the longevity of firms in emerging economies, because it results in a 
more effective monitoring and control of a firm’s management (Claessens et al., 
2000).  Ownership by foreign owners reduces the likelihood of emerging economy 
firms choosing an exit option (Ranko, Richard, & Wolfgang, 2003; Svejnar & 
Kocenda, 2002).   
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When it comes to forming collaborations, I found that domestic private owners 
do not prefer to collaborate with foreign firms, whereas foreign owners, both private 
and institutional, prefer to collaborate with foreign firms.  These findings are 
consistent with my arguments that domestic owners are pressure sensitive 
(Ramaswami et al., 2002), and do not want to risk losing control over the firm by 
inviting foreign firms to collaborate.  Foreign owners, on the other hand are pressure 
resistant, and take decisions to maximize their profit and have growth seeking motives.  
The higher magnitude of the impact of foreign institutional investors than foreign 
private investors confirms the notion that foreign institutional investors are more 
pressure resistant.  These findings support the view that studies investigating the 
strategic consequences of ownership structure need to incorporate the role of owners’ 
identity, their motivations and incentives along with the ownership concentration 
(David et al., 1998). 
Analyzing the impact of institutional transition on strategic choices, I found an 
inverted ‘U’ shaped relationship between institutional transition and a firm’s 
likelihood to choose exit or collaboration strategies.  There was a high incidence of 
exit as well as collaborative activities during the initial years of institutional transition.  
However, the probability of exit and collaboration became less as the institutional 
transition progressed.  This finding supports Newman’s (2000) hypothesis of an 
inverted ‘U’ shaped relationship between institution level changes and organizational 
changes.   
With regards to business group affiliation, we found that group affiliated firms 
are more likely to choose the “exit” as well as “collaborate” options with other foreign 
firms as compared to unaffiliated firms.  A higher incidence of exit by group 
affiliated firms contradicts the dominant logic in the business group literature that 
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groups fill institutional voids in emerging economies (Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna 
& Palepu, 1997, 2000a, b).  Scholars have argued that in weak institutional 
environments, group structure provides firms with a way to bypass the less efficient 
external markets for product, capital and labor.  This results in improved 
competitiveness and performance of group affiliated firms.  However, I found that 
not all the affiliated firms may be able to benefit from the group affiliation, and 
groups may have to exit some of the businesses to maintain the competitiveness of 
other firms of the group.  
Even though I do not test for the performance consequences of group 
affiliation, a higher incidence of exit does suggest that group affiliated firms may be 
finding it more difficult to compete in the changed institutional environment in 
emerging economies.  Gaur and Delios (2006) found support for this logic and 
showed that group affiliated firms had lower profitability as well as sales growth as 
compared to stand-alone firms, and performance deteriorated more during later 
periods of institutional transition than the earlier period.  A higher incidence of 
collaborative activities by group affiliated firms supports the view that groups are a 
collection of firms sharing many formal and informal ties (Encarnation, 1989; 
Granovetter, 1994).  These ties help groups to share the benefits of foreign 
collaborations by a particular group member, amongst all the member firms.   
This essay has its limitations.  First, I did not look at all the strategic choices 
available to a firm.  Institutional transition does not just pose challenges, but also 
creates several opportunities for firms to exploit, such as product and geographic 
diversification.  Future studies can look at these other aspects of strategic choices 
that firms make.  Second, the findings of this study could be context dependent.  
However, firms in other transition economies face similar challenges and pressures as 
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I have outlined here. Thus the theoretical framework presented here can be used to 
study the strategic choices made by firms in other economies undergoing institutional 
transition.   
This study contributes to the strategic change literature in a number of ways.  
The focus on strategic choices that result in change can reconcile some of the 
inconclusive results found in studies on strategic change.  The likelihood and pace of 
the change may depend on the mechanism of the change, which the extant literature 
mostly ignores (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997).  Second, the studies on strategic 
adaptation and change, which are based on large scale secondary data, mostly ignore 
the role of dominant organizational actors (Gibbs, 1993; Ginsberg & Buchholtz, 
1990).  Even the studies utilizing in depth case studies consider only the role of the 
managers (e.g., Webb & Dawson, 1991), and ignore the role of other important 
stakeholders such as different ownership groups.  An implicit assumption in these 
studies is that the organizational actors are equally motivated to work towards 
strategic adaptation.  This may not always be true, as is evident from the findings of 
this essay.  Studying organizational choices as being affected by different ownership 
groups helps us understand why some organizations may be able to change, while 
others fail to do so. 
Third, this study shows the difference in an organization’s susceptibility to 
change depending on the conditions of the external environment.  Much of the extant 
literature on strategic change does not incorporate the heterogeneity of the external 
institutional environment due to the cross sectional nature of the studies, and a narrow 
conceptualization of institutional transition.  This essay does so in two ways.  First, 
in this essay, I conceptualize institutional transition as a comprehensive process of 
development of institutions for efficient market based economic exchange.  Second, 
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I incorporate the role of business group affiliation, which is a manifestation of the 
weak institutional environment in many emerging economies.  Together, these 
findings enhance our understanding of the strategic choices emerging economy firms 




STRATEGIC ADAPTATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Firms attempt to align their strategies with external environment (Andrews, 
1971; Zajac et al., 2000) as such alignment leads to superior performance (Duncan, 
1972; Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 1985; Pennings, 1992).  However, the strategic 
choices firms make to adapt to the external environment may not always result in 
developing a congruence with the external environment (Tan & Tan, 2005; Zajac et 
al., 2000), and therefore may not always be beneficial for the firms.  Much of the 
extant literature on strategic adaptation fails to identify the underlying strategic 
choices that result in a better alignment with the external environment, and 
consequently affect firm performance.  This essay contributes to the literature by 
shifting the focus from strategic adaptation to firms’ strategic choices and the 
performance consequences of these strategic choices. 
The past focus on strategic adaptation and change, rather than strategic choices, 
is understandable.  In large sample studies, it is often difficult to track the strategic 
choices firms make over time.  Consequently, scholars conceptualize strategic 
adaptation, based on their own subjective assessments (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 
1997), as comprising changes that take an organization from one state to another state 
(Van de Van & Poole, 1995).  However, different conceptualizations across studies 
(as detailed in Table 2.7, and Chapter 2) lead to conflicting findings about the causes 
and consequences of strategic adaptation.  One way to resolve this ambiguity about 
different conceptualizations is to look at the underlying strategic choices that drive 
strategic changes over time.  A focus on strategic choices rather than the overall 
change will also help in identifying different aspects of the strategic adaptation 
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process that align firm strategies with the environment, and influence firm 
performance. 
A second and related reason for the focus on strategic adaptation rather than 
strategic choices in the past literature is that most studies conceptualized strategic 
change as a static event using cross-sectional data (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997; 
Venkatraman, 1989; Zajac et al., 2000).  Strategic adaptation is a multi-dimensional 
dynamic process (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Feldman, 2004; Weick & Quinn, 1999; 
Zajac et al., 2000), in which firms make many strategic choices over time in response 
to the changes in the external environment (Peng, 2003).  These strategic choices 
may result in visible changes in a firm’s performance over time (Ginsberg, 1988).  
This necessitates that scholars apply longitudinal research designs to conceptualize 
and measure the performance consequences of firms’ strategic choices. 
In this essay I address the above issues by looking at the performance 
consequences of two strategic choices – the choice to collaborate with foreign firms 
and the choice to exit a market – using a longitudinal design covering 16 years in an 
emerging economy undergoing institutional transition.  In addition to examining the 
performance consequences of the choice to collaborate and the choice to exit, I also 
investigate the contingency conditions related to firm governance that affect the value 
of these strategic choices (Haveman, 1992; Yin & Zajac, 2004). 
I investigate these issues using an integration of agency theory with an 
institutional perspective. I use agency theory because the internal governance 
structure of a firm has consequences for the strategic choices a firm can make and the 
benefits it can derive from the strategic choices (Carney, 2005; Child, 1997).  In 
addition, an institutional perspective helps in theorizing about the influence of 
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external governance structure, which affects firm performance by shaping the internal 
governance structure, agency costs and incentives for stakeholders (Park et al., 2006).   
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Background 
The decisions to collaborate with foreign firms and exit the market are important 
strategic choices for firms facing a changing institutional environment.  The extant 
literature has, however, not given sufficient attention to the performance 
consequences of the collaboration and exit decisions. 
Collaboration could be an adaptation mechanism in that collaborations allow 
firms to secure access to resources and capabilities, which are not internally available 
within a firm (Hamel, 1991; Lane et al., 1998).  Collaborations may be particularly 
important for emerging economy firms during institutional transition, as many of 
these firms were founded and have operated in a relatively protected environment.  
As the institutional environment changes, and the level of competition increases, 
firms need to augment their resource base to remain competitive (Peng, 2003).  
Collaborations with foreign firms help in providing access to such resources and 
capabilities.  However, collaborations, while providing certain benefits, could also 
be potentially detrimental for domestic firms (Bleeke & Ernst, 1991; Luo, 2007).  
Foreign firms may utilize local firms to gain access to the domestic market and may 
even become competitors in the long run.  How the net effect of gains and losses 
from foreign collaborations affects domestic firms’ performance is a question that has 
yet to receive a systematic treatment from scholars. 
Likewise, exit is also an adaptation mechanism for firms affiliated to business 
groups in emerging economies.  Hannan and Freeman (1989: 42) proposed that for 
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multi-unit organizations, adaptation may be a selection process in that exit by some 
members of the larger organization may be some sort of adaptation for the entire 
organization.  Delacroix (2005) extended this proposition to the case of multinational 
firms as multinational firms are multi-unit organizations and they enter and exit 
different product and geographic markets as a part of the strategic adaptation process.  
In the case of emerging economies undergoing institutional transition, many business 
groups actively restructure their business portfolios and exit businesses selectively in 
the hope to become more competitive (Hoskisson et al., 2005; Jaipuria, 2002; 
Kripalani, 2004).  However, there has not been any systematic inquiry to explore the 
performance consequences of an exit strategy in the case of multi-unit organizations 
such as business groups.   
In this essay I take a contingency approach (Haveman, 1992; Yin & Zajac, 
2004) to investigate the performance consequences of the choice to collaborate and 
the choice to exit the market.  I propose that the foreign collaborations are in general 
helpful for domestic firms in emerging economies.  However, the value of foreign 
collaborations is enhanced if the collaborations are made in accordance with the 
governance structure of the firms.  With respect to the choice to exit the market for 
firms affiliated to business groups, such exit decisions by some members of a group 
are likely to enhance the performance of other members.  I further propose that this 
relationship is contingent on the ownership structure of the group.   
Figure 4.1 extends these core ideas to develop the theoretical framework of 
this chapter.  I elaborate on each of the linkages displayed in this figure and develop 
the hypotheses related to the impact of ownership structure and business group 
affiliation on a firm’s choice to exit a market or collaborate with foreign firms 
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FIGURE 4.1:  





Hypotheses: H1:  Link 1 (+) 
 
    H2a: Link 2 (-) 
    H2b: Link 3 (+) 
    H2c: Link 4 (+) & Link 5 (+) 
    H2d: Link 4 < Link 5  
 
    H3:  Link 6 (+) 
 
    H4:  Link 7 (+) 
 
    H5a: Link 8 (+) 
    H5b: Link 9 (+) 
    H5c: Link 10 (+) 


























Foreign firms often possess proprietary assets, superior technical know-how and 
superior managerial capabilities, that provides them with their competitive advantages 
over the domestic firms in host countries (Dunning, 1993).  In the past, many foreign 
firms did not enter the emerging markets, either because they were not allowed to 
enter (Ramamurti, 2001), or because they found it difficult to navigate the weaker and 
less efficient institutional environments in emerging economies (Delios & Henisz, 
2003; Henisz, 2003).  However, in recent years, foreign firms have heavily invested 
in emerging markets, following the improvements in the investment climate and the 
overall institutional environment.  This is evident from the rising share of inward 
FDI in emerging economies.  Between 1990 and 2005, the emerging economies’ 
share of total inward foreign direct investment doubled from 18% to 36% (World 
Investment Report, 2005). 
The entry of foreign firms has both positive and negative consequences for 
domestic firms. For example, Keller and Yeaple (2003) found substantial productivity 
gains from foreign firms for US firms.  Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002) found 
similar positive spillover effects in the case of the UK firms.  However, studies done 
in emerging economies generally report a negative impact of the presence of foreign 
firms.  Aitken and Harrison (1999) found that a larger foreign presence negatively 
affected the productivity of firms in Venezuela during 1976 – 1989 period.  Likewise, 
Kathuria (2000) reported a negative impact of foreign investments on the performance 
of Indian firms during 1975 – 1989 period.   
To explain the positive and negative consequences of the presence of foreign 
firms, scholars have argued that in some cases foreign firms may benefit the local 
firms by transferring technological and managerial capabilities, while in other cases 
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the competitive and market-stealing effects outweigh the positive effects (Aitken & 
Harrison, 1999; Kosova, 2004).  Firms in developed economies, with their stronger 
resource base, may be able to make a better use of the positive externalities generated 
due to the presence of the foreign firms, while emerging economy firms suffer as the 
foreign firms with superior capabilities gain market share leaving domestic firms to 
compete at lower levels in the market (Dawar & Frost, 1999). 
For emerging economy firms, one way to tackle the increased competition due 
to liberalization and opening up of an economy is to collaborate with foreign firms 
and learn from them.  By collaborating with foreign firms, domestic firms can enjoy 
the positive benefits of the presence of foreign firms, while not being affected by the 
market stealing and other competitive effects.  Studies have found that the positive 
spill over effects of the presence of foreign firms were often captured by the domestic 
firms which had some foreign collaborations (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Djankov & 
Hoekman, 2000) 
The positive benefits for domestic firms include gains on technical expertise, 
managerial know-how, patented knowledge, trade marks, brand names, and 
preferential access to better quality imported raw material (Feingberg & Majumdar, 
2001; Chhibber & Majumdar, 1999; Djankov & Hoekman, 2000).  Foreign 
collaborators also provide access to foreign markets and other foreign firms, which 
help in further enhancing the competitiveness and performance of the domestic firms 
(Buckley at al., 2002).  Such collaborations not only help the domestic firms to 
compete against other foreign firms entering the local market, but also to compete 
with other domestic firms.  Accordingly, I hypothesize 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The number of foreign collaborations is positively 
related to firm performance. 
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Moderating role of ownership structure 
Not all firms derive the same benefits from foreign collaborators.  The governance 
structure of a firm plays an important role in determining how much benefit a firm 
can derive from a particular strategy (Buckley et al., 2002; Carney, 2006; Yin & Zajac, 
2004).  In the case of Chinese firms, Buckley et al. (2002) found that firms with high 
state ownership benefited less from foreign collaborations.  In the case of high state 
ownership, property and control rights are not well defined (Zhu, 1999) and the 
owners do not have effective control over the managers.  Managers know that their 
fortunes are not linked to the performance of the firm, and do not put in efforts to 
benefit from the foreign collaborations.  Foreign collaborators often exploit such a 
scenario to gain at the expense of the domestic partners (Luo, 2001).   
The potential value of foreign collaborations can be enhanced if the firms can 
guard against the opportunistic behavior of the foreign firms, which is closely linked 
to the ability and motivation of the different owners to protect the interest of their 
firms.  In addition, foreign collaborations provide the local managers with an 
opportunity to gain useful experience of working with foreign firms (Morck & Young, 
1991), which is an invaluable asset in emerging economies.  With such an 
experience, local managers can easily move to better positions in other firms.  
Therefore, if the local managers are not monitored properly, they may enter into 
foreign collaborations to serve their own interests, which may not always be 
beneficial for the domestic firm.  Even when the foreign collaborations may be 
beneficial, local managers, without proper monitoring, may not put in the needed 
efforts to extract the benefits from the collaborations (Buckley et al., 2002). 
The problems of opportunistic behavior and shirking could be minimized if 
the ownership is concentrated with the groups that have the motivation and ability to 
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perform more effective monitoring.  As identified earlier, domestic private owners 
belong to the pressure sensitive category, and are not very effective in monitoring and 
disciplining the managers.  Domestic private owners also view foreign 
collaborations as a threat to their own position in the firm (Lane & Beamish, 1990; 
Luo et al., 2001).  The negative disposition of domestic private owners towards 
foreign collaborations inhibits the gains from these collaborations for firms in which 
domestic private owners have a higher ownership stake.   
Domestic institutional investors, on the other hand are less pressure sensitive 
than domestic private owners.  They act as a deterrent to the managers through 
coordinated actions (David et al., 1998) if the managers indulge in value destroying 
activities.  Domestic institutional investors also view collaborative activities with 
foreign firms as value enhancing strategies and therefore encourage the managers to 
derive maximum benefits from the collaborations.  Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The greater the ownership concentration of 
domestic private owners, the weaker the positive effect of foreign 
collaborations on the performance of a firm. 
 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The greater the ownership concentration of 
domestic institutional owners, the stronger the positive effect of foreign 
collaborations on the performance of a firm.  
 
Foreign owners are more pressure resistant than domestic owners.  The 
presence of foreign owners enhances the value of foreign collaborations for domestic 
firms in multiple ways.  Foreign owners have more skills in monitoring the activities 
of local managers (Khanna & Palepu, 1999).  As foreign owners do not have any 
fear of retribution from the managers, they can actively guard against the self serving 
behavior of the managers.  Foreign owners also have more experience in managing 
collaborations due to their extensive involvement in collaborative activities in 
different countries.  They can help the domestic firms in assessing the potential 
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collaborators and in extracting maximum benefits from the collaborative activities.  
Finally, foreign owners help enhance the absorptive capacity of the domestic firms 
(Buckley et al., 2002).  Domestic firms with superior absorptive capability are in a 
better position to derive the benefits from foreign collaborations than their 
counterparts who may lack these capabilities. 
Within the foreign ownership category, institutional owners are more pressure 
resistant than private owners.  Even though foreign private owners help the domestic 
firms to benefit from the collaborations; in some cases, foreign private owners may 
encourage a collaboration to serve their own interest.  For example, Japanese firms 
are known to develop network relationships with other Japanese firms both in 
domestic market as well as when they invest in foreign countries (Keeley, 2001).  
Such collaborations may not always be in the best interests of the domestic firm.  
Foreign institutional owners, being the least pressure sensitive, are likely to 
discourage the collaborations which do not help the domestic firm in which they 
invest.  As a result, the presence of foreign institutional owners is likely to be more 
beneficial than the presence of foreign private owners in enhancing the value of 
foreign collaborations for a domestic firm.  Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): The greater the ownership concentration of foreign 
(private or institutional) owners, the stronger the positive effect of foreign 
collaborations on the performance of a firm. 
 
Hypothesis 2d (H2d): The positive effect of foreign owners’ ownership 
concentration on the foreign collaboration and firm performance 
relationship (in H2c) will be stronger if the owners belong to the 
institutional owner category than if they belong to the private owner 
category.  
Moderating role of business group affiliation 
Business groups in emerging economies such as India are typically controlled by a 
single family through a pyramidal ownership structure (Almedia & Wolfenzon, 2004; 
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Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999).  The family may have a controlling 
stake in one of the affiliates, which may in turn have controlling stakes in other firms, 
and so on.  Such a structure gives control to an individual or a family, of a large 
number of firms, through a chain of ownership relationships.  The unification of 
ownership and control in the case of business groups helps reduce the classic agency 
problems in at least three ways (Fama & Jensen, 1983).   
First, when owners also act as managers, the agency costs are naturally 
minimized as there is no need to institute a costly mechanism to separate the 
management and control of decisions.  Second, ownership structure in business 
groups ensures that property rights are restricted to internal decision agents.  
Because of the personal involvement of internal decision agents, managers do not 
have any opportunity to misallocate the resources.  Finally, the cross holding pattern 
in ownership ensures that the shares are held by the agents who have close 
relationships with other decision agents.  Such an arrangement allows the agency 
problems to be controlled as it is easier to monitor and discipline the “related” agents. 
In addition to the above advantages of business group based governance 
system, Carney (2005) argues that the decision making process in group affiliated 
firms is more efficient due to fewer internal and external constraints.  The 
owner-managers can bypass the internal bureaucratic constraints, while not being 
unduly concerned about the external constraints of accountability, disclosure and 
transparency (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988).  Such decision making provides a 
great deal of flexibility and efficiency, which are likely to enhance the smooth 
management of, and consequently the benefits from foreign collaborations.  
Group affiliation also helps the affiliated firms in extracting more value from 
collaborations due to many formal and informal ties between different members of a 
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group (Encarnation, 1989; Granovetter, 1994).  The formal and informal ties help 
group affiliated firms take coordinated actions (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  As a result 
the actions taken by one particular member of a group are likely to be beneficial or 
detrimental for all other member firms as well.  In the case of foreign collaborations, 
the resources and learning obtained by one firm of a group can be easily transferred to 
the other members of the group through intra group transactions and transfer of 
personnel (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Khanna & Yafeh, 2005).  Even when a group 
affiliated firm may be bound by contract not to share the expertise obtained from 
foreign collaborations, with other member firms, informal socialization between the 
management cadre and employees results in positive externalities for all the firms of a 
group.  Thus the benefits of collaborations are magnified for all the member firms of 
a group.  Therefore, I expect the following:  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The positive effect of foreign collaborations on firm 
performance is higher for group affiliated firms than for the unaffiliated 
firms. 
Exits 
Exiting a market is one way to adapt to changing institutional environment for 
large, multi-unit organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Hoskisson et al., 2005).  
The decision to exit a market has no further implications for the unaffiliated firms.  
However in the case of a business group, the decision to exit or divest some 
businesses has implications for other firms belonging to the group (Hoskisson et al., 
2005).  Business groups are multi-unit organizations operating in multiple unrelated 
industries.  In the past, a high level of unrelated diversification was sustainable, and 
even led to superior performance for group affiliated firms due to weak institutional 
environments in some countries (Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna & Palepu, 1997).  
Through a nexus of inter-firm relationships, business groups benefited by internally 
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transacting what other firms must transact in highly inefficient markets.  However as 
the institutional environment changes, business groups need to restructure themselves 
to remain competitive in the market place (Hoskisson, Cannella, Tihanyi, & Faraci, 
2004; Khanna & Palepu, 1999).   
Recent research has shown that the institutional development in emerging 
economies leads firms to rely more on market based strategies and less on relationship 
based strategies to remain competitive (Peng, 2003).  Business groups, which rely on 
formal and informal relationships to support a large network of firms, may no longer 
benefit from such relationship based strategies (Gaur & Delios, 2006; Hoskisson et al., 
2005; Kim, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Hong, 2004; Lee et al., 2004).  For these business 
groups, exiting some businesses could be a part of the adaptation process necessary 
for survival (Hannan & Freeman, 1989).   
By exiting the non-core businesses, business groups release the limited and 
invaluable resources, which could be deployed for more productive purposes in other 
firms of the group.  Prior studies have found that redeployment of resources by 
divesting non-core units helps improve the overall performance of the focal firm 
(Hayes, Thompson, & Wright, 2002; Johnson, 1996; Montgomery & Thomas, 1988).  
In addition, exits reduce the cognitive demands on the top management of a group as 
the managers have to deal with fewer activities (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005).  This 
results in a more speedy and effective decision making, and consequently improves 
performance of the remaining members of the group. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4):  The greater the number of exits in a business group, 





Moderating role of ownership structure 
All firms affiliated to a business group may not be able to gain the same benefits from 
the exit strategy.  The ownership structure of a group affiliated firm plays an 
important role in shaping the outcomes of the exit decisions (Hoskission et al., 2005).  
Studies done in developed economy contexts have also emphasized the importance of 
firm governance and ownership structure in reaping the benefits from the divestment 
decision of firms (Bergh, 1995; Donaldson, 1990). 
As discussed earlier, business groups in emerging economies such as India are 
controlled by a single family or an individual through pyramidal ownership structure. 
The private owner in control of the group does not need a very high ownership level 
to exercise control (Carney, 2005).  The pyramidal ownership structure ensures that 
the group owner can direct all the affiliated firms to pursue the strategies that are in 
the best interests of the group.   
While the pyramidal ownership structure may be beneficial in reducing the 
principal-agent problems and ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making 
(Carney, 2005), it also creates a different kind of principal-principal agency problem 
(Bertrand et al., 2002).  Scholars have found that in countries with weak institutional 
environments, the majority shareholders have the potential to misappropriate the firm 
value at the cost of the minority shareholders (Cho, 1999; Dharwadkar et al., 2000).  
Principal-principal agency problem is more severe if the ultimate private owner has a 
very high ownership in the group affiliated firms (Ketchen, Thomas, & Snow, 1993).  
With absolute authority in the hands of an individual or a family, a group affiliated 
firm with high private ownership faces heightened problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazards.  
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The decision to exit is specially affected by the principal-principal agency 
problem as the owners may misuse their controlling power to appropriate all the 
valuable resources from some firms, and not utilize them for productive purposes 
(Schulze et al., 2001).  A high private ownership also creates the problem of self 
control when the ultimate owners pursue strategies that can “harm themselves as well 
as those around them” (Jensen, 1998: 48).  Domestic private owners may utilize the 
resources obtained by exiting some businesses to indulge in altruism and other 
self-gratifying actions, which are likely to harm all the firms affiliated to the group.  
Therefore, I expect that firm with higher domestic private ownership will benefit less 
from the exit decisions. 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): The greater the ownership concentration of 
domestic private owners, the weaker the positive effect of exits in a group 
on the performance of other firms affiliated to the group.  
 
The problems arising due to high private ownership in business groups can be 
minimized if the affiliated firms follow good governance practices.  Schulze et al. 
(2001) suggest that business groups can minimize the problems of monitoring the 
agents as well as owners by following practices such as performance based pay 
system, vigilant boards, transparency in transactions and careful strategic planning.  
Scholars have found that the presence of other shareholders such as domestic and 
foreign institutional owners, and foreign private owners ensures that a firm follows 
good governance practices (Ramaswami et al., 2002).  These investors are pressure 
resistant and have their own economic incentives to prevent the private owners from 
undermining the viability of a firm (Lin, 1996; Schulze et al., 2001).  If there are 
other shareholders to watch the actions of the domestic private owners, the chances of 
domestic private owners misusing the exit option for personal gains are reduced.   
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A higher ownership stake by institutional investors and foreign private owners 
in a group affiliated firm can also make the firm more competitive.  Scholars have 
found that group affiliated firms in which institutional and foreign owners hold 
ownership stakes, outperformed their counterparts in which the ownership was largely 
held by the private owners (Hoskisson et. al., 2004; Schulze et al., 2001).  When a 
group affiliated firm exits the market, there is competition amongst other affiliated 
firms to secure access to the resources released by the exiting firm.  These resources 
are more likely to go to the firms which are capable of making better utilization of the 
resources.  The presence of institutional and foreign owners gives a signal to the 
domestic private owner that these resources, if invested in such firms, will generate 
more rents than if deployed elsewhere. 
Thus I expect that an increase in the ownership concentration of each of the 
other three groups of investors – domestic institutional, foreign institutional and 
foreign private – will enhance the benefits that a group affiliated firm can drive from 
the exit of other affiliated firms. 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): The greater the ownership concentration of 
domestic institutional owners, the stronger the positive effect of exits in a 
group on the performance of other firms affiliated to the group. 
 
Hypothesis 5c (H5c): The greater the ownership concentration of foreign 
private owners, the stronger the positive effect of exits in a group on the 
performance of other firms affiliated to the group. 
 
Hypothesis 5d (H5d): The greater the ownership concentration of foreign 
institutional owners, the stronger the positive effect of exits in a group on 




Data Sources and Measures 
The base data for this essay comes from the Prowess database of the Center for 
Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).  The 2005 edition of Prowess has data on 
9,926 firms from 1989 till 2005.  I restricted the sample to only publicly listed firms 
as the details on ownership structure are not available for unlisted firms.  This 
resulted in a sample of 5,248 firms.  Since this study is concerned with the strategic 
adaptation of domestic firms, I removed the firms in which foreign private owner held 
more than 50% of the equity stake, resulting in a sample of 5,076 firms.  I further 
restricted the sample to only manufacturing firms based on the 2 digits NICs 
(National Industrial Classification).  This classification is similar to the US SIC 
classification.  The manufacturing firms fall between NIC 15 and NIC 37.  This 
restriction resulted in a sample of 2,692 firms.   
Finally, a list-wise deletion of cases for missing values on key independent 
variables resulted in an unbalanced panel with a total of 22,460 firm year observations 
belonging to 2,401 different firms.  The sample comprised of 915 firms affiliated to 
401 business groups and 1,486 unaffiliated firms.  I analyzed the performance 
consequences of exit choice on a sub sample of business group affiliated firms 
comprising of 10,098 firm year observations. 
Dependent variables.  I use return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) to 
measure firm performance.  I calculate ROA and ROS as profit before interest and 
tax over total assets and total sales respectively (Rumelt, 1991).   
Explanatory variables. The explanatory variables include number of foreign 
collaborations, number of firm exits, group affiliation dummy and ownership 
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variables.  The information on foreign collaborations comes from the Annual List of 
Foreign Collaborations, published by India Investment Center, a Government of India 
organization.  This information is available only for 1991-2001 period.  I calculated 
cumulative number of foreign collaborations on yearly basis for each firm.  The 
annual cumulative count of foreign collaborations varied from 0 to 32 with the 
average value of 0.68.  I also divided the foreign collaborations into two sub 
categories – financial collaborations and technical collaborations, and performed 
additional analyses for financial and technical collaborations. 
Firm exits included exits by closure or by merger and sale.  The information 
on firm exit comes from the annual filing of closure applications with a federal 
department under the Finance Ministry of the Government of India, and the merger 
and sales information provided in the Prowess data base.  The annual cumulative 
count of all exits for a business group varied from 0 to 35 with the average value of 
0.45.  I also performed separate analyses for exits by failure and exits by merger and 
sale.  The yearly cumulative count of exits by failure varied from 0 to 9, where as the 
same by merger and sale varied from 0 to 26. 
I obtained information on business group affiliation and ownership variables 
from the Prowess data set (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  The group affiliation variable 
took a value of 1 when a firm belonged to a business group and 0 otherwise.  The 
ownership variables included the percentage of ownership of the domestic private 
owners, domestic institutional owners, foreign private owners and foreign institutional 
owners.  Other scholars have used similar ownership categories in studies of firm 
strategy and performance in Indian context (Douma et al., 2006; Ramaswami et al., 
2002).   
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Control variables. I control for firm size, age, technological and marketing 
capabilities, and industry effects.  I obtained information on these variables from the 
Prowess database.  I measure firm size as a natural logarithm of the total assets of a 
firm.  Firm age is the number of years passed since the foundation of a firm till the 
year in the study.  Technology and marketing capabilities are the ratios of research 
and development expenditure over total sales and advertising and marketing 
expenditure over total sales respectively.  I lag the technological and marketing 
capabilities by one year.   
In the analyses on the sub sample of group affiliated firms, I controlled for the 
group diversity.  I calculated group diversity by taking a natural logarithm of the 
number of 2-digit NIC industries in which a group operated.  Finally, I control for 
industry level variation by creating industry indicator variables at the level of 2-digit 
NIC classification.  The firms in the sample operated in 23 different industries based 
on the 2-digit NIC classification. 
To assess the reliability of the data obtained from the Prowess database, I 
obtained data on a random sub sample of 317 firms for 1997-2001 period, from 
Capitaline, which is an alternate source of firm level data on Indian firms.  A 
comparison between the Prowess and Capitaline databases on the dependent and 
independent variables reveals no difference.  
Analytic Procedure 
I examined the performance implications of the two strategic choices using a 
firm-year unit of analysis.  With firm-year records, I applied General Linear Square 
(GLS) Random-Effects models to test the hypotheses.  I preferred a GLS regression 
over pooled OLS regression due to the important assumptions of homoskedasticity 
and no serial correlation in Pooled OLS.  Pooled OLS requires the errors in each 
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time period to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the same time period, 
for the estimator to be consistent and unbiased (Wooldridge, 2002).  A GLS 
regression is more suitable in that it corrects for the omitted variable bias, and 
presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in pooled time series data.  This 
methodology allows researchers to examine variations among cross-sectional units 
simultaneously with variations within individual units over time (Hsiao, 1995).  It 
assumes that regression parameters do not change over time and do not differ between 
various cross-sectional units, enhancing the reliability of the coefficient estimates.  
An important assumption for choosing random-effect estimation is that the 
unobserved heterogeneity should not be correlated with the independent variables.  I 
tested for this assumption and appropriateness of random-effects estimation using 
Hausman test.  The insignificant Hausman test statistic suggested that the 
assumptions for random effects estimation were not violated. 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics and correlations for the full sample 
and the sample of group affiliated firms respectively.  The average age of the firms 
was 23.7 years in the full sample, and 28.5 years in the business group sample.  
Average ROA for all the firms was 0.13 as against 0.24 for the group affiliated firms.  
Douma et al. (2006) also reported a mean ROA 0.13 for a sample of 1005 Indian 
firms for the 1999-2000 period, which is similar to the value I obtained in this study. 
The correlations are very modest, with the highest value being 0.34 between domestic 








TABLE 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Full Sample) a  
 
Variables Mean S. D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Age  23.75 20.96 --           
2. Size (log Assets) 3.74 1.45 0.22 --          
3. Marketing intensity 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.14 --         
4. Technological intensity 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 --        
5. Group affiliation 0.45 0.50 0.21 0.51 0.09 0.00 --       
6. Domestic private owner b 45.52 20.89 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.06 --      
7. Domestic institutional owner b 5.10 8.18 0.18 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.25 -0.16 --     
8. Foreign private owner b 2.47 9.10 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.09 -0.26 -0.02 --    
9. Foreign institutional owner b 1.42 4.32 0.05 0.37 0.09 0.00 0.20 -0.06 0.18 0.02 --   
10. No of Collaborations 0.68 1.93 0.12 0.36 0.06 0.02 0.21 -0.04 0.14 0.09 0.24 --  
11. ROA 13.07 39.24 0.14 0.56 0.08 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.22 0.03 0.42 0.34 -- 
a Based on a sample of 22,460 firm year observations during 1991 – 2005 time period. 








TABLE 4.2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Group Affiliated Firms) a 
 
Variables Mean S. D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Age  28.52 22.26 --           
2. Size (log Assets) 4.56 1.42 0.13 --          
3. Marketing intensity 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 --         
4. Technological intensity 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.03 --        
5. Group diversification b   1.78 0.74 0.17 0.20 0.00 -0.02 --       
6. Domestic private owner c 46.99 20.33 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 --      
7. Domestic institutional owner c 7.40 9.31 0.15 0.26 -0.02 0.00 0.12 -0.26 --     
8. Foreign private owner c 3.42 11.17 -0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.34 -0.06 --    
9. Foreign institutional owner c 2.35 5.56 0.04 0.36 0.11 0.04 0.06 -0.11 0.16 -0.01 --   
10. No of Exits  0.45 0.18 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 --  
11. ROA 24.57 55.11 0.12 0.60 0.07 0.03 0.19 -0.06 0.19 0.00 0.42 -0.06 -- 
a Based on a sample of 10,098 firm year observations during 1991 – 2005 time period. 
b Natural logarithmic of the number of industries in which a group participates. 
c Ownership given as percentage share holding. 
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Foreign Collaborations and Performance Consequences 
Table 4.3 presents the results assessing the effect of foreign collaborations on firm 
performance.  I developed the models in a hierarchical manner, including one 
interaction at a time.  Model 1 is the base line model that includes control variables 
and the annual cumulative count of the number of foreign collaborations.   
As shown in the results for model 1, firm age and firm size positively affect firm 
performance.  R&D intensity and marketing intensity have no significant effect on 
performance.  Ownership level of domestic private owners has a negative impact on 
firm performance, but foreign private owners’ ownership level has no significant 
impact.  At the same time, an increase in the institutional ownership (both domestic 
and foreign) affects performance positively.  The coefficient on group affiliation 
indicator variable is negative and significant, suggesting that unaffiliated firms have 
better performance than the group affiliated firms.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that foreign collaborations will positively affect firm 
performance.  The positively signed coefficient on the foreign collaboration variable 
in Model 1 supports this hypothesis.   
I test Hypotheses 2a-2d by adding the interactions of ownership variables with 
the number of foreign collaborations, one at a time, in Models 2-5.  The addition of 
the interaction terms in different models results in a significant improvement in model 
fit as given by a significant change in the Wald chi-square.  Hypothesis 2a predicted 
that the positive effect of foreign collaborations will be reduced as the ownership of 
domestic private owners increases.  Inclusion of this interaction term does not 
improve the model fit, and the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant.  
Hypothesis 2a is not supported.   
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TABLE 4.3: Effects of Foreign Collaborations (All) on Firm Performance (ROA) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Age  0.063*** 0.01  0.063*** 0.01  0.061*** 0.01  0.064*** 0.01  0.063*** 0.01  0.066*** 0.01  0.063*** 0.01 
Total Assets  11.88*** 0.19  11.88*** 0.19  11.99*** 0.19  11.88*** 0.19  12.26*** 0.19  12.02*** 0.19  12.31*** 0.19 
Marketing Intensity -8.228 7.23 -8.756 7.24 -4.869 7.21 -7.771 7.24 -7.914 7.18 -7.628 7.19 -6.716 7.16 
R & D Intensity -7.018 4.03 -7.272 4.03 -6.191 4.02 -7.018 4.03 -5.930 4.00 -4.437 4.02 -5.433 3.99 
Domestic Private Owner -0.027** 0.01 -0.031** 0.01 -0.023* 0.01 -0.027** 0.01 -0.023* 0.01 -0.024* 0.01 -0.045*** 0.01 
Domestic Institutional Owner  0.114*** 0.03  0.115*** 0.03  0.014 0.03  0.114*** 0.03  0.101*** 0.03  0.105*** 0.03  0.066* 0.03 
Foreign Private Owner -0.028 0.02 -0.026 0.02 -0.014 0.02 -0.047 0.03  0.006 0.02 -0.011 0.02 -0.064* 0.03 
Foreign Institutional Owner  2.111*** 0.05  2.115*** 0.05  2.053*** 0.05  2.115*** 0.05  1.658*** 0.06  2.078*** 0.05  1.704*** 0.06 
Group Affiliation -3.525*** 0.49 -3.542*** 0.49 -3.349*** 0.49 -3.521*** 0.49 -3.383*** 0.49 -5.736*** 0.51 -4.859*** 0.51 
Foreign Collaborations (H1)  2.656*** 0.12  2.303*** 0.25  1.049*** 0.17  2.613*** 0.12  0.751*** 0.16 -1.677*** 0.31 -4.756*** 0.43 
Interactions               
Domestic Private x  
Collaborations (H2)    0.009 0.01          0.050*** 0.01 
Domestic Institutional x 
Collaborations (H2)      0.138*** 0.01        0.053*** 0.01 
Foreign Private x  
Collaborations (H2)        0.015* 0.01      0.080*** 0.01 
Foreign Institutional x  
Collaborations (H2)          0.260*** 0.01    0.237*** 0.02 
Group Affiliation x  
Collaborations (H3)            4.897*** 0.33  3.229*** 0.35 
R Square 0.393 0.393 0.398 0.393 0.402 0.399 0.408 
Wald χ2 14537*** 14540*** 14820*** 14546*** 15071*** 14900*** 15419*** 
Change in Wald χ2  3* 283*** 9* 534*** 363*** 882*** 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests);  
n (firm year) = 22,460
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Hypothesis 2b predicted that an increase in the ownership of domestic 
institutional owners will enhance the positive value of foreign collaborations.  The 
coefficient of the interaction term in Model 3 is positive and significant, as is the 
improvement in model fit, giving support to H2b.  I present the interaction effect in 
Figure 4.2.  As shown in the figure, firm performance improves with an increase in 
the number of foreign collaborations (H1); however the performance improvement is 
greater for firms with high domestic institutional ownership than for firms with low 
domestic institutional ownership (H2b). 
FIGURE 4.2:  
Effect of Foreign Collaborations and Domestic Institutional Ownership on  





0 1 2 3 4 5
Number of Foreign Collaborations
RO
A
Low Domestic Institutional Ownership
High Domestic Institutional Ownership
 
Note: Low and high domestic institutional ownership refer to one standard 
deviation below and above the mean value. 
 
Hypothesis 2c predicted that an increase in the ownership stake of foreign 
private and foreign institutional owners will enhance the value of foreign 
collaborations.  The coefficient of the interaction between foreign private ownership 
and foreign collaborations is positive and significant in Model 4, and that between 
foreign institutional ownership and foreign collaborations is positive and significant in 
Model 5.  These results support H2c.   
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Figures 4.3 and 4.4 depict these interaction effects.  As shown in Figure 4.3, 
the line representing high foreign private ownership crosses the line representing low 
foreign private ownership as the number of foreign collaborations increase.  This 
suggests that the performance improvement with an increase in the number of foreign 
collaborations is greater for firms with high foreign private ownership than for firms 
with low foreign private ownership (H2c).  Likewise, the slopes of the lines 
representing high foreign institutional ownership and low foreign institutional 
ownership demonstrate that the performance improvement is greater for firms with 
high foreign institutional ownership than for firms with low foreign institutional 
ownership (H2c). 
 
FIGURE 4.3:  
Effect of Foreign Collaborations and Foreign Private Ownership on  
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Note: Low and high foreign private ownership refer to one standard 
deviation below and above the mean value. 
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FIGURE 4.4:  
Effect of Foreign Collaborations and Foreign Institutional Ownership on  
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Note: Low and high foreign institutional ownership refer to one standard 
deviation below and above the mean value. 
 
Hypothesis 2d predicted that foreign institutional owners will be more 
beneficial in enhancing the value of foreign collaborations than foreign private 
owners.  To test this, I included all the interaction terms together in Model 7, and 
compared the coefficients of the two interaction terms involving foreign private 
ownership and foreign institutional ownership using a Wald test for linear hypotheses.  
The coefficient of interaction between foreign institutional ownership and foreign 
collaborations is significantly greater than that between foreign private owners and 
foreign collaborations.  This supports H2d. 
Next, I look at the effect of business group affiliation on the foreign 
collaboration and performance relationship.  Hypothesis 3 predicted that foreign 
collaborations will have stronger positive effect on the performance of business group 
affiliated firms than unaffiliated firms.  I test this hypothesis by including the 
interaction between group affiliation and foreign collaborations in Model 6.  The 
interaction term is positive and significant, providing support to H3.  Figure 4.5 
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shows this interaction effect.  As shown in the figure, given an increase in the 
number of foreign collaborations, business group affiliated firms perform better 
whereas unaffiliated firms perform worse (H3). 
FIGURE 4.5:  
Effect of Foreign Collaborations and Business Group Affiliation on  
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Exits and Performance Consequences 
Table 4.4 presents the results assessing the effect of firm exits in a business group on 
the performance of other group affiliated firms.  As in the case of foreign 
collaborations, I developed the models in a hierarchical manner, including one 
interaction at a time.  Model 1 is the base line model that includes control variables 
and the annual cumulative count of number of firm exits for a business group.  Firm 
age and firm size positively affect firm performance.  R&D intensity and marketing 
intensity have no significant effect on performance.  Group diversity, however, has a 
positive effect on the performance of firms belonging to business groups.  Domestic 
owners, both private and institutional have no significant direct effect, but foreign 
owners, both private and institutional, improve firm performance.  
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TABLE 4.4: Effect of Exits (all) on Performance (ROA) of Group Affiliated Firms 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Age  0.094*** 0.02  0.093*** 0.02  0.086*** 0.02  0.094*** 0.02  0.097*** 0.02  0.091*** 0.02 
Total Assets  18.67*** 0.34  18.64*** 0.34  18.59*** 0.34  18.65*** 0.34  18.33*** 0.34  18.33*** 0.34 
Marketing Intensity -4.692  14.54 -6.507  14.52 -8.454  14.44 -2.699  14.55 -25.86  14.40 -25.77  14.39 
R & D Intensity -10.99  35.60 -9.402  35.57 -7.410  35.35 -11.99  35.59 -8.954  35.14 -7.370  35.03 
Group Diversity  5.090*** 0.67  5.080*** 0.67  5.014*** 0.66  5.073*** 0.67  5.053*** 0.66  5.008*** 0.66 
Domestic Private Owner  0.018 0.02  0.060* 0.02  0.030 0.02  0.016 0.02  0.031 0.02  0.004 0.02 
Domestic Institutional Owner  0.057 0.05  0.049 0.05 -0.165*** 0.05  0.055 0.05  0.038 0.05 -0.131** 0.05 
Foreign Private Owner  0.097* 0.04  0.110** 0.04  0.105** 0.04  0.142*** 0.05  0.117*** 0.04  0.100* 0.05 
Foreign Institutional Owner  2.470*** 0.08  2.468*** 0.08  2.456*** 0.08  2.467*** 0.08  2.067*** 0.09  2.098*** 0.09 
Exits (All) (H4)  0.941* 0.44  5.137*** 0.98 -2.910*** 0.54  1.193** 0.45 -2.230*** 0.47 -8.650*** 1.41 
Interactions             
Domestic Private x  
Exits (H5)   -0.084*** 0.02       -0.072*** 0.02 
Domestic Institutional x  
Exits (H5)      0.461*** 0.04      0.371*** 0.04 
Foreign Private x  
Exits (H5)        0.176** 0.07    0.045 0.07 
Foreign Institutional x  
Exits (H5)          0.959*** 0.06  0.865*** 0.06 
R Square 0.421 0.423 0.429 0.422 0.436 0.440 
Wald χ2 7331*** 7369*** 7579*** 7342*** 7792*** 7914*** 
Change in Wald χ2  38*** 248*** 11*** 461*** 583*** 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests);  
n (firm year) = 10,098 
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Hypothesis 4 predicted that number of exits in business group positively affect 
performance of affiliated firms.  The positively signed coefficient on the Exits 
variable in Model 1 supports this hypothesis.   
I test Hypotheses 5a-5d by adding the interactions of ownership variables with 
the number of foreign collaborations, one at a time, in Models 2-5.  The addition of 
each interaction variable significantly improved the model fit, as given by a 
significant change in the Wald chi-square.  Hypothesis 5a predicted that the positive 
effect of the number of exits will be reduced as the ownership of domestic private 
owners increases.  The coefficient of the interaction term between the domestic 
private ownership and the number of exits is negative and significant in Model 2, 
giving support to H5a.  Figure 4.6 shows this interaction effect.  As shown in the 
figure, as number of exits in a business group increases, performance deteriorates for 
firms with high domestic private ownership, but improves for firms with low 
domestic private ownership (H5a). 
 
FIGURE 4.6:  
Effect of Exits and Domestic Private Ownership on Performance of  
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Note: Low and high domestic private ownership refer to one standard 
deviation below and above the mean value. 
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Hypotheses 5b, 5c, and 5d predicted that the number of exits will have 
stronger positive effect on the firm performance as the ownership of domestic 
institutional owners (H5b), foreign private owners (H5c), and foreign institutional 
owners (H5d) increase.  The coefficient of the interaction term between the number 
of exits and the domestic institutional ownership is positive and significant in Model 3, 
giving support to H5b.  The coefficient of the interaction term between the number 
of exits and the foreign private ownership is positive and significant in Model 4, 
giving support to H5c.  Likewise, the coefficient of the interaction term between the 
number of exits and the foreign institutional ownership is positive and significant in 
Model 4, giving support to H5d.   
I plotted the interaction effects hypothesized in H5b, H5c, and H5d in Figures 
4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 respectively.  Figure 4.7 shows that high ownership by domestic 
institutional owners enhanced the performance as the number of exits increases.  On 
the other hand, firms with low domestic institutional ownership performed worse with 
a greater number of exits (H5b).  Figure 4.8 shows that the number of exits had a 
stronger effect on enhancing the performance of firms with high foreign private 
ownership than for firms with low foreign private ownership (H5c).  Likewise, the 
relative slope of the lines representing high foreign institutional ownership and low 
foreign institutional ownership shows that the firms with high foreign institutional 
ownership performed better as the number of exits in a group increased, as compared 
to the firms with low foreign institutional ownership (H5d).  
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FIGURE 4.7:  
Effect of Exits and Domestic Institutional Ownership on Performance of  
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Note: Low and high domestic institutional ownership refer to one standard 




FIGURE 4.8:  
Effect of Exits and Foreign Private Ownership on Performance of  
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Note: Low and high foreign private ownership refer to one standard 




FIGURE 4.9:  
Effect of Exits and Foreign Institutional Ownership on Performance of  
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Note: Low and high foreign institutional ownership refer to one standard 
deviation below and above the mean value. 
 
Robustness Tests 
I tested the robustness of the above results in two ways.  First, I disaggregated the 
main independent variables.  I divided the foreign collaborations into two categories 
– financial collaborations and technical collaborations.  I calculated the annual 
cumulative count of financial and technical collaborations and performed two separate 
analyses.  Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the results of these analyses.  As shown in 
Table 4.7 and 4.8, the coefficients for the hypothesized effects are qualitatively 
similar in both the tables.  Foreign collaborations, whether financial or technical, 
improved firm performance.  The positive impact of foreign collaborations is further 
enhanced as the ownership of the domestic institutional, foreign private and foreign 
institutional owners increase.   
Further, a comparison of the coefficients between the interaction terms 
involving foreign institutional ownership and foreign collaborations, and foreign 
private ownership and foreign collaborations, suggests that the moderating effect of 
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foreign institutional ownership is greater than the moderating effect of foreign private 
ownership.  The interaction between group affiliation variable and foreign 
collaborations is also positive and significant.  These results suggest that the effect of 
foreign collaborations is not sensitive to the definition of collaborations. 
I divided the number of exits in a business group into two categories 
depending on whether a firm exited by closure or by sale and/or merger.  Tables 4.7 
and 4.8 present the results of these analyses.  Here again I find that exits by merger 
or sale had a similar effect as I found in the case of all the exits in Table 4.6.  The 
exits by closure did not have a significant effect on firm performance.  However, 
interactions between the exits by closure and ownership variables have similar effects 
as I found in the case of all the exits.  Thus, I find that the effect of the number of 
exits in a group on the performance of firms affiliated to a group is quite robust. 
Second, I used return on sales (ROS) as an alternate performance measure.  I 
replicated all the previously done analyses on ROS, and found the result to be 
qualitatively similar.  This suggests that the results are not sensitive to the definition 
of independent or dependent variables used in the study. 
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TABLE 4.5: Effects of Foreign Collaborations (Financial) on Firm Performance (ROA) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Age  0.081*** 0.01  0.081*** 0.01  0.076*** 0.01  0.079*** 0.01  0.077*** 0.01  0.077*** 0.01  0.072*** 0.01 
Total Assets  12.53*** 0.19  12.53*** 0.19  12.47*** 0.19  12.47*** 0.19  12.64*** 0.19  12.45*** 0.19  12.47*** 0.18 
Marketing Intensity -10.01 7.28 -9.652 7.30 -7.113 7.25 -11.92 7.27 -8.679 7.24 -10.69 7.24 -9.538 7.22 
R & D Intensity -6.456 4.06 -6.343 4.06 -5.733 4.04 -6.517 4.05 -5.717 4.04 -4.847 4.04 -4.614 4.02 
Domestic Private Owner -0.031** 0.01 -0.029** 0.01 -0.028** 0.01 -0.030** 0.01 -0.028** 0.01 -0.032*** 0.01 -0.028** 0.01 
Domestic Institutional Owner  0.118*** 0.03  0.118*** 0.03  0.014*** 0.03  0.119*** 0.03  0.111*** 0.03  0.113*** 0.03  0.058* 0.03 
Foreign Private Owner -0.027 0.02 -0.028 0.02 -0.013 0.02  0.047 0.03  0.001 0.02 -0.025 0.02  0.048 0.03 
Foreign Institutional Owner  2.175*** 0.05  2.174*** 0.05  2.112*** 0.05  2.141*** 0.05  1.785*** 0.06  2.144*** 0.05  1.889*** 0.06 
Group Affiliation -3.486*** 0.50 -3.478*** 0.50 -3.279*** 0.50 -3.372*** 0.50 -3.383*** 0.49 -5.024*** 0.50 -4.290*** 0.51 
Financial Foreign 
Collaborations (H1)  4.740*** 0.35  5.284*** 0.79 -0.013 0.46  6.124*** 0.38  1.064** 0.41 -2.832*** 0.60 -3.606*** 1.08 
Interactions               
Domestic Private x  
Fin. Collaborations (H2)   -0.013 0.02         -0.004 0.02 
Domestic Institutional x  
Fin. Collaborations (H2)      0.554*** 0.04        0.276*** 0.04 
Foreign Private x  
Fin. Collaborations (H2)        0.272*** 0.03      0.190*** 0.04 
Foreign Institutional x  
Fin. Collaborations (H2)          0.759*** 0.05    0.407*** 0.05 
Group Affiliation x  
Fin. Collaborations (H3)            11.109*** 0.71  7.540*** 0.80 
R Square 0.385 0.385 0.391 0.386 0.391 0.391 0.397 
Wald χ2 14015*** 14015*** 14403*** 14123*** 14443*** 14407*** 14787*** 
Change in Wald χ2  0 388*** 108* 428*** 392*** 772*** 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests);  
n (firm year) = 22,460 
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TABLE 4.6: Effects of Foreign Collaborations (Technical) on Firm Performance (ROA) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Age  0.061*** 0.01  0.060*** 0.01  0.059*** 0.01  0.061*** 0.01  0.062*** 0.01  0.066*** 0.01  0.064*** 0.01 
Total Assets  12.09*** 0.19  12.09*** 0.19  12.17*** 0.19  12.07*** 0.19  12.39*** 0.19  12.18*** 0.19  12.42*** 0.19 
Marketing Intensity -7.260 7.24 -7.686 7.24 -4.492 7.22 -6.071 7.24 -7.618 7.19 -6.664 7.22 -5.939 7.17 
R & D Intensity -6.489 4.04 -6.757 4.04 -5.892 4.03 -6.482 4.04 -5.685 4.01 -4.757 4.03 -5.772 4.00 
Domestic Private Owner -0.030** 0.01 -0.035*** 0.01 -0.026** 0.01 -0.030** 0.01 -0.025* 0.01 -0.025* 0.01 -0.047*** 0.01 
Domestic Institutional Owner  0.114*** 0.03  0.115*** 0.03  0.038 0.03  0.114*** 0.03  0.100*** 0.03  0.108*** 0.03  0.091*** 0.03 
Foreign Private Owner -0.019 0.02 -0.016 0.02 -0.010 0.02 -0.066* 0.03  0.006 0.02 -0.006 0.02 -0.085*** 0.03 
Foreign Institutional Owner  2.142*** 0.05  2.146*** 0.05  2.087*** 0.05  2.152*** 0.05  1.754*** 0.06  2.110*** 0.05  1.740*** 0.06 
Group Affiliation -3.587*** 0.49 -3.606*** 0.49 -3.442*** 0.49 -3.558*** 0.49 -3.439*** 0.49 -5.100*** 0.51 -4.398*** 0.51 
Technical Foreign 
Collaborations (H1)  2.911*** 0.14  2.379*** 0.29  1.162*** 0.20  2.777*** 0.14  0.660*** 0.19 -1.642*** 0.41 -5.897*** 0.53 
Interactions               
Domestic Private x  
Tech. Collaborations (H2)   -0.014 0.01         -0.071*** 0.01 
Domestic Institutional x  
Tech. Collaborations (H2)      0.151*** 0.01        0.025 0.02 
Foreign Private x  
Tech. Collaborations (H2)        0.050*** 0.01      0.129*** 0.01 
Foreign Institutional x  
Tech. Collaborations (H2)          0.313*** 0.02    0.340*** 0.02 
Group Affiliation x  
Tech. Collaborations (H3)            5.047*** 0.42  3.258*** 0.44 
R Square 0.391 0.392 0.395 0.392 0.400 0.395 0.405 
Wald χ2 14420*** 14427*** 14648*** 14447*** 14929*** 14653*** 15281*** 
Change in Wald χ2  6* 228*** 27*** 509*** 233*** 861*** 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests);  
n (firm year) = 22,460 
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TABLE 4.7: Effect of Exits (by Merger/Sale) on Performance (ROA) of Group Affiliated Firms 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Age 0.095*** 0.02 0.093*** 0.02 0.089*** 0.02 0.095*** 0.02 0.094*** 0.02 0.090*** 0.02 
Total Assets 18.66*** 0.34 18.61*** 0.34 18.56*** 0.34 18.66*** 0.34 18.59*** 0.34 18.55*** 0.34 
Marketing Intensity -3.592 14.53 -5.782 14.53 -7.728 14.47 -5.152 14.54 -9.862 14.55 -9.563 14.52 
R & D Intensity -11.39 35.61 -11.07 35.59 -10.19 35.45 -10.86 35.60 -11.01 35.56 -10.29 35.44 
Group Diversity 5.494*** 0.63 5.507*** 0.63 5.534*** 0.63 5.530*** 0.63 5.601*** 0.63 5.576*** 0.63 
Domestic Private Owner 0.017 0.02 0.032 0.02 0.025 0.02 0.017 0.02 0.021 0.02 0.019 0.02 
Domestic Institutional Owner 0.055 0.05 0.053 0.05 -0.020 0.05 0.052 0.05 0.050 0.05 -0.022 0.05 
Foreign Private Owner 0.093* 0.04 0.098* 0.04 0.103** 0.04 0.111** 0.04 0.101* 0.04 0.100* 0.04 
Foreign Institutional Owner 2.467*** 0.08 2.465*** 0.08 2.456*** 0.08 2.465*** 0.08 2.405*** 0.08 2.423*** 0.08 
Exits (Mergers/Sale) (H4) 1.257*** 0.22 2.128*** 0.55 -1.685*** 0.30 0.392* 0.21 -0.466* 0.23 -3.205*** 0.87 
Interactions             
Domestic Private x  
Mergers/Sale (H5)   -0.039*** 0.01       0.022 0.01 
Domestic Institutional x  
Mergers/Sale (H5)     0.210*** 0.02     0.213*** 0.03 
Foreign Private x  
Mergers/Sale (H5)       0.066** 0.03   0.019 0.03 
Foreign Institutional x  
Mergers/Sale (H5)         0.161*** 0.03 0.089** 0.03 
R Square 0.421 0.422 0.426 0.422 0.423 0.427 
Wald χ2 7325*** 7349*** 7484*** 7332*** 7375*** 7497*** 
Change in Wald χ2  24*** 159*** 7*** 50*** 172*** 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests);  
n (firm year) = 10,098 
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TABLE 4.8: Effect of Exits (by Closure) on Performance (ROA) of Group Affiliated Firms 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Age  0.095*** 0.02  0.094*** 0.02  0.091*** 0.02  0.094*** 0.02  0.096*** 0.02  0.093*** 0.02 
Total Assets  18.66*** 0.34  18.63*** 0.34  18.64*** 0.34  18.67*** 0.34  18.51*** 0.34  18.54*** 0.34 
Marketing Intensity -1.972 14.53 -3.361 14.53 -4.056 14.49 -3.691 14.53 -13.24 14.49 -12.86 14.48 
R & D Intensity -11.52 35.61 -11.05 35.60 -10.87 35.50 -11.59 35.59 -9.967 35.42 -10.04 35.37 
Group Diversity  5.940*** 0.63  5.943*** 0.63  5.941*** 0.63  5.954*** 0.63  5.820*** 0.63  5.836*** 0.63 
Domestic Private Owner  0.016 0.02  0.033 0.02  0.024 0.02  0.015 0.02  0.025 0.02  0.015 0.02 
Domestic Institutional Owner  0.054 0.05  0.051 0.05 -0.039 0.05  0.052 0.05  0.047 0.05 -0.024 0.05 
Foreign Private Owner  0.091* 0.04  0.098* 0.04  0.095* 0.04  0.115** 0.04  0.104** 0.04  0.106** 0.04 
Foreign Institutional Owner  2.468*** 0.08  2.469*** 0.08  2.462*** 0.08  2.464*** 0.08  2.316*** 0.09  2.327*** 0.09 
Exits (Closure) (H4) -0.479 0.48  2.492* 1.11 -3.585*** 0.61 -0.112 0.49 -2.894*** 0.53 -7.517*** 1.65 
Interactions             
Domestic Private x  
Closure (H5)   -0.061*** 0.02       -0.051* 0.02 
Domestic Institutional x  
Closure (H5)      0.350*** 0.04      0.279*** 0.05 
Foreign Private x  
Closure (H5)        0.253** 0.08    0.065 0.09 
Foreign Institutional x  
Closure (H5)          0.694*** 0.07  0.613*** 0.07 
R Square 0.421 0.422 0.425 0.422 0.427 0.429 
Wald χ2 7324*** 7339*** 7434*** 7340*** 7510*** 7567*** 
Change in Wald χ2  15*** 110*** 16*** 186*** 243*** 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; (all two-tailed tests);  
n (firm year) = 10,098 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study examined the performance consequences of the choice to collaborate with 
foreign firms and the choice to exit the market.  I conducted this analysis on a 
sample of emerging economy firms.  Using an integration of agency theory and an 
institutional perspective, I argued that ownership structure and group affiliation 
moderate the positive impact of foreign collaborations on the performance of 
domestic firms.  With respect to the exit decision, I argued that exit by firms in a 
business group help improve the performance of other, non-exiting firms in the group.  
The strength of the positive impact of exit for the non-exiting firms was however 
contingent on the ownership structure of the firm. 
The empirical analyses largely supported my arguments.  Foreign 
collaborations enhance the performance of domestic firms, but this relationship is 
contingent on the ownership structure and business group affiliation.  With an 
increase in the number of foreign collaborations, firms with a higher domestic 
institutional, foreign private or foreign institutional ownership experience a greater 
improvement in performance than firms with a lower domestic institutional, foreign 
private or foreign institutional ownership.  These findings are consistent with the 
arguments that gains from the presence of foreign firms may be entirely captured by 
the domestic firms with foreign ownership (Djankov & Hoekman, 2000), and better 
firm governance (Buckley et al., 2002; Lin, 1996; Schulze et al., 2001).   
Further, I found foreign collaborations were more beneficial in enhancing the 
performance of group affiliated firms than for unaffiliated firms.  This is consistent 
with the view that groups benefit from formal (Keister, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2000; 
Khanna & Yafeh, 2005) and informal (Encarnation, 1989; Guillén, 2000) ties.  The 
formal and informal ties help group affiliated firms take coordinated actions and share 
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the benefits of a particular strategy such as foreign collaborations with each other, and 
thereby enhance the value of that strategy for all member firms. 
With respect to the performance consequences of firm exits, I found that the 
number of exits in a business group was positively associated with the performance of 
the non-exiting firms of the group.  This confirms Hannan and Freeman’s (1989) 
proposition that large, multi-unit organizations adapt to the external environment by 
selective elimination of some parts of the organization.  The exit strategy could 
however be misused by the owners, if adequate safeguards are not put in place.  A 
higher ownership of domestic private owners in group affiliated firms enhances the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazards (Lin, 1996; Schulze et al., 2001).  
The presence of institutional and foreign owners acts as a deterrent to the emergence 
of strategies devoted to the self-serving interests of domestic private managers.  
Consistent with this, I found that an exit strategy is more beneficial for firms in which 
domestic institutional, foreign private or foreign institutional owners have a higher 
ownership position; but less beneficial for firms in which domestic private owners 
have a higher ownership position.   
Aside from establishing the importance of strategic choices for firm success, 
my motivation was to show that strategic choices may not always align a firm’s 
strategy with the external environment, as the strategic alignment has to take into 
account the internal governance structure of the firm (Yin & Zajac, 2004).  The 
results in this study provide corroborating evidence concerning the importance of a 
firm’s ownership structure in influencing the relationship between a strategic choice 
and its performance consequences.  In addition, by differentiating between different 
owners on the basis of their sensitivity to the pressures from the managers, the 
analyses captured different agency problems firms can face, in developing congruence 
  134
with the external environment.  As proposed by other scholars (Carney, 2005; 
Ramaswami et al., 2002; Schulze et al., 2001), I found that the presence of more 
pressure resistant owners helps firms make more prudent strategic choices, which 
consequently enhances the value of these strategic choices for the firms.   
Future research should address the limitations of this study.  This study uses 
an Indian manufacturing firms’ sample.  Although, I believe that ownership structure 
will affect the relationship between strategic choices and firm performance regardless 
of a firm’s national origin, the use of a single country sample raises concerns about its 
cross-national generalizability.  As scholars have identified that the nature of agency 
problems vary depending on the external governance environment of a country (La 
Porta et al., 1999), it will be interesting to study how ownership structure affects a 
firm’s strategic adaptation in other emerging economy settings. 
Second, besides ownership structure, there could be other factors that affect 
the strategic adaptation of firms during institutional transition.  For example, in the 
case of Chinese firms, scholars have argued (Peng & Luo, 2000; Park et al., 2006) 
that a firm’s relationship with different bodies of the government is an important 
determinant of its competitiveness.  Although the firms in my sample had a 
negligible level of state ownership, it would be interesting to identify if there are other 
informal ways through which the state can affect a firm’s strategic choices and the 
performance consequences of these choices.  Finally, the strategic choices to 
collaborate and to exit are only two of the many options available to a firm.  Future 
studies could look at other strategic choices such as diversification and growth 
through acquisition, and how these affect firm performance.  
This study contributes to the strategy-performance literature in a number of 
ways.  I have sought to develop an extension of the strategic adaptation literature 
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into a new theoretical domain and empirical context.  Using a longitudinal research 
design with 16 years of data, I find support for the argument that a strategic choice 
helps a firm to adapt to its external environment, only if the choice is made with a 
consideration given to the incentives and motivations of the internal decision agents 
of the firm.  I hope that the arguments and findings of this study could catalyze 
discussions in the strategic adaptation literature to move beyond the well-trodden path 
of assessing the performance consequence of strategic change, to include new 
theoretical and empirical analyses of how and which strategic choices lead to better 
adaptation and improved performance. 
For example, it would be interesting to explore how this study’s theoretical 
framework and findings about the importance of exit strategy for business groups, 
may apply to other large, multi-unit organizations, such as multinational corporations 
(MNCs).  Much research on MNCs and foreign subsidiaries has assumed subsidiary 
exit as a measure of subsidiary performance (Delios & Beamish, 2001).  It is 
possible that MNCs use the exit strategy, not just to remove non-performing 
subsidiaries, but also to adapt to the changing global environment (Dunning, 1988: 
22).  Future research can consider subsidiary exit as a strategic choice, and assess 
how exit helps MNCs adapt to the changing institutional environments and what are 
the performance consequences of exit strategy, for other foreign subsidiaries and the 
MNC. 
Likewise, scholars have speculated that the positive spill over effects of the 
presence of foreign firms may only be available for local firms which form 
collaborations with the foreign firms (Aitken & Harrison, 1999).  This study further 
investigates this issue to suggest that the benefits of collaborations do not accrue to all 
the local partners in the same proportion.  It would be interesting to explore how 
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these findings apply to majority owned foreign firms, which enter emerging 
economies in collaboration with local firms.  In other words, this study’s theoretical 
framework can be applied to assess the impact of the governance structure of the local 
collaborators on the performance of majority owned foreign firms.  
Aside from the focus on strategic choices, this essay also contributes by 
acknowledging the importance of a firm’s internal governance structure, in studies of 
strategy-environment fit.  This approach can perhaps reconcile conflicting findings 
about the performance consequences of strategic adaptation (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 
1997).  Firms do not just need to match their strategies with the demands of the 
external environment, but also with the demands of the internal environment, to 
realize the value of strategic adaptation.  I hope that this study stimulates managers 
and researchers to acknowledge the importance of different groups of owners in 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I study the strategic choices firms make to adapt to the external 
environment during a period of institutional transition.  I also investigate the 
performance consequences of these strategic choices.  The two strategic choices I 
focus on include the choice to collaborate with foreign firms and the choice to exit the 
market.  I develop the theoretical framework in this dissertation using an integration 
of agency theory and an institutional perspective.   
I examine the strategic choices and the performance consequences of strategic 
choices in two essays.  In the first essay, I argue that the ownership concentration of 
different types of owners, institutional transition, and business group affiliation, each 
affects a firm’s choice to collaborate with foreign firms or to exit the market.  In the 
second essay, I argue that strategic choices such as collaboration with foreign firms or 
exiting the market, in the case of business group affiliated firms, have a positive 
impact on a firm’s performance.  However, the relationship between the strategic 
choices and a firm’s performance is contingent on the governance structure of the 
firm. 
I test the theoretical arguments presented in the two essays on a sample of 
9,926 Indian firms during the period from 1989 to 2005.  The time period from 1991 
onwards is a period during which there has been a gradual and significant 
development in various institutional dimensions related to product markets, labor 
markets and capital markets in India.  This makes India an ideal setting for studying 
the process of strategic adaptation during institutional transition.   
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I test a firm’s likelihood of entering into foreign collaborations or exiting the 
market using an exponential event history modeling, and a random effects panel data 
Poisson estimation.  I test the performance consequences of the choice to collaborate 
or the choice to exit using a random effects GLS estimation.   
The empirical analyses largely support my arguments.  With respect to the 
choice to collaborate with foreign firms, I find that domestic private owners do not 
prefer to collaborate with foreign firms, whereas foreign owners, both private and 
institutional, prefer to collaborate with foreign firms.  Domestic institutional owners 
do not affect the choice to collaborate.  With respect to the choice to exit, I find that 
an increase in the ownership of domestic private, foreign private or foreign 
institutional owners reduces the probability of exit; whereas an increase in the 
ownership of domestic institutional owners increases the probability of exit.   
Institutional transition has a non-linear impact on the choice to collaborate and 
the choice to exit.  During the initial years of institutional transition, there was a high 
incidence of exit as well as collaborative activities; however, as the institutional 
transition progressed, the exit and collaboration choices were implemented less 
frequently.  Finally I find group affiliated firms to be more likely to choose the 
“exit” as well as the “collaborate”, options as compared to unaffiliated firms.   
Regarding the performance consequences of strategic choices, I found that a 
firm’s choice to collaborate and exit had a positive impact on a firm’s performance.  
The positive effect of foreign collaborations on a firm’s performance is greater for 
firms with a higher domestic institutional, foreign private or foreign institutional 
ownership.  Domestic private ownership, however does not moderate the 
relationship between foreign collaborations and a firm’s performance.  Further, 
foreign collaborations enhanced the performance of group affiliated firms more than 
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that of unaffiliated firms.  Likewise, I found that the positive relationship between 
the number of exits in a business group and a firm’s performance was contingent on 
the ownership structure of the non-exiting firms of the business group.  Firms with a 
higher domestic private ownership benefited less from the exit strategy, whereas firms 
with high domestic institutional, foreign private or foreign institutional ownership 
benefited more from the exit strategy. 
In summary, I find that a firm’s strategic choices are influenced by the internal 
governance structure and by institutional transition; and the firms that make their 
strategic choices giving due consideration to the incentives and motivations of the 
internal decision agents, benefit more from these strategic choices. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation contributes to theory and practice in several ways.  First, this 
dissertation augments the studies that have utilized a punctuated equilibrium model of 
strategic adaptation and change, by considering strategic adaptation as a continuous 
process (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Weick & Quinn, 1999).  Rather than 
conceptualizing change as an episodic, static phenomenon, I utilize a dynamic 
perspective, wherein I conceptualize change as comprising certain specific strategic 
choices, which over time may result in better alignment between an organization’s 
strategies and its environment.  A focus on strategic choices utilizing a dynamic 
perspective is suitable for studying strategic adaptation in environments that are 
turbulent and continuously changing (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Pettigrew et al., 
2001). 
Second, this dissertation proposes that organizations should not only attempt 
to establish a fit between their strategies and the external environment, but also adapt 
to have a fit between their strategies and their internal governance structures.  The 
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extant literature investigates the issue of strategic adaptation from the point of view of 
developing congruence between an organization’s strategies and its external 
environment.  However, any attempt to develop congruence between an 
organization’s strategies and its environment may not be successful unless 
organizations make strategies with due consideration to their internal governance 
structures (Yin & Zajac, 2004).  This dissertation contributes to the strategic 
adaptation literature by acknowledging the role of ownership structure, and business 
group affiliation, which are important components of a firm’s internal governance 
structure, in the studies of strategic adaptation and change. 
A third contribution of my dissertation is its integration of rational, cognitive 
and learning perspectives on strategic adaptation and change (Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1997).  Studies using a rational perspective rely on large sample empirical 
analyses, but ignore the role of organizational actors.  On the other hand, studies 
using learning and cognitive perspectives focus on the role played by organizational 
actors in strategic adaptation, using in-depth case studies, but compromise on the 
generalizability of the findings (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997).  The theoretical 
framework of this dissertation overcomes the shortcomings of the rational, cognitive 
and learning perspectives, by incorporating the role of different organizational actors 
(owners) and their incentives, motivations and abilities to influence an organization’s 
strategic choices.  
Fourth, my focus on the strategic choices to collaborate and to exit augments 
the extant literature, which has considered a firm’s strategic reactions to compete 
through changes to its product-market and geographic diversification strategies 
(Haveman, 1992; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001), when faced with internal or 
external pressures to adapt.  For many firms in emerging economies, competition 
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may not always be the most viable strategy (Dawar & Frost, 1999).  Rather, many 
emerging economy firms and business groups prefer to collaborate, or selectively exit 
some businesses, to contend with the new and perhaps expanding pressures that come 
with a changing institutional environment.  A focus on collaboration and exit as 
adaptive mechanisms, opens new avenues for research on strategic adaptation of 
emerging economy firms. 
Fifth, this dissertation contributes to agency theory and an institutional 
perspective. Much of the research utilizing agency theory is limited to exploring the 
performance consequences of agency problems.  I contribute to this literature by not 
just exploring the performance consequences, but also by identifying the strategic 
preferences of different types of owners in a dynamic context.  In addition, this 
dissertation highlights the nature of agency problems faced by firms in weak and 
changing institutional environments (Claessens et al., 2000; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; 
Lemmon & Lins, 2003), and how these agency problems affect firms’ strategic 
choices.   
With respect to the institutional perspective, my focus on the impact of 
institutions over a period of time helps us understand the temporal implications of 
institutional changes for firm strategy and performance (Peng, 2003).  In addition, by 
making institutional transition the underlying theme of this dissertation, I am able to 
integrate agency theory with the institutional perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989).  An 
integration of agency theory and an institutional perspective helps to me to 
conceptually relate how heterogeneity in the motivations and preferences of different 
types of owners in group affiliated and unaffiliated firms ultimately affect a firm’s 
strategic choices and how the performance consequences are related to these strategic 
choices. 
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Sixth, this dissertation involved a significant data collection effort on an 
emerging economy undergoing institutional transition.  The empirical context of this 
dissertation provides a unique setting to study strategic adaptation of firms from an 
international and cross-cultural context undergoing fundamental institutional 
transition, an approach which has been advocated in previous research (Pettigrew et 
al., 2001: 697; Scott, 1995: 148).  Given the difficulties in collecting reliable 
secondary data in emerging economies (Kosova, 2004; Lane et al., 2001), the 17 year 
panel of data utilized in this dissertation is a contribution in itself.   
Finally, the findings of my dissertation provide a few directions to policy 
makers and managers.  I have found that the positive effect of strategic choices on 
firm performance is greater for firms that have a higher ownership by the owners that 
are more pressure resistant, than by the owners that are more pressure sensitive.  
Specifically, I found that a high ownership by the domestic private owners reduces the 
positive value of strategic choices; whereas a high ownership by domestic 
institutional, foreign private and foreign institutional owners enhances the positive 
value of strategic choices.  As I have argued, the negative effects of a higher 
domestic private ownership emanate from the fact that emerging economies do not 
provide enough protection to minority shareholders (Dharwadkar et al., 2000).   
For practioners, these findings suggest the need to have a more distributed 
shareholding, with greater ownership being given to pressure resistant owners such as 
foreign investors and institutional owners.  However, a more distributed ownership 
may not be readily achieved as domestic private owners may not be willing to 
compromise their control in an organization.  An alternative to having a more 
distributed ownership could be to institute better corporate governance practices that 
could restrict domestic private owners from making sub-optimal strategic choices.   
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The finding of this dissertation that there may be a need to monitor the 
domestic private owners, contradicts the view proposed by some scholars that 
emerging economy firms may not face agency problems (Schulze et al., 2001).  Even 
though a high domestic private ownership may reduce the principal-agent agency 
problems, there is still a need to restrict total authority in the hands of the domestic 
private owners, not only to protect the interests of the minority share holders, but also 
to ensure that the decisions firms make are in the best interest of the firms, and not 
just the dominant owners.  For policy makers, these findings suggest the need to 
enact and enforce rules and regulations to protect the rights of minority shareholders 
and to ensure that firms follow good corporate governance practices.  
The non-linear impact of institutional transition also has implications for 
managers and policy makers.  I observed that the incidence of exit as well as 
collaborations increases during the initial years, only to reduce during the later years 
of institutional transition.  This suggests that over time, firms learn to operate in the 
changed environment.  Managers of the domestic firms need to understand that 
institutional transition may not always be bad for their firms, and domestic firms may 
be able to compete and benefit from the institutional transition if the domestic firms 
can hold the ground during the initial years.   
For policy makers, these findings suggest the importance of gradual and slow 
reforms, giving enough time to domestic firms to prepare themselves for the changed 
environment.  Often times, policy makers in emerging economies are pressured by 
the governments of the developed countries and the donor agencies such as the World 
Trade Organization, the World Bank and the IMF, to implement reforms in a fast 
manner.  These multilateral bodies need to understand the unique historical 
conditions of the emerging markets and provide them with enough leverage in terms 
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of time and resources before the emerging economies can be fully integrated with the 
global economy. 
Finally, the finding that exits (as well as collaborations) benefit the group 
affiliated firms, suggest that the business group managers should not shy away from 
selectively exiting some of the businesses, to improve the performance of other firms 
of the group.  Group management is often very conservative in taking the decision to 
quit a businesse due to various emotional and psychological attachments (Sharma & 
Manikutty, 2005).  Group management needs to overcome this inertia to increase the 
competitiveness of the affiliated firms. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This study has a few limitations, which also suggest the directions for extending this 
dissertation.  First, I focused only on the strategic choices to collaborate and to exit 
the market.  While these are important strategic choices for emerging economy firms, 
it would be interesting to extend the theoretical framework presented in this 
dissertation to the study of other strategic choices such as product and geographic 
diversification, growth through acquisitions, and new venture formation, in the case of 
business groups.  The strategic choices of diversification and growth are especially 
pertinent for emerging economy firms that have been growing at a rapid pace since 
the year 2000 (Khanna & Palepu, 2006). 
Second, I examined the role of organizational actors by incorporating a firm’s 
ownership structure.  While owners are important decision agents, owners exercise 
their power through the board of directors.  Thus the top management and the board 
represent another set of organizational actors, who may have a significant role in a 
firm’s strategic adaptation processes.  Future research could examine how the 
composition of the board and the cross-membership across the boards of different 
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firms affects a firm’s strategic choices.  The issue of cross-membership may be 
particularly important for emerging economy firms affiliated to business groups, as 
private owners in business groups often rely on cross-membership across the boards 
of different member firms to exercise control and take coordinated actions.   
Third, the ownership behavior identified for different owner groups in this 
dissertation may be limited to emerging economies with less efficient institutional 
environment and weaker external governance (La Porta et al., 1999, 2000).  
However, my arguments that owners differ and affect a firm’s strategic choices would 
equally apply to developed economies.  One could extend this dissertation by 
examining the behavior of different owners in affecting a firm’s strategic choices in 
environments with stronger external governance and institutions. 
Fourth, the conceptualization of institutional transition as a continuous process 
and its measurement through time trend may not be true in all cases.  Even though 
the experience of institutional transition in India suggests the gradual nature of 
institutional development, future studies could improve on the conceptualization and 
measure of institutional transition, by establishing a closer correspondence between 
institutional changes and the metric to measure these changes. 
Finally, the theoretical framework of this dissertation could be extended to 
examine how the temporal dimension of institutional transition and its various 
sub-components interact with ownership and group affiliation dimensions in 
influencing a firm’s strategic choices and the performance consequences of the 
strategic choices.  Scholars have argued that institutions comprise regulative, 
normative and cognitive pillars (Scott, 1995), which collectively decide “the rules of 
the game in a society” (North, 1990: 3).  The design of this dissertation necessitated 
that I examine institutions and institutional transition in a holistic manner.  However, 
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not all institutions change at the same speed (Kasper, 2002), nor do all institutions 
matter equally for economic activities (Roll & Talbott, 2003).  It would be 
interesting to examine how different institutional dimensions affect a firm’s strategic 
adaptation during different phases of change. 
To conclude, I believe that the theoretical framework and the findings of my 
dissertation will stimulate strategy and organizational scholars, as well as practioners, 
to approach a firm’s strategic adaptation in a disaggregated, and yet in a more 
comprehensive, manner.  Researchers should be motivated to study adaptation as a 
continuous process, comprising several strategic choices that can help a firm align its 
strategies with not only the external environment, but also its internal governance 
structure, systems and design.  Practioners should be motivated to institute sound 
corporate governance practices that could ease a firm’s transition to face turbulent and 
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